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Serbia is wherever there are Serbian graves.
—VUK DRAŠKOVIĆ

CHAPTER THREE

Giving Proper Burial, Reconfiguring Space and Time

I began this book with a number of politically significant bones and corpses, along with some general ideas about how one might think about them. In chapter 2, by contrast, I discussed at length a single set of bones, summarizing the powerful forces that moved Inochentie Micu from his first to his second grave site. I focused on political conflicts around property, national identity, and global religious competition, asking how various religious groups sought to incorporate him into Romanian national genealogies. Although I spoke of ideas about proper burial and reconfiguring space and time (additional themes from chapter 1), they took second place to those other topics.

In the present chapter I alter my strategy once again. I look at some examples from what used to be Yugoslavia, placing more emphasis than before on the politics of national conflict, the creation of new states, and

the concomitant reconfiguring of space and time (that is, on altering the significance of territory and on rewriting history). Whereas in chapter 2 I used concepts to analyze a case, in this one I use disparate case material to illustrate concepts, gradually moving away from the cases toward a more abstract discussion of dead-body politics and reconfiguring time. My dead bodies here are, unlike Inochentie Micu, largely nameless; their work in cosmic reordering is mediated by ideas about kinship and ancestor worship, mortuary practices, and space and time. Finally, the two chapters differ in their form: in contrast with chapter 2, which was organized loosely around a chronology (Inochentie's pre- and postmortem lives) combined with a spatial move from local upward to global and back again, this chapter works more like a loom, interweaving its themes by repetition and shifts of emphasis, and by ranging back and forth among horizontally equivalent sites. I hope the effect of this difference will contribute to my message about contrasting organizations of space and time.

I choose post-Yugoslavia because there is no better instance for seeing the complexity of the interlinked themes I want to explore. That complexity, however, makes the case difficult both to describe and to generalize from. Therefore, I will spell out more fully than I did for Inochentie Micu what makes post-Yugoslav dead-body politics unique (underscoring my point that there is no single rule for how to analyze these phenomena).[1] I use the term "Yugoslavia" to refer only to the entity that existed before the secession of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, not to the Serbian state that subsequently usurped that name; to speak collectively about the new states there, I use "post-Yugoslav." A brief reminder: Yugoslavia was a federation consisting of republics—Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and so forth—some of which became separate states and all of which had different ethnonational groups intermingled on their territories.

The obvious difference between Yugoslavia and most other cases in the region is that not only did a hegemonic Party collapse, but so did the entire state, through warfare aimed at creating several new successor states.[2] That process involved, first, territorial revisions aimed at reducing each republic's multiethnicity and, second, even more thoroughgoing revisions of history than occurred in other places. The revisions not only decommunized history (the main tendency elsewhere) but also created specifically

national histories suited to consolidating new nation-states. In speaking of post-Yugoslav nation-state creation, I should emphasize, I do not see it (unlike much popular writing) as "resuscitating" old enmities that communism had "suppressed." Rather, post-1989 nationalism was the product of Yugoslavia's own organization, which *reinforced* national identities by making them the basis for the federal republics.[3] Already in the 1970s problems were arising from this solution, and they worsened after Tito's death in 1980.

Another thing specific to the post-Yugoslav cases is what we might call a very intense burial regime. First, even before the breakup, one had to pay rent on grave sites of kin buried in cemeteries; the fee went to the Yugoslav state, and if it wasn't paid, the burial site would be leased to someone else (doubtless with the contents removed). Pamela Ballinger has described the disruptive effects of this practice for Italians exiled from Istria by the formation of communist Yugoslavia in 1945.[4] The practice has been retained, with the successor states now getting the fees. Second, people hold strong ideas about proper burial and about continuing relations with dead kin; frequent visits to tombs are common; and violence against enemy graves has a history at least as old as World War II. I will expand upon this point below.

Also specific to the post-Yugoslav cases is a distinctive patterning in how dead bodies enter politics: the *nameless* dead have been of equal if not greater importance, compared with the famous heroes common to my other examples. In consequence, I will devote most of this chapter to them, leaving the famous aside. Post-Yugoslavs, too, have reburied some famous dead,[5] such as Prince Lazar (mentioned in the introduction), but in addition they have reburied with much ceremony thousands of plain citizens found scattered in various unmarked burial sites—persons whose names are known only to their families, friends, and neighbors. There are two kinds of post-Yugoslav nameless dead: those from World War II and those from the present fighting. Rediscoveries of World War II dead helped to ignite warfare in 1991, which yielded still other bodies in mass graves, sources of recrimination that fueled the wars further.[6]

These specificities of the post-Yugoslav cases—new nation-state formation, strong feelings about relations between dead and living, and the role of nameless dead—give a unique coloring to the place of these dead bodies in

reordering meaningful worlds, and particularly to their reconfiguring space and time. Concerning space, burial and reburial are a matter of *earth*, of digging into the very dust of the spaces and territories in which the bodies lie. To establish new successor nation-states means to mark territories as "ours" by discovering "our sons" in mass graves and giving them proper burial in "our soil," thus consecrating the respective space as "ours." Owing to the interspersal of ethnic groups within post-Yugoslavia, however, what are now "our" territories with "our" dead also contain dead who are "alien." Thus fixing and consecrating the boundaries of "our" soil has been a nasty, bloody process. That process is part of what I call reshaping or reconfiguring space. Vuk Drašković, Serbian nationalist and leader of the opposition to dictator Slobodan Milošević, put it succinctly: "Serbia is wherever there are Serbian graves."[7]

Post-Yugoslav corpses have also aided in reshaping time. The six-hundred-year-old bones of Prince Lazar, borne from monastery to monastery throughout all the areas containing Serbs, not only established the territorial claims of a new Serbian state. They also compressed time, as if his death in 1389 had occurred just a few days ago. In this way the new Serbia was rejoined with its days of glory as the first medieval state formed in Southeastern Europe, prior to the Ottoman conquest. Reburying Vlatko Maček in Zagreb reconnected the new Croatia with precommunist (1930s) politics, as if the communist period had not existed. The same excising takes place by reburying the dead of World War II precisely as new dead are being produced in their name. To prepare the way for a lengthier treatment of how Yugoslav bodies reconfigure space and time, I will briefly show their role in how the wars began.

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, LAND OF GRAVES

If, in chapter two, Transylvania was the epicenter of tectonic shifts in relations among Catholics, Orthodox, and Protestants, the space that was Yugoslavia occupies the same position for *multiple* intersections: of Eastern and Western Christianity with Islam, of "East" and "West" more broadly, of "communism" and "capitalism," communism and fascism. It is also the land of political corpses without number, lying in limestone

caves, mass graves, and other sites all across the landscape. As shown in the work of anthropologists Pamela Ballinger, Bette Denich, and Robert Hayden, the skeletal inhabitants of limestone caves were the first troops mobilized in the Yugoslav wars.[8] They were mobilized for a campaign to revise recent history.

Briefly, the subject being revised was multiple massacres committed by numerous groups during the latter part of World War II. The most important perpetrators were Croatian fascists—known as the Ustaša—against Serbs and the communist underground ("partisans"); partisans against fascists and others in their way; and Serbian royalists (Četniks) against partisans, Muslims, and some Croats.[9] Mass slaughter occurred on all sides, the victims being thrown into caves or buried in shallow mass graves or simply left to rot. Here is a short description concerning one specific episode, from Yugoslav Communist Party leader Milovan Djilas in his memoir *Wartime*:

> The number exceed[ed] twenty thousand. . . . A year or two later there was grumbling in the Slovene Central Committee that they had trouble with the peasants from those areas, because underground rivers were casting up bodies. They also said that piles of corpses were heaving up as they rotted in shallow mass graves, so that the very earth seemed to breathe.[10]

At the war's end and with the installation of Tito's regime, all specific mention of these massacres was suppressed: they could be spoken of only in the abstract categories "victims of fascism" and "domestic traitors."[11] Monuments were raised to the abstract "victims of fascism," but no one was to name or to see to the proper burial of their own particular dead. Most especially, there was no mention at all (except quietly, within families) of the murders carried out by communist partisans. The silencing of this grim subject meant that none of the murders could be avenged (very important, in this area), and so neither the souls of these dead nor the minds of those close to them could rest in peace.

As the regime began to weaken in the late 1980s, however, bit by bit those people who knew where their dead lay began opening graves and giving the victims proper burials. Significantly, and unlike most reburi-

als of the famous, these involved numerous people in local communities, drawn directly into the process of handling the dead. In addition, they involved even larger numbers indirectly, as some of the exhumations and reburials were filmed and shown on television. Films widely viewed in Serbia, for instance, showed people digging out bones from the caves, placing the bones in plastic bags, and handing the bags up into the light. The bags were then passed down long lines of villagers, each of whom held them (see plate 19), making direct contact with long-dead relatives and friends; the camera recorded their deep emotions for a national audience.

Bette Denich shows how nationalist politicians, taking stock of these events, used them to feed a growing nationalist frenzy.[12] Attention centered on the question of culpability, as different groups claimed various dead as "ours," massacred by "communists" or "Serbs" or "Ustaša." Seeking political support, nationalist politicians raised questions as to how many had been massacred on each side and who was most at fault. Finding the skeletons of those whom communist partisans had killed, for instance, was instrumental in building the anticommunist sentiment that assured the

19 Exhumation of skeletons of Serbian dead from limestone caves in Croatia, 1991 (shown on Serbian television). The bag in the foreground contains bones.

victory of Franjo Tudjman's nationalist party in the first Croatian elections. Initially the arguments aimed to rewrite the history of relations between the political categories "fascists" and "communists," both of whom had existed all over Yugoslavia's territory. These political terms gradually gave way, however, to the more territorially based *ethnic* terms—"Serb," "Croat," "Slovene," and "Muslim"—as Pamela Ballinger demonstrates for similar conflicts between Slovenes and Italians in the same period.[13] All sides strove to transfigure anonymous skeletons into their own martyrs. Those skeletons then served in the historical revisionism by which new nationalist histories emerged for newly emerging states.

These powerful political symbols entered deeply into public awareness through immense funerals (often televised) for the bones removed from caves. Hayden reports, for example, that in August 1991 there was an immense public funeral in Belgrade for " 'three thousand [Serb] victims of the Ustaša genocide, whose bones were recently removed from ten caves in Herzegovina'" following nine months of exhumations (this was according to Radio Belgrade). "The line of coffins stretched for one and a half kilometers; the liturgy was sung by the patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church," with speeches from leading nationalist intellectuals and politicians. A few months later came an exhibition of documentary films about the genocide, seemingly designed "both to demonize Croats as a 'genocidal people' and to stir the passions of Serbs as having been among the great victims of the twentieth century."[14] Such mass events represented the state's having "collectivized" and nationalized the dead bodies hitherto mourned by families as their individual dead.[15] They were part of forming new Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian nation-states.

So, in a different way, were the smaller, more localized burials that took place in communities all over the new states' territories (see plate 20.[16]). For this task, "nameless" bodies were particularly effective. Because the wartime massacres were so spatially widespread, as has been the fighting during the 1990s, there are literally thousands of possible sites at which dead people might be found and reinterred.[17] In this context, graves laid out a geography of territorial claims and of personal commitment to those claims, for in these places "our" dead were buried. Retrieving and reburying these nameless bones marked the territory

20 Local reburial of people killed in warfare during 1993, hastily buried by their killers, and reburied now with proper rituals. (*Source*: Photo Documentation Archive of *Vreme*, Belgrade)

claimed for a Greater Serbia, one that found its dead in the soil of most of the other republics. We might say that these corpses assisted in reconfiguring space by etching new international borders into it with their newly dug graves.[18]

Led by their vanguards of bones, then, armies of Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, and Muslims proceeded to dismember Yugoslavia, a protracted and potentially endless process in which scarcely does a fragile peace emerge in one area (Bosnia) than conflict erupts in another (Kosovo, Macedonia). In each place, bodies hastily buried by their killers are later dug up and given proper burial. Thus the concern with corpses continues, as the fighting produces ever more graves. Their occupants become grounds for mutual recrimination, objects of deep mourning and of efforts at retrieval for proper burial, and means of a politics of blame, guilt, and accountability. This brief summary condenses all my principal themes for the discussion that follows: the politics of nation-state formation; corpses, space, and territory; grief and proper burial; vengeance and accountability; and revisions of history. All of these are central to reordering postsocialism's worlds of meaning.

RECONFIGURING SPACE

The Politics of Territory

Not surprisingly, nationalist politics goes a long way toward explaining the place of dead bodies in the wars of Yugoslav succession. Aside from manipulations of the dead that spurred nationalist electoral victories, secession, and war, there was the problem of drawing territorial boundaries around the new states. The problem was intractable, given the high intermixture of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims (particularly in Bosnia). According to Susan Woodward, the European Union at first insisted that the borders of Yugoslavia's several republics become the new international borders; the Serbs refused to accept this solution, however, for it would leave about 30 percent of Serbs outside the borders of a new Serbia.[19] From this impasse emerged "ethnic cleansing." It was a response to the European Union's declaring that the border question should be decided by referendum: thus all sides strove to chase "others" off land they hoped to make permanently "theirs." The problem was particularly severe for Serbs. Not only were they more numerous than others outside the borders of their former republic; in Bosnia, they made up nearly three-fourths of the farmers and only a third of the total population. This made land an issue not just of state-making and international diplomacy but also of basic livelihood, and it ruled out any possibility of setting the borders strictly according to population percentages.[20]

The border question became even more unmanageable when combined with some of the matters I raised in chapter 2, concerning global religious realignment and the revitalization of faith. Pope John Paul II's ecumenism extended not only to the patriarch of Constantinople but also to Islam. As became clear at the Cairo conference on population (1996), the pope saw in Islam his best ally on the social issues so important to him. Because in post-Yugoslavia differences of nationality coincide overall with religious difference—Croats are mostly Catholic; Serbs, Orthodox; and many (other[21]) Bosnians, Muslim—the religious competition I discussed in chapter 2 entered into these conflicts, with Orthodox Serbs seeking protection from the Russian patriarch against the pope's Catholic Croats and their Muslim allies.[22] The politics of dead bodies reflects this coincidence of religions with nation-state creation, precisely because the churches

hold the ultimate authority with respect to death and burial. Thus religion connects with nation-state borders via (among other things) practices around death. But how can we understand more fully *why* there is this close link between burials and borders? I suggest we think about kinship.

Ancestors, Soil, and Nations

In his classic work *The Ancient City*, Fustel de Coulanges examines Roman, Greek, and other burial practices so as to demonstrate an indissoluble link between localized kinship groups and the land they live on; the link is ancestor worship. Ancestors were buried in the soil around the dwelling; their presence consecrated that soil, and continuous rituals connecting them with their heirs created a single community consisting of the dead, their heirs, and the soil they shared. (Twentieth-century ethnography from Transylvania and Hungary reports additionally that the placenta of a newborn was often buried under the house.[23]) The dead were thought to *live* underground[24] and to require frequent nourishing with food and prayers; in return they gave their descendants protection. A person's death thereby brought him or her into a new social relationship with the living, marked by reciprocal offerings and aid (points I touched on in chapter 1). Comparative ethnography, including that from Transylvania, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and farther east, is full of similar conceptions. It would be easier to dismiss them as marginal if they did not also appear in contemporary ethnography from Western Europe.[25]

I mention these practices not to suggest that nothing has changed since the Romans but to startle readers into thinking differently about nation-states and territory.[26] Such practices remain culturally available for use in new times even if they cease to be widely observed. Indeed, politicians who claim to represent a different, more authentic political order than the one they have overthrown often call for resuming "traditions" like these. Given the close connection between dead people and *soil*, it would be surprising if land-hungry post-Yugoslavs did *not* find such "traditional" practices compelling. I take up this matter below.

To fill out Fustel's argument, I return to the points I made in chapter 1 concerning nationalism as a kind of ancestor worship.[27] There I suggested that nationalisms are forms of ancestor cult, writ large enough to encom-

pass localized kin-group affiliations and to incorporate into the notions of "ancestors," "brothers," and "heirs" people with whom our immediate blood ties are nil. On this reading, to rebury a dead person is not simply to reassess his place in history;[28] it is to revise national genealogies, inserting the person as an ancestor more centrally into the lineage of honored forebears. Thus ideas about kinship are highly relevant to modern-day politics. This is especially true of post-Yugoslavia, where kinship structures are highly salient in social life and intergroup relations.[29] (In saying this, I do not mean to call Yugoslavia a "tribal" or "primitive" place, *pace* widespread media commentary to that effect, but to say only that the process of state-building in this region continually shored up the existence of supranuclear family groupings. What state-building accomplished was largely to supplement an emphasis on lineal ancestry with that of blood brotherhood, as a metaphor for nationhood.[30])

To illustrate political use of this nationalism-kinship connection, I quote from the inflammatory 1987 speech that catapulted Slobodan Milošević straight into the leadership of Serbia. Visiting Kosovo province[31] to attend to the complaints of Serbs who reside among Albanians there, he baptized a new Serb nationalist politics with these words, aimed at convincing the dissatisfied Serbs to remain in Kosovo rather than leave:

> You should stay here. This is your land. These are your houses. Your memories. You shouldn't abandon your land. It was never part of the Serbian character to give up in the face of obstacles. You should stay here for the sake of your ancestors and descendants. Otherwise your ancestors would be defiled and descendants disappointed. But I don't suggest that you should stay, endure, and tolerate a situation you're not satisfied with. On the contrary, you should change it.[32]

Note that leaving the land would mean *defiling* the ancestors, and recall those Bosnian Serbs who took their ancestors *with* them. The mass reaction to this speech showed Milošević that he had hit upon a perfect political formula: articulating Serb national sentiment through references to *kinship rooted in particular soils*.

The connection among kinship, burial, nationalism, and soil is a very potent and widespread one. We find it illustrated in fiction: for example,

Günter Grass's novel *The Call of the Toad* shows people trying to create a Polish-German reconciliation by allowing Germans expelled from Gdansk in 1945 to be (re)buried there; Polish nationalists scuttle the plan, protesting that the German corpses would recolonize Polish soil.[33] Second, and very appropriately, the same cluster of themes—proper and improper burial, mobile dead, descent groups, and soils that have a national quality—are at the heart of Bram Stoker's famous *Dracula*. In his rendition, Dracula must go to London *in his own soil*, shipped in numerous coffins.[34] In England he sets about creating new lineages of offspring by sucking English blood, thereby annexing English territory and endangering England's integrity as a nation, for the new vampirelings will sleep by day in *their* own (English) soil.[35] Given that the best way to kill a vampire is to drive a stake through its heart and (a crucial detail) *into the earth beneath*, so as to hold it securely in its grave,[36] perhaps here is a creative inversion of the idea that proper burial, of the kind that permits an orderly universe and fruitful relations with kin and ancestors, must occur in *one's own (national?) soil*.

The kinship-soil-nationalism connection is powerful not just fictionally but also politically. Examples include the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Moscow, which is surrounded by six marble blocks containing sacred earth from each of six "hero cities"; this earth was drenched with the blood of brave soldiers in World War II.[37] The same principle appears in the 1894 funeral of Hungary's 1848 revolutionary hero, Lajos Kossuth. According to Martha Lampland, plans for it included bringing lumps of soil to Budapest from every site where the blood of Hungarian patriots had been shed in 1848, and mixing these lumps with the soil from Kossuth's grave. The plan was later expanded to include soil from other important national sites as well.[38]

Connections of this kind suggest ways of assigning new values to space (reconfiguring it), the larger point with which I opened this section. If we look at relations between ancestors and the idea of proper burial, I believe we grasp the place of dead-body politics in nation-state formation even more fully.

ANCESTORS AND PROPER BURIAL

For those who take ancestors seriously (and I think there is more of this around than one might imagine), the politics of reburial engages the abid-

ing sociality of relations between living and dead. As I suggested in chapter 1, these relations include not just mourning loved ones but also fearing them, as sources of possible harm; one must therefore closely observe the myriad rules and requirements of proper burial, for they affect the relations of both living and dead to the world that all inhabit.[39] Because my ethnographic information about Yugoslav burial practices is not extensive, I must be modest in my claims for the points I am about to make, which are drawn not only from post-Yugoslavia but also from Transylvania, Hungary, and Ukraine, concerning beliefs thought to be more general to this region.[40]

As in those other places, proper care of the dead is a matter of great concern in the former Yugoslavia.[41] Communist Milovan Djilas even explains in these terms Montenegrin peasants' World War II support of the Četniks against the communist partisans they had favored at first. The communists, says Djilas, mistreated dead bodies, hurling them into ravines ("less for convenience than to avoid the funeral processions and the inconsolable and fearless mourners"); the Četniks, by contrast, treated the dead with respect, retrieving corpses from the ravines and giving them solemn burial.[42] Post-Yugoslavs (most especially Serbs) hold strong ideas about proper burial and about continuing relations with dead kin. Weekly visits to tombs and frequent commemorations are the norm. In chapter 1 I observed that mortuary hospitality had intensified in Serbia beginning in the 1970s, as villagers built entire houses on the graves of their kin within which to hold ongoing relations of visiting and feasting. The same principle of concern for the dead is apparent also in its obverse: violence against enemy graves. This practice has a history at least as old as World War II, as Pamela Ballinger found in her research on the flight of Italians from territory given over to Yugoslavia: the new Slovene masters made a point of defacing Italian tombstones, writing Slavic names over the Italian ones and removing the corpses.[43] Such practices were echoed in the wars of the 1990s, as Serbs machine-gunned the contents of Croat graves.[44]

I would like to make two points about proper burial and post-Yugoslav politics. The first has to do with proper burial and community-making, the second with burial and land claims. For both, my argument is that ideas central to cosmic reordering—such as the idea that cosmic order comes

from right relations of kin, including proper interment—can work not just cognitively but also politically. Their political effects permit us to think about these "traditional" ideas without presupposing that they have unbroken continuity from past times.

Burials and reburials serve both to create and to reorder community. They do so in part simply by bringing live people together to eat, drink, gossip, and exchange gifts and information, and in part by setting up exchanges (usually of food and objects) with the dead, whom they thereby bring as ancestors into a single community with them. Beyond these effects, as Robert Hertz argued, (re)burials reaffirm the political community of those who orient to them.[45] I suggest that in the post-Yugoslav context they serve not just to *reaffirm* community but also to *narrow* and *bound* it.[46] A (re)burial creates an audience of "mourners," all of whom think they have some relation to the dead person. The question is, *Which* aggregate of people is brought together (directly or indirectly) for this event? Whom does the gathering of mourners leave out who might have been present a year or two ago? For political reburials, this becomes, Who is to be included in or excluded from the new national society that is being made? Thus post-Yugoslav reburials create new, narrower, national communities, as the group of participants has come to be monoethnic. Whereas Bosnia's Muslims used to go to the burials of their Serb or Croat covillagers and vice versa, for instance, that is no longer possible.[47] Burials bring people together, reminding them of the reason for their collective presence—relatedness—but that relatedness has now become ethnically exclusive.

Hertz saw a homology between the communities of living and dead. Expanding upon his logic, I suggest that reorganizing relations with the dead can be a way of reordering live human communities. That is, precisely because the human community includes both living and dead, any manipulation of the dead automatically affects relations with and among the living. This is what post-Yugoslav corpse politics does. Acknowledging certain people as ancestors and kin, and gathering a specific living public to rectify relations with the community of the dead through proper burial, reorganize relations among the living. I prefigured this argument in chapter 2, where I observed that Inochentie Micu's reburial created a community of chiefly *Greek Catholic* mourners, rather than the much larger community (includ-

ing Orthodox) that might have been created by commemorating him strictly as a *national* hero. Similarly with Hungarian Imre Nagy, of chapter 1: because Communist Party participation in his reburial was expressly limited, the event created a much larger community—all Hungarians who had suffered under the previous regime—and inscribed Nagy in the very long list of nationalist freedom fighters. Thus concerning the mass burial service in Belgrade in 1991 mentioned above, with a procession of coffins a kilometer and a half long, I can now observe that the mourners were, emphatically, Serbs burying Serbs as their national kin. In brief, I suggest that post-socialist reburials involve reconfiguring human communities according to new standards of inclusion and exclusion.

My second point concerns proper burial and land claims, which bring us back to the theme of reconfiguring space. In discussing the links among ancestors, soil, and nations, I noted that such conceptions make kinsmen, descendants, territory, and specific burial sites inseparable from each other. Attachment to the burial sites of kin poses major problems for redrawing nation-state borders, however, for its obvious corollary is that people should not move from the places where their kin are buried. If they do, then they lose their social bearings—unless they take their kin along or maintain contact with them in other ways.

Consider in this light some fragmentary evidence from Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia concerning present-day attachment to kin and the soil of their burial.[48] In February 1996, following the Dayton accords, five Sarajevo suburbs were to be transferred from the control of Serbs to that of the Muslims they had expelled during the fighting. NATO and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) botched the job, Muslim gangs began looting and murdering Serbs, and the Serbs decided to leave. Before departing, they dug up the graves of their kin (these Serbs had been living there for generations) and took the contents with them.[49] As the head grave digger in one cemetery told a reporter, "People say they cannot live without being able to come to the grave every Sunday to light a candle and put down flowers."[50] This transport occasioned great expense, since huge fees were levied for transferring bodies "across state lines." Imposing such "customs duty" clearly demarcated "our" buriable soil from "theirs" (offering the perfect contrast with the duty-free trip of Frederick the Great from West to East Germany, mentioned in the introduction).

Muslims and Croats had the same concern but were prepared to travel for it, rather than take ancestral bones along with them. A main demand of Muslims following the Dayton accords was that they be allowed to return home so they could tend the graves of their dead. Likewise, in ongoing UN-mediated talks about territories that Croats were being asked to cede, a critical issue was the demand of Croats displaced from those territories to be able to cross the new border to visit their dead whenever they wished, most particularly on All Souls' Day.

I am not going to challenge whether those who use this idiom of proper burial are indeed attached to ancestral graves; I assume that many of them are. It is worth noting, nevertheless, that the idiom buttresses certain kinds of land claims. The same could be said of Istrian exiles' self-construction as deeply wronged by having had to leave their dead in Istria, improperly mourned.[51] Perhaps Muslims and Croats, in holding out for visits to tend their kinsmen's graves, are simply craftier than Serbs, who, in taking their dead along, leave no grounds for claiming access to the former burial place. In other words, Muslims and Croats may be acting from strategic calculation rather than from mortuary custom: they want an excuse to go back. Whether or not their sentiments are genuine or calculated is, however, unimportant for my purposes. What counts is that their calculations use an idiom—in fact a very old one—linking people with the geographical emplacement of their dead, and this idiom is both culturally and politically powerful.

I consider these examples additional support for my view that grave sites, ancestors, and nation-state formation are interconnected. Exhuming and reburying (or at least going to visit) the bodies of kin enriches the meanings both of the human communities that assemble there and of the soil itself.[52] These actions thereby reconfigure space and, in at least two ways, give it new significances apt for creating new nation-states. First, they saturate countless spaces with powerful emotion that blends the personal grief of kin with rage against the enemy, nationally conceived.[53] Second, they lay out a geography of territorial claims pertinent to drawing new international borders. Thus burying or reburying ancestors and kin sacralizes and nationalizes spaces as "ours," binding people to their national territories in an orderly universe.

RECONFIGURING TIME

Accountability and the Past: Rewriting History

I suggested above that reburials narrow and bound the community of mourners, excluding persons no longer welcome in the national kin group of the new nation-state. These effects come not just from who participates in which reburials but also from controversies over *culpability* and *accountability*: Who is responsible for these deaths, and how should the guilty be brought to justice? Part of a seemingly worldwide phenomenon of seeking retribution and holding people accountable for past wrongs (think of Argentina, Guatemala, and, in a quite different way, South Africa),[54] these widespread processes aim at social and political reconciliation—at "settling accounts," in Borneman's words.[55] As I observed in chapter 1, postsocialist blaming and retribution-seeking are part of reordering morality, making the new order a moral one in contrast with the old (for at least some people). Pursuing accountability and justice around dead bodies in these cases also serves to reconfigure time by rewriting history. I will begin illustrating this point with post-Yugoslav examples and will then broaden my discussion into a more general treatment of reconfiguring time.

In post-Yugoslavia, dead bodies have been a principal means of blaming and demanding accountability. It was the discovery of mass burials in caves that began Croat-Serb contests over who was to blame for which set of massacres. Presidents Tudjman and Milošević, by taking up the matter on behalf of the presumed Croat and Serb victims, sought to augment the moral authority of their respective governments. The process involved much more, however, than establishing blame: it involved creating certain kinds of social actors. To determine accountability necessarily entails identifying the guilty and the victims. *Which* kind of social being can be effectively blamed and held accountable? The state? The former regime? An ethnic or national group? Single individuals? One means for settling accounts has been lustration laws, such as those in the Czech Republic and Poland, which hold the prior regime collectively responsible but single out individuals for punishment.[56] Other governments, such as Romania's and Bulgaria's, resisted making such laws, reasoning that because so many people were complicit, *none* would be blameless, and to punish a former regime is impossible.

What distinguishes these cases from the post-Yugoslav ones is that whereas in the former the guilty collective actor is a political organization—the Communist Party—in the latter the culpable collective actors are not political entities but ethnonational ones. Initial discoveries of Serb and Croat mass graves presented their contents as the victims of "Ustaša," "communists," and "Četniks"; soon, however, the perpetrators changed to "Croats" and "Serbs." Thus responsibility for the previous crimes of political organizations slid onto the shoulders of ethnonational groups. Pamela Ballinger shows precisely this process in accountability demands over the mass graves of Slovenes and Italians in the Julian March.[57] Because reciprocal accusations of genocide were flung at *groups*, not individuals, and responsibility was attributed to collective actors, retribution took the form of collective punishment through new massacres. There is a stark contrast between these ideas of accountability and those pursued by the Hague War Crimes Tribunal, whose goal is to identify culpable *individuals* and try them with evidence from specific individual victims.[58]

These questions of moral responsibility are questions not merely of recompense in the present, however, but also of revising the past. Dead-body politics involving accountability and justice connects with my earlier observations about ancestors, reburials, and national community-making, through the theme of rewriting history. Commentators who have written on this topic generally agree that the politics of corpses is about reorienting people's relations to the past.[59] Who are our true ancestors? Who has been unjustly shunted aside, and who has usurped their place in our lineal self-definition?—that is, about what set of people will our national history be rewritten? (Ambulant statues and corpses figure prominently in these matters.) Which ancestors will our history acknowledge, which forget? Some of this work of rewriting (or of creating histories for new nation-states) may occur through the bones of the nameless, and some through famous heroes whose place in genealogies a reburial rediscovers.

Throughout the postsocialist world there has been a veritable orgy of historical revisionism, of writing the communist period out of the past; corpse politics is central to it.[60] We make better sense of that process if we see it as a reaction to the equally thoroughgoing historical revisionism attempted by the various communist parties during their rule. The multiple ways in which they revised histories included all the usual practices:

bringing into history books previously unremarked persons or events that might be seen to prefigure the communist social transformation (a 1933 workers' strike, an early socialist thinker), or recasting the images of persons and events already in the textbooks; suppressing names and dates whose mention might induce inappropriate associations, thus turning them into nonpersons and nonevents; airbrushing out of photographs anyone who fell from favor;[61] and placing the regime's many nameless victims in unmarked graves. Such practices were to fortify Communist Party rule. Rév writes: "As long as the graves remained unmarked, the victims unnamed, the prosecutors could suppose that they ruled the company of the hanged."[62]

Against this backdrop, the orgy of historical revisionism since 1989 is seen as a rectification of communist censorship and lies. The large majority of repatriations and reburials since 1989 have been of people who, during the communist period, fled or were exiled from their home countries and could not be or did not want to be buried there (such as Hungary's Bartók and Poland's Sikorsky); people whom the communists had persecuted or killed (such as László Rajk and Imre Nagy, in Hungary; Rudolf Slánský, in Czechoslovakia; or the family of the tsar, in Russia); people whose histories the communists had suppressed (such as the nameless dead in Ukrainian forests or Yugoslav caves, and the famous men of the fascist period); and so on. The people whom the communists airbrushed out are particularly apt symbols for deleting the communist era itself from the new histories, thus signifying its death. Reburials accomplish this by revisiting the bodies of persons the communists mistreated, resurrecting them, and placing them in a new light.[63]

But the communist practices pose difficulties for subsequent revisions: If everyone already knows that history can be manipulated, then how can the authorities now produce a truth effect?[64] Dead bodies are particularly helpful in resolving this problem. Manipulating physical remains is a visual and visceral experience that seems to offer true access to the past. I suggested earlier that corpses are effective symbols because they are protean while being concrete; here it is their *concreteness* that I wish to emphasize. If one wants to revise the past in the age of virtual reality, when people can indeed be airbrushed out of or technologically inserted into history, it is comforting to have actual bones in hand. (This does not

guarantee, of course, that those bones "really belong" to the dead person in question.[65])

Perhaps this point illuminates a marvelous episode reported by journalist Tim Judah, when Tito "came back" for two days in 1994. As a joke, Belgrade's radio station B-92 hired an actor, dressed him up as Tito, and followed him around to record people's reactions to him. Astonishingly, people reacted as if it were the real Tito, come back to life. They would stop to blame him for things he had done wrong, accuse him of being pro-American, complain about present problems and his role in producing them, or express their nostalgia for the days when he ruled Yugoslavia. The deputy director of B-92 observed of the prank, "It shows that the common people have lost touch with reality. Everything you tell them through the media they absorb like a sponge. So you have a situation where Tito is resurrected and people believe that."[66] I think, rather, that amid all the confusion, lies, and illusions that were permeating daily life in Belgrade, Tito's seemingly palpable body created a truth effect stronger than widespread common knowledge of his death. (Even the *New York Times* appears to recognize Tito's transcendent properties: on December 2, 1997, it carried a headline, "Though Still Dead, Tito Can Be Reached on Line."[67])

These observations raise once again the matter of dead bodies and sentiment. The emotional force of reburials that arouse sentiments related to death is undoubtable in the case of reburials of our own beloved, dead within memory—that is, in cases like Yugoslavia—whose departure leaves us feeling amputated long after the fact, for our life with those immediate dead has formed us as persons. But, as I suggested for Inochentie Micu, even public reburials of famous people who were not our friends and kin awaken complex emotions, wherever genealogies have been so successfully integrated into national imagery that people view the famous dead as in some sense also "ours." Relevant here are my earlier remarks about East European national ideologies and victimization, closely tied to questions of blame and accountability. Like saints, ancestors engage deep feeling when their biographies can be cast in that most common of all nationalist tropes: suffering. The revival of religion has intensified this imagery. When it can be said of a dead person that, like Christ, he suffered—for the faith, for the nation, for the cause—then that gives his corpse both sanctity and a basis for empathic identification. The reason is not just that many people in Eastern Europe are currently suffering, but that national ideologies there

have so successfully crafted an identification between personal suffering and the suffering of one's nation.

What am I claiming in the above discussion? I have pointed to a number of themes (proper burial, reconfiguring time and space, culpability, and so on) concerning the use of dead bodies in revising history. Sometimes these themes rest on a substrate of popular belief, sometimes they are manipulated for political effect. Touching as they do on matters of accountability, justice, personal grief, victimization, and suffering, dead bodies as vehicles of historical revision are freighted with strong emotion. To the extent that they have been politically effective, one reason is the associations they evoke for people whose feelings of disorientation make them receptive to arguments, stories, and symbols that seem to give them a compass. In post-Yugoslavia the terrible displacements of persons, the tortures and murders, the devastating inflation, and so on surely indicate that the cosmos is out of joint.[68] Among the things people know of that produce such misery are the vengeful souls of the improperly buried and of ancestral spirits inadequately tended. Without claiming that this interpretation "explains" what is happening in Yugoslavia, I believe these ideas deepen our comprehension of its dead-body politics by exploring matters of affect. (Their relevance to other cases remains, of course, an open question.[69])

Time Compression and the Shapes of History

And so reburials revise the past by returning names to the nameless and perhaps endowing these revisions with feeling. Such outcomes are common to dead-body politics everywhere. I believe, however, that in the postsocialist world there is more to it than that. History is not simply being rewritten with new/old characters and a different plot line—for instance, a plot that replaces the communist radiant future with a narrative of tyranny overthrown and resistance triumphant. Rather, the very notions of time that underlie history are thrown open to question. By this I mean that several different things are potentially altered: the *understanding of temporal process* that enables people to excise the socialist period in their revisions of history; the *shapes of history* (often unconscious) in terms of which people act; and the *conception of time's passage* implicit in their actions. Changes in any of these amount to "reconfiguring time."

Writing of the Nagy reburial, István Rév helps us to discern the first of these three possibilities while also tying it to the topics of accountability and justice:

> Retroactive political justice brings the past closer to the present. The embarrassing times can thus be erased by turning them into *Jetztzeit*. By changing the length of eclipsed time, history is shortened. The replay of the sins brings certain episodes of the past nearer, and can help in compressing time. By bringing back and reburying the repressed, the time between the [first] burial and the final funeral is put into brackets. A new chronology is created by the immediatization of the remote.[70]

This observation is crucial, for it shows that the reburial did not just reevaluate the events of 1956 but reconfigured time itself. Rév points to two important elements of Imre Nagy's reburial in Heroes' Square: on the right side of the square was the Yugoslav embassy, in which Nagy had sought asylum when Soviet troops entered Budapest in November 1956; meanwhile, loudspeakers broadcast Nagy's last words to his executioners, *in his own voice*. It was as if this huge commemoration were following his execution, which had just happened. The intervening thirty-odd years had simply vanished.

Many postsocialist historical revisions have proceeded in exactly this way, although usually with reference to the mid-1940s rather than Nagy's 1956: they join the precommunist period directly to the 1990s. This practice reveals an interesting conception of time, in which time is not fixed and irreversible. One can pick up the time line, snip out and discard the communist piece of it that one no longer wishes to acknowledge, paste the severed ends together, and hey presto! one has a new historical time line. One has not accepted and incorporated the recent past, one has simply excised it. Excising the communist period often occurs by treating it as an aberration; throughout the former socialist bloc one hears repeatedly that what everyone wants now is to repossess a "normal" past and weave it into "normal" presents and futures.[71] This conception is evident in every rehabilitation of a cultural or political personage from World War II, in every attempt to extirpate "communism" from people's lives and to demand compensation for the wrongs it wrought, and in every call for a *restitutio*

in integrum of the status quo ante (a primary means being the return of properties to those who had them before).

Facilitating excision of the communist period is the shallowness of Bolshevism's own historical roots. It dated itself largely from the mid-nineteenth century (the writings of Marx and Engels), emphasizing its own novelty and its supersession of local histories heretofore, and its end in a radically different future. It strove to suppress Christian temporalities and replace them with festivals and rhythms of its own.[72] Having a short time line also means having a shallow genealogy: Bolshevism's founding ancestors lie only four generations back, a flash in the pan compared with the minimum of seven generations any male Serb could recount to ethnographer Eugene Hammel in the 1960s.[73] Indeed, the communist time line, with its emphasis on breaking from the past toward a radically different future, militates against having many ancestors. The collapse of Communist Party rule opens the door to those other temporalities of Christianity and of kinship affiliation—both of which yield much broader and deeper pasts than anything the communists could muster.[74] Using these deeper temporalities, postsocialist politicians can present themselves (sometimes by manipulating dead bodies) as heirs to a precommunist past.

Thus the present rewriting of history is about far more than making a new story: what is at stake is the very *shape* of history. Different conceptions of human action in the past have different shapes (shallow or deep, broad or narrow). These shapes, in turn, enter into people's life experiences: because the sense of self rests partly on a sense of *being-in-time*, the shape people attribute to history infuses both individuals' and groups' self-understanding. Therefore, locating oneself in time is a function of the shape one accords it. We can grasp this idea best by considering the shape of history inherent in various ideas about kinship.

History has a different shape, depending on what notions of ancestry and genealogy prevail; figure 1 illustrates some shapes of history according to different notions of ancestry.[75] Where people in the present think of the world as inhabited by themselves and their fellows, all descended from an "eponymous ancestor" in the deep past, history takes on the shape of a cone or pyramid (figure 1a). By contrast, where people in the present think of the world as inhabited by individuals like themselves, each the product of many forefathers, the cone is inverted into a fan (figure 1b). Then there are the

knotty clusters characteristic of bilateral kinship systems (figure 1c), in which ego counts as relatives (1) his/her parents and grandparents but rarely more distant forebears; (2) his/her own siblings plus their spouses; (3) his/her children and siblings' children; (4) perhaps the siblings and children of own and parents' cousins; and (5) his/her grandchildren. The result includes both short cones and short fans and resembles the most common kinship system in the United States. In that kind of system one situates oneself in a fairly shallow time line and one's sense of self is more present-oriented than in lineal systems, in which the cones and beads of relatedness can be very deep. A shallow time line often accompanies a strong sense of individual agency in the present moment, while a deeper one favors, instead, a potentially drawn-out and collective sense of agency. These differences are crucial elements of personal and group self-understanding.

Kinship systems characteristically exclude some people who might be counted in, while including others. For example, Old Testament genealogies take the shape of a string of beads, with a central line of "begats" running from Adam through a long line of patriarchs on to the anticipated Messiah (New Testament ones continue on to a second Messiah as well); they leave out ancillary lines and women. Because the underlying system is patrilineal, its dominant imagery is cone-shaped (descendants of a common ancestor), although, depending on one's purposes, one might emphasize the entire lineage (the cone) or just the patriline (the string of begats) (figure 1d). Similarly, in traditional China one's sense of whom one is related to across an extended time looks like a rake, with a line of firstborn male ancestors forming the rake's handle, the offspring of the present heir's grandfather or great-grandfather being its teeth (offspring of female consanguines would not appear in this rake but in that of their husbands) (figure 1e).[76] The genealogy of communism is a foreshortened version of this rake: it has a vertical handle of three "begats"—Marx begat Lenin begat Stalin—followed by a quick radiation outward of "offspring," in the Party heads of the various satellite countries (figure 1). Here we see a historical shape that resembles that of a kinship system, though it substitutes political kinship for blood links. It is possible to imagine intermeshing rakes, in which certain unrelated persons (three, as in figure 1g) are taken to be ancestors of today's larger kin group.


FIGURE 1 Some Shapes of Genealogical History

These thoughts bear on locating oneself not only in a specific kinship system but also, through the argument I made earlier, in one's *nation* as kinship writ large. National kinship imageries are not fixed but vary; they, too, include some kinds of "brothers" and exclude others, and the resulting imageries produce communities with particular shapes in time. How one feels about oneself as part of the national family will vary accordingly. Thinking about history's different shapes relative to how different kinship organizations lay out relatedness in time enables us to see how nation as kindred might serve as more than simply a metaphor.

Reconfigured Temporalities and Alternative Political Projects

I have been speaking so far of the implications of history's shapes for how people situate themselves socially and in time, providing fundamental elements of their identity. To conclude this section I would like to expand these remarks to include conceptions of temporality itself: how people understand (and, by their actions, create) what "time" is. I do not plan to treat this subject comprehensively but only to offer a few reflections.

In his influential essay on time,[77] Edmund Leach wrote that the two most basic temporalities are the linear and the cyclical: time is perceived either as moving in a straight line (our common notion of "progress," for instance) or as doubling back on itself in circles (a common conception among populations whose lives are governed by the agricultural cycle). Linear time may be slanted upward (reflecting progress) or not (showing simple social reproduction, or even decay); cyclical time, likewise (showing a long-term upward trend, as in cycles of capital accumulation, or not). Again, time may be thought of as continuous and even infinite, having no beginning or end; or it may be discontinuous, with cataclysmic beginnings (the Creation, the Bolshevik Revolution, the "Big Bang" of present-day astronomers) or endings (the Last Judgment of some Christian conceptions, the "death of the nation" feared by nationalists). Figure 2 illustrates some of the possibilities.

Temporal conceptions are crucial elements of human experience. They ground it by establishing the largely unconscious expectations within which people live out their lives.[78] Furthermore, as Erik Mueggler has shown in a brilliant essay on time and agency in China, different temporal

A. Forms of Temporal Movement


B. Forms of Discontinuity (indicated by ‖)

FIGURE 2 Conceptions of Time

conceptions may accompany great differences in how human agency is understood.[79] That, in turn, has implications for the matter of accountability, which I mentioned above: whether the accountable action is seen to be the responsibility of autonomous individual subjects, of ghosts, or of collective actors will affect decisions about punishment or compensation.

No human group has one and only one conception of time, uniformly experienced by all, although one temporal conception may be societally

dominant. For example, the temporality privileged in Western industrial societies is primarily linear and directed upward, resting on a central notion of endless progress; within this, one may find groups with different experiences (such as homeless people or minorities)[80] and conceptions (an apocalyptic end of time, a Judeo-Christian cyclicity from the first Messiah to the Second Coming, and so on). Communist planning similarly assumed linear progress but posited an effectively timeless end state that would be the communist utopia; the imagery was of a socialist road to the future. Actual experience within "planned" economies was otherwise, however, as poor coordination gave rise to spastic work rhythms of speedup (the celebrated "storming") and standstill (recall the Hungarian film *Time Stands Still*).[81]

Among the more unsettling aspects of postsocialist transformation, I believe, is the possibility that the temporal experiences and conceptions familiar to people during the socialist period are being changed, especially for elites. Intellectual and political elites feel themselves caught in a terrible time bind, for example; many complain that the pace of their lives has become dizzying and almost unbearable, compared with before.[82] They face, in other words, a potential reconfiguring of how time is conceived and lived. There are several reasons why, and means through which, this might be happening. One means is political struggle over competing political agendas, as social actors pursue projects whose implicit temporalities differ. From the altered balance of political forces after the collapse of Soviet-style socialism emerged a political free-for-all. Among the many contending groups were religious elites (as in chapter 2), nationalists (chapters 1–3), neoliberals (chapter 1), neocommunists, and so on. Implicit in their programs were different temporal conceptions, which their strife brought into conflict. In struggles over property, understandings of the political process, ideas about blame and punishment, representations of the future, and all manner of other political issues, one can find different groups acting within the frame of different temporalities.

For example, nationalist politicians have a number of temporal options as well as varying potential allies. Some operate within a cyclical time sense, governed by the life-cycle metaphor of birth, growth, decay, and death. Their worst fear is the possibility that their nation might die, a prospect they may see as more urgent than economic crisis. For them, dead

bodies—especially of national heroes—are politically vital in showing that because a dead person has posthumous life, the nation itself need not fear death. Anxiety about national death has consequences for the policies of these "cyclical nationalists." They will give high priority to promoting the nation's biological and social reproduction, through antiabortion policies and restrictions on minority-language education for those of other nationalities, for example. Fear of national death may also govern policy in other ways, as in Eduard Beneš's decisions not to take Czechoslovakia into war in 1938 or 1948, decisions he justified explicitly in terms of national death.[83]

Cyclical nationalists may find themselves drawn into alliance with religious elites whose time horizon is very long, absorbing cycles of religious persecution and revival while preserving the people's faith toward the Last Judgment. (Thus I find it no accident that Mančevsky's celebrated film *Before the Rain* is structured around a cyclical temporality of national conflict that intersects in the figure of an Orthodox priest.) In Romania this kind of alliance appeared between cyclical nationalists and the Romanian Orthodox Church, renowned for taking the long view—hence its justification for collaborating with the Communist Party, a small price to pay for not being altogether suppressed. The Romanian case is further complicated, however, by property questions and a religious "market" that compel the church to take action within an unusually short time frame.

In contrast to cyclical nationalists are more "linear" ones who see the nation's fate as wrapped up more with its economic viability than with its demography. These groups might find allies among reform politicians concerned with the fate of the economy, including neoliberals and market-oriented neocommunists. In cases such as Hungary, where the 1994 elections brought a neoliberal/neocommunist coalition, no concessions need be made to the nationalists; but in other cases (such as Poland, perhaps) a possible alliance with "linear nationalists" might require compromise, if for various reasons the nationalists prefer a gradualist approach to reform instead of "shock therapy." Indeed, in those famous alternatives we see how essential temporalities are in pursuing different policy options. Because neoliberals are likely to have a more compressed and urgent sense of time's passage than are neocommunists, the former may find themselves supporting Protestants or Greek Catholics over Orthodox in strug-

gles over property, as in the case of Romania. Within each postsocialist country, the alternative policies and alliances will produce arrays of temporalities that differ from case to case.

These points have practical implications for outside involvement as well. Western politicians and investors see their best local allies as those who seem to have "put the [communist] past behind them" (presupposing a progressive linear time sense). If outsiders overlook the temporal nuances, however, they may find themselves misled. As I noted above, revising history in Eastern Europe often means snipping out and discarding sections of the time line, then attaching the precommunist period to the present and future as the country's true or authentic trajectory and thus putting the communist past behind them. That result emerges, however, from not one but two different temporalities. Those snipping out the socialist period on a time line that is linear do not necessarily repudiate socialism's equally linear orientation; they merely see the linear trajectory it adopted as somehow off (maybe aiming too high or too far to the left), or its rate of progress as too slow.[84] The snipping out thus rectifies an unnecessary detour. For actors whose time sense is more cyclical, by contrast, that same snipping out comes from excising a full temporal cycle, not simply modifying an initial angle of departure. When such groups join the ends of the truncated time line, they are by no means redirecting it progressively. Each of these scenarios comes with a different set of future policy options. Therefore, Western policymakers seeking evidence that one political group or another is "progressive" and "anticommunist" should be careful of interpreting any and all excisions of the communist past as a sure sign of reformist intent.

In sum, the politics and revisions of history occurring around dead bodies participate in an epochal kind of time shift, from which may issue new paradigms for thinking about time and the future. Here we have "reconfiguring time" in its broadest sense. The new organizations of time that will emerge depend on which political forces become allied and perhaps dominant. If, in the long term, political struggles settle into a pattern of alternating parties or coalitions, a certain temporality may become hegemonic—and, with it, certain time disciplines and the economic patterns associated with them.

CONCLUSION

Our space is finite and our time linear; let me bring this book to a close. In doing so, I revisit a thought posed early in the book and again at the start of this chapter. It concerns the relation between the substance of my arguments in the book and the different forms taken by chapters 2 and 3. I hope that the way I presented my discussion of shifting temporalities has helped readers to sense how disorienting and complicated are the transformations brought about in postsocialism. In this chapter, by repeatedly returning to and interweaving the numerous themes of earlier chapters—accountability and compensation, emotion, morality, kinship and ancestors, national identities, space and soil, revising history, and so on—I have tried to do two things. One is to use the chapter's very form (recursive) in contrast with that of chapter 2 (linear), so as to insinuate my argument about temporality into readers' unsuspecting imaginations. The second is to illustrate the magnitude, richness, and complexity of the issues at the heart of postsocialist transformation. In these ways I have sought to show how arresting, even enchanted, the study of postsocialist politics might be, compared with standard fare in this literature.

I have done so by emphasizing political symbolism and questions of meaning. Using dead bodies as my subject(s) has facilitated showing how the very multiplicity of available meanings makes something (such as a dead body) a good political symbol, effective in moments of system transformation. It has also facilitated a complex argument about the place of "tradition" in contemporary politics. Symbols come with histories, but they are used in contexts that modify them. Ideas about ancestry in contemporary nationalism or the mortuary beliefs underlying today's reburials are not "the same" as those of a few decades ago. They provide present-day social actors with ways of talking about the past and of integrating into present action possible "traditions" whose most important role may be to signify the rejection of the "aberrant" communist period and a return to an ostensibly more authentic national history. Furthermore, these kinds of ideas and practices participate in the cosmic domain, a domain political analysis too often ignores and one to which dead bodies afford special access. Cosmic concerns and reordering universes of meaning, I have suggested, are essential to the transformations of postsocialism; if nothing

else, they provide the material for symbolizing a new (cosmic) order even if in several respects what is emerging resembles the socialist one.

Although I illustrate my themes with postsocialist cases, I believe my demonstration has consequences beyond them. The reason is the argument with which I began chapter 1: that the transformation of socialism is not an isolated occurrence but part of a wider process of global change. The matters I have pursued here are not limited to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union but appear elsewhere as well. Worldwide, we find struggles over property (especially *intellectual* property rights, involving indigenous peoples); questions of accountability and responsibility (as in South Africa); a crisis within many societies as to what "morality" means (the United States is an excellent example); continued national conflicts and the possible reconfiguring of national groups even in "advanced" countries (Quebecois separatism in Canada, Welsh and Scottish parliamentary devolution in the British Isles); crises in political authority (including the various scandals over campaign financing and other matters during the Clinton administration); wholly altered experiences of space and time (by use of the Internet and through the "time-space compression" that accompanies the shift to flexible accumulation[85]); an animation of religious activity in many parts of the world (sometimes mixed with identity politics, as in the Hindu and Sikh conflicts in India); and so on.

To think usefully about the politics bound up with these signs of epochal shift requires, it seems to me, a richer and more meaningful conception of what politics itself consists of. We might call it a more enchanted view of politics, one that gives special importance to political symbolism, life experiences, and feelings. That is what I have been arguing for in this book. But, the skeptical reader might ask, why bother going to such lengths? Why not simply speak of new governments and emergent social groups seeking legitimacy (as some of my critics think I should)? How can I justify having asked you to accompany me on this crooked path through kinship and ancestors, competition for believers, burial practices, property, authority, accountability, space, and time?

My reason is discomfort with the rationalistic and dry sense of politics that so many political analysts employ, particularly when dealing with postsocialist transformation. In my view, postsocialist politics is about much more than forming parties, having free elections, setting up independent

banks, rewriting history books, or restoring property rights—complex though these be. To see dead-body politics in Eastern Europe as nothing more than revising the past toward legitimating new polities seems to me not wrong but impoverished. Rather, dead bodies have posthumous political life in the service of creating a newly meaningful universe. Their political work is to institute ideas about morality by assessing accountability and punishment, to sanctify space anew, to redefine the temporalities of daily life, to line people up with alternative ancestors and thereby to reconfigure the communities people participate in, and to attend to ancestors properly so they will fructify the enterprise of their descendants. By creating room in our analysis for ideas of this kind, we both look for things in postsocialist politics that we might otherwise ignore and also, I believe, enliven and enrich the study of politics in general, broadening and deepening what we understand it to mean.

Edwin Arlington Robinson wrote, "I will have more to say when I am dead." No matter which conceptions of cosmic order, ancestors, space, and time we human beings employ, it seems our dead, like Lenin, are always with us. The important thing is what we do with them.