

Voprosy filosofii, 1970, No. 6

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SPINOZA'S THEORY OF THE EMOTIONS IN LIGHT
OF CONTEMPORARY PSYCHONEUROLOGY*

Introduction

The period of the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s was a portentous period for Soviet psychology. As this period recedes into the past, the figure of L. S. Vygotskii rises more and more before us. Vygotskii died of tuberculosis when not quite 37 years old. He was a psychologist for only 10 years, and it was only in the last 6 of these that he did the work we now associate with his name. During those brief years Vygotskii wrote over 120 works, including more than 10 large books. His was a short life — filled with inspired, indefatigable, and heroic work. A significant part of his written work has re-

*This article was selected and translated by Edward E. Berg, Ph.D., of the University of Wisconsin. The text is an excerpt from the last chapter of a monograph by L. S. Vygotskii entitled "Ucheniye ob emotsiyakh v svete sovremennoi psikhonevrologii. Istoriko-psikhologicheskiye issledovaniya" [A Theory of the Emotions in Light of Contemporary Psychoneurology: Historico-Psychological Researches]. The monograph also bears the headings "Spinoza," "Ocherki psikhologii. Problema emotsii" [Spinoza, Essays in Psychology: The Problem of the Emotions]. With regard to this monograph, see the editor's commentary section in L. S. Vygotskii's book *Psikhologiya iskusstva* [The Psychology of Art], Moscow, 1968, pp. 502 and 504. The text that follows was prepared by R. N. Vygotskaya.

mained unpublished and indeed much of it remained unfinished. A seven-volume collection of Vygotskii's work is currently underway, and even this will not contain everything he wrote. The final volume of this collection will include his articles "The Sense of the Psychological Crisis" and "Spinoza's Theory of the Passions."

It fell to Vygotskii to make the first and perhaps the most difficult step in translating the Marxist-Leninist conception of man into a concrete psychological theory. Vygotskii took this step in his theory of the qualitative difference between higher (social) and lower (natural) mental functions. He argued that, like work activity itself, the higher mental functions are mediated by their own special tools — by signs, i.e., by the signs of language. To Vygotskii, higher mental functions are first constructed as forms of verbal intercourse between people and then later become the inner forms of verbal thinking. The general path of the development of the human mind is thus from the "outside" to the "inside." This idea received experimental confirmation in the research of A. N. Leont'yev. It has been an idea of great significance. More than anything else, it has provided a principled basis for rejecting two fundamental theses of the old psychology: the thesis of the eternally and absolutely closed nature of individual consciousness and the thesis of the primary and absolute difference in character between the "mental" and the remaining "physical" world.

After he became a psychologist, Vygotskii consistently focused his efforts on two tasks. The first task was to make a critical analysis of bourgeois psychology. (The rapid growth of this psychology, we should note, was matched only by its practitioners' despair over its ever becoming a real science.) The second task was to work out a new positive theory of human consciousness. The basic landmarks of this theory came to be these: sign-meaning, meaning-concept, and concept-cell of consciousness. In short, the development of the

concept is the basic line of the development of human consciousness.

Thus, Vygotskii turned out to be a rationalist in psychology. He felt uncomfortable in this role and constantly pointed out the inadequacy of rationalism. He struggled with the mechanistic rationalism of bourgeois psychology and with its ever so typical contraposing of reason and feeling, of intellect and affect. From this struggle flows Vygotskii's interest in the debate between "physiological (explanatory) psychology" and "descriptive (understanding) psychology" and in the study of feelings. From this struggle, too, flows Vygotskii's interest in Spinoza, for he saw in Spinoza a thinker who anticipated the removal of this false antithesis.

Even those who are well acquainted with Vygotskii's works will find something new and perhaps unexpected in the excerpt published below. Every reader, however, will feel the intense striving of great thought toward a lofty understanding (or, as Vygotskii liked to say, toward a "pinnacle" of understanding) of man in all his possibilities.

P. Ya. Gal'perin

The field of study called "the descriptive psychology of the emotions" studies the nature of higher feelings. Descriptive psychology asks: do higher emotions simply represent complex combinations and modifications of elementary emotions? Or do higher emotions represent something quite new with respect to elementary emotions, something demanding a quite special scientific approach? Descriptive psychology chooses the second part of this dilemma as its basic premise, and asserts that the distinguishing mark of higher feelings is their intentionality, their directedness, their meaningful connection with an object. Without this directly experienced, meaningful connection with an object, a higher feeling ceases to be what it is.

In one of his early works, Scheler drew the distinction between higher and lower feelings in just this way. The connection of lower feelings with an object is always mediated and established by subsequent acts of referring. There is no direc-

tionality inherent in lower feelings. We see this, for example, in the fact that it is sometimes necessary to search for an object of our sadness. On the contrary, a higher feeling is always directed at a specific thing, just as is a representation of something. This is a thought out process, available in principle only to the understanding. Elementary states of feeling, on the other hand, can only be given a causal explanation. When I am happy or sad, experiences of value are giving rise to specific feelings. Love and hate are intentional in the strictest sense of the word, as Brentano pointed out. We do not love about something, rather we love something.

Thus, higher feelings demand not a causal-explanatory, psychological investigation, but rather a conceptualistic psychology (a psychology of understanding) whose sole purpose is to understand various immediately experienced connections. The experience of values does not evoke specific higher feelings on the basis of some sort of logical connections, like those between syllogistic premises and a conclusion. Rather, the connection here is teleological. The nature of conscious life is structured in such a way that I respond with gladness to everything that I experience as having a certain value and for which my will is motivated to strive. This connection permits only an understanding which is united with the experience of its goal directedness, and it is to be contrasted with a connection which remains nonunderstood and noninterpreted, such as the connection of something sweet with pleasure and of something bitter with displeasure. I can only take these connections as facts. In themselves, they are not the kinds of connections I can understand or interpret.

This noninterpretability, in principle, of basic or primitive feelings, as we have already seen, is one of the cornerstones of the Cartesian theory of the passions. Descartes maintained that sadness and happiness as passions are not only distinct from pain and pleasure as sensations, but that they can be completely separated from them. We can imagine the most vivid pain being experienced with the emotional indifference of a most ordinary sensation. We can even be amazed that pain so

frequently accompanies sadness and pleasure accompanies happiness. We can be surprised that hunger (which is a simple sensation) and appetite (which is a desire) are so intimately interconnected that they always occur together. Contemporary descriptive psychology of the emotions thus only repeats in the words of Scheler the old Cartesian thesis of the complete meaninglessness of elementary emotions (which exclude in principle every possibility of their meaningful understanding) and asserts this privilege only for higher feelings.

This theory of the intentional nature of higher feelings, which was developed by Brentano, Scheler, Pfender, Geiger, and others, laid the foundations for the modern descriptive psychology of the emotions. With the aid of this theory, descriptive psychology of the emotions tries to avoid the pitfall of the naturalistic theory of feeling, which views a higher feeling as a complex or product of the development of simpler mental elements. Scheler does not take the error of this theory to be the fact that it incorrectly explains the life of higher feelings, but rather that the theory simply does not see these phenomena, that it is blind to them. If the naturalistic theory would simply examine the phenomena of sacred or spiritual love, it would see that such phenomena can in no way be understood in terms of or deduced from the facts of sensual love. In this failure, however, lies the chief shortcoming of every form of naturalistic theory. The whole emphasis of the naturalistic theory blinds it to the fact that quite new acts and qualities arise in the course of a person's life. In a very essential way these qualities arise in an uneven and spasmodic manner. They can never be viewed as the simple and gradually unfolding old forms that we see, at least in principle, in animals. Naturalistic theory's orientation blinds it to the fact that fundamentally new and deeper levels of being and value can emerge in the course of a lifetime, and that on these levels whole new areas of objects and values for a self-developing life can arise. It is only as life develops that these new areas of being and value begin to reveal and take on the full wealth of their defining qualities. For the naturalistic theory, however, each new quality means a new

illusion. Like all naturalistic philosophy, this theory, in principle, falls short of the mark.

The considerations adduced above bring out most clearly how the groundlessness and limitations of explanatory psychology inevitably occasioned the rise of the teleological theory of higher feelings. It is in the life of feelings that descriptive psychology finds its deepest and most vital object. There we see before us, says Dilthey, the true center of mental life. It is there that the poetry of all ages finds its objects. The interests of humanity are constantly directed to the life of feelings, on which depends the happiness and unhappiness of human existence. For this reason the psychology of the seventeenth century, which profoundly directed its attention to the content of mental life, was concentrated in the theory of feeling states, for these were its affects.

Dilthey proceeds on the assumption that feeling states are important and central only if they cannot be analyzed and decomposed. For the most part, our feelings merge together in a common state in which the various component parts become indistinguishable. Our feelings, as well as our motives, cannot be voluntarily reproduced or summoned to consciousness. To revive mental states, we must experimentally bring to mind the conditions under which these states arise. From this it follows that our definitions of mental states do not analyze and decompose the content of these states but only indicate the conditions under which the states arise. Of such a nature are all the definitions of mental states given by Spinoza and Hobbes, and it is thus incumbent on us first of all to perfect the methods of these thinkers. Definition, precise nomenclature, and classification comprise the first task of descriptive psychology in this area. It is true that new auxiliary means are opened up in the study of expressive movements and representation symbols for mental states. In particular the comparative method, which introduces more simple relations into the feelings and motives of animals and primitive people, permits us to go beyond the bounds of seventeenth century anthropology. But even using these auxiliary means does not put on solid footing an explana-

tory method which tries to deduce the phenomena of a given area from a limited number of uniquely definable elements.

At this point, Dilthey simultaneously sets forth three logically incompatible propositions. It is true that these three propositions coincide in their practical results. Nevertheless, from a theoretical point of view, not only can they not be combined; they also exhibit the most striking form of internally contradictory anecdotal logic. Let us examine his argument. Dilthey first points out that there are sharply competing attempts to explain the life of our feelings and that no definite answer is in sight. We are hard pressed to answer very basic questions about the relation of feelings to motives and will, and about the relation of qualitative feeling states to the ideas mixed with them. Thus Dilthey's first proposition is that, as a matter of fact, at the present time there is simply no well-grounded explanatory psychology of feelings.

On the basis of this factual failure of the explanatory psychology of feelings, Dilthey concludes that an explanation of feelings is unnecessary and impossible. This is his second proposition. If we cast an eye, he says, at the amazing wealth of the world's literature that dwells on mental states and human passions, we cannot help but notice that all the fertile statements which enlighten this area do not require the same kind of explanatory assumptions. These statements describe only the complex and outstanding forms of processes, in which the various indicated aspects are tied together. One need only analyze the facts of this area to see the uselessness of such explanatory hypotheses. To support this idea, Dilthey gives the example of the aesthetic enjoyment which is evoked by a work of art and which is characterized by most psychologists as a state of pleasure. But the aesthetician, he says, who is studying the effect of the various styles in various works of art, is forced to recognize the inadequacy of such an understanding. The style of a Michelangelo fresco or a Bach fugue flows from the mood of a great spirit and from its understanding of these works of art; it communicates to the spirit of the enjoyer a specific form of mood, in which the spirit expands, rises, and spreads out.

Dilthey thus associates the existing theoretical poverty of explanatory psychology with both the futility, in principle, of explanatory hypotheses in this area and the impossibility, in principle, of a causal explanation of such higher forms of aesthetic mood. Having done this, he then turns around and argues as his third proposition that, as a matter of fact, explanatory psychology is simply not yet ready to solve the problem of feelings, and hence that descriptive psychology should prepare and clear a path for explanatory psychology. He thus concludes that the domain of mental life is not really ready for a complete analysis. For this, descriptive and analytic psychology must first carry out its own program in detail.

This conflation of three quite different propositions reminds us of the logic of one of Freud's jokes in his study of wit. A woman whose neighbor had accused her of breaking a borrowed pot tried to justify herself with the following three arguments. She first said, "I didn't take any pot from you"; secondly, "When I took it, it was already broken"; and thirdly, "I returned it whole to you." Dilthey first says that explanatory psychology has not hitherto given a satisfactory explanation of the life of our feelings; secondly, that such an explanation is quite futile and unnecessary and cannot, in general, be given; and thirdly, that explanatory psychology will be able to give its explanation only after descriptive psychology completes its task of decomposition and analysis.

This conflation of conflicting propositions also appears in Dilthey's positive program of research for a descriptive psychology of feelings. As Dilthey sees it, the investigation should move primarily in three directions. It should reflect the basic types of flow of mental processes. We should try to make available for conceptual analysis that which the great poets, such as Shakespeare, gave us in images. The investigation must pick out certain fundamental relations which flow through the life of human feelings and motives. It must try to establish the various component parts of feeling and motivational states. To Dilthey, the advantage of the descriptive and analytic method over the explanatory method lies in the fact that the explanatory

method is limited to examining problems that have already been solved. Obviously, to Dilthey the task of an explanatory psychology of feelings is unsolvable. In general, there was no pot — neither broken nor whole — in spite of the fact that we just asserted that the pot was taken broken and returned whole.

This contradiction is avoided by the investigator Munsterberg, who drew just as sharply as Dilthey and others the distinction between a causal psychology and a teleological psychology, as two independent and equally proper sciences. This idea, which is underscored by the whole historical development of modern psychology, matured simultaneously in various investigators, just as (in the words of Goethe) apples fall simultaneously in different gardens. But Munsterberg was more consistent than Dilthey, and although he devoted all his concrete research to carrying out the task of explanatory psychology, he also worked out a complete program and research plan for descriptive psychology.

As Munsterberg sees it, the disastrous state of modern psychology, in which we know more disjointed facts than ever before and yet know less about what psychology really is, results from the fact that modern psychology is struggling with prejudice and is simply one form of psychology. The concept of psychology contains two quite different scientific tasks, which should be distinguished in principle and should really be given special names. In reality, psychology has a double nature. If the prejudice is dominant that, at most, one of these natures is sufficient for science, then it is natural that some psychologists will cultivate only one form of psychology and will put the other form aside, while others will concern themselves only with that other form and will disregard the first. Alternatively, both forms will be mixed together in an imaginary unity, with data being arbitrarily distributed between them, or else one of them will become more or less intertwined with the other. All these possibilities are represented in modern scientific psychology.

It stands to reason that such dissimilar forms of psychology would not exist side by side and be found in spiritual communion if there were not something in common between them. Their

common element lies first of all in the fact that every psychology deals with the experiences of the individual. In this, psychology is distinct from the sciences of corporeal nature and from the normative sciences. The individual personality is indeed the decisive starting point for every psychology.

But two psychologies can begin from this common starting point and yet diverge in principle. In every beating pulse of our living experience, says Munsterberg, it becomes obvious to us that we can understand our own inner life in a dual fashion; we can attain a dual knowledge of it. On the one hand, we can grasp the sense of our feeling and desire, of our attention and thinking, of our recollections and representations. All this we try to grasp and hold in a certain quality present in all our experiences, i.e., in the quality of the reality of our "I," as an intention of our personality directed at a certain goal. We can then trace how one desire is included in another, how one idea points to another, and how a world of inner relations opens up within our spirit. But we can view our experiences in quite another way. We can contrast our experiences as a spiritually acting personality with our experiences as a simple observer. When we do this, our experiences become for us the contents of our perception. To be sure, these contents are quite different from the content of nature. We distinguish them from external contents as contents of our consciousness, but we are interested in them in the same way that we are interested in external things and processes. And we investigate the contents of consciousness only from the point of view of an observer who describes their flow and understands their necessary connections, i.e., as an observer trying to explain them. Through this description the contents of consciousness become a combination of elements, and through explanation these elements become a chain of causes and effects. Thus we arrive at a quite different understanding of the very same mental life. In the first case, we come to an understanding of the inner relations and we grasp the inner intentions and connections between them. In the second case, we come to a description and explanation of the elements and their effects.

If we carry to conclusion these two different methods for studying our inner life and put them in a scientifically completed form, we will have two theoretical disciplines which are different in principle. One discipline will describe mental life as the totality of contents of consciousness and will seek to explain this. The other will interpret and understand the very same spiritual life as a totality of purpose and meaning relations. The one is a causal psychology, the other is a teleological and intentional psychology. Furthermore, there can be no exclusive classifying of data into one of these psychologies or the other, since all data must necessarily be examined from both points of view. Every feeling, every recollection, and every desire can be understood just as well under the category of causality (as a content of consciousness), as from the intentional point of view (as a spiritual activity).

In historical and modern psychology, both forms are mixed together in a false unity. Each rarely appears in a really pure and logical form. But for the most part, teleological psychology stands in some sort of external conjunction with the elements of causal psychology. In such a case, the processes of memory, for example, are pictured as causal, and the processes of feeling and will are pictured as intentional. This is a mixture which easily arises under the influence of the naive ideas of everyday life. So it is that side by side with causal psychology, we can speak of an intentional psychology or of a psychology of spirit. So it is that we can speak of a psychology of consciousness or of an understanding psychology side by side with an explanatory psychology.

In defining the tasks of the two kinds of psychology, Munsterberg consistently developed the distinction to its logical conclusion. He completely excluded every necessity and possibility of causal explanation from descriptive psychology, which permits only an understanding and a grasping of purpose and meaning relations between experiences. Descriptive psychology thus requires an investigation of spiritual activity as a completely autonomous part of reality which lies outside of nature and outside of life. In the words of Spinoza, it is not a natural thing

which follows the general laws of nature, but a thing lying beyond the bounds of nature. It is, so to speak, a kingdom within a kingdom. Yet if we examine the arguments of Dilthey and Munsterberg, we can immediately see its force and its weakness, its positive and negative poles, its unconditional rightness and its equally unconditional wrongness. The force and rightness of the argument lie exclusively in its recognition of the groundlessness, insufficiency, and inadequacy, in principle, of the explanations hitherto advanced by physiological psychology concerning higher mental phenomena. Its rightness and strength lie exclusively in the fact that it tackles the most important problems of man's higher life and thus for the first time defines the full task of a psychology of real and living man.

But in this very point lies the weakness and error of the argument. In essence, the argument says that the new psychology is not so different from the old. In something, and indeed, if you please, in the most central and important aspect, the two psychologies coincide, in spite of their apparent contradiction. Specifically, descriptive psychology as a whole completely accepts explanatory psychology's basic idea — that a causal explanation can be no more than a mechanical reduction of complex and higher processes to atomistically uncoordinated elements of mental life. In saying this, the new psychology arrives at the very same position from which the old psychology started out. The new and the old psychologies meet and coincide in that they both take mechanical causality as the only possible category for explaining mental life. They both limit causal explanation in psychology to the narrow bounds of the Socratic parody. Thus the sole valid argument in favor of developing an independent descriptive psychology is the vacuousness of an explanatory psychology which does not go beyond the bounds of a mechanistic causal explanation of spiritual life. In its neighbor's broken pot, the new psychology finds its sole reason for cooking in its own quite special pot. This argument from the broken pot is at the same time the weakness and strength of the partisans of the new psychology. As Scheler correctly noted, it is indisputable that explanatory psychology does not give a false explanation

of the real problems of human psychology, rather it simply doesn't touch these problems and is blind to them. It is equally indisputable that these problems should be set before scientific psychology as the most primary and central problems demanding solutions. But from this, one can logically draw only the conclusion that the foundations of modern psychology must be radically reconstructed. Should we then conclude from these premises that it is necessary to assign the solution of these problems to some sort of new and special science which excludes in principle the possibility of causal explanation? To do this is to completely justify the present state of explanatory psychology with all its errors, to completely accept its mistakes, to fail to rise above it and master it. It is simply to ask explanatory psychology to build a fantasy house of the "psychology of spirit" on a corrupt foundation, fit only for castles in the sky and houses of cards.

For this reason, the James-Lange theory, with its parody of a causal explanation of human feelings, unavoidably generates the Scheler theory, which completely refuses to explain higher feelings and which sets an understanding of teleological connections in the place of explanation. But Scheler is only as far from James as the new psychology is from the old. Along with James, he seems to assume that the only acceptable psychological explanation is an explanation based on the laws of physiological mechanics. Thus he, as does all descriptive psychology, fails to solve the problem, but rather goes around it. There is a question addressed to all modern psychology which we view as a prototype of all basic questions demanding a causal explanation: it is the question of why Socrates remained in the Athens jail. The James-Lange theory answers this question in terms of contraction and relaxation of muscles and bending of limbs, while Scheler's theory says that Socrates remained in jail to satisfy a higher feeling of value. Both theories are equally indisputable and are as obvious as they are infertile. Both are equally far from a genuinely scientific answer to the question, and neither directs attention to the true cause. Indeed, as Socrates put it, he speaks the truth who says that without such

things as bones and sinews, I could not do as I please. Indeed, without a contraction of muscles, Socrates could not come to the jail and sit down in it. But the real content of the experience would have remained quite the same if he had been led or carried into the jail. And the very same muscular movements could have carried Socrates from jail to the hiding place his followers had arranged.

Quite analogous is the real grief of a mother weeping at the death of her child. As Lange pointed out, the grief is directly connected with her tears, even though the grief can be experienced in her spirit without being accompanied by tears, and even though tears can result from a quite opposite feeling, as tears of joy. All this is indisputable, but, as Plato said, to search for a cause in this would be foolishness beyond words.

It is equally indisputable and obvious that Socrates' decision to remain in jail was connected with pursuing a certain vital goal and that it satisfied a certain feeling of value. But a quite opposite experience such as his fleeing would have had the same goal- and value-oriented character.

In short, the repudiation of all causal explanation and the attempt to go around the problem by depending on teleological analysis does not advance us beyond the explanatory psychology of feelings, with all its undoubted imperfection. On the contrary, such a move leads us profoundly backward. Dilthey himself brilliantly recognized this when, in setting out a program for a descriptive psychology of feelings, he proposed first of all to perfect the method of Spinoza and Hobbes. Definition, nomenclature, and classification, said Dilthey, comprise the first task of descriptive psychology in this area. In saying this, however, he forgot that this path of definition and classification, which psychology traveled for several centuries, led to a situation in which the psychology of feelings was the most infertile and boring branch of all psychology.

James was undoubtedly right when he said that description and classification are the lower stages in the development of a science. Thus, from the insubstantiality of James's causal explanation of emotions, descriptive psychology fails to draw

the only correct conclusion — that this explanation must be replaced with a better and truer one, which proceeds from a different and more principled basis. Rather than expand the base of causal explanation, however, descriptive psychology tries to deny the very possibility and notion of causal explanation. It takes the factual failure of a certain theory and of everything based on it and makes this a failure in principle. In doing this, descriptive psychology thus reveals the tie between its own disputable doctrine and its commitment to these fundamentally mistaken principles.

It is natural in this regard that the path of the new psychology should turn backward rather than forward. Dilthey consistently tells us to turn back to the anthropology of the seventeenth century and to perfect its methods. It is interesting, however, to see what he takes from the thinkers of the seventeenth century, and especially from Spinoza. He takes what is most antiquated, dead, and lifeless — i.e., Spinoza's nomenclature, classification, and definitions, which do not reveal the content of our affects but which only indicate the conditions under which a given mental state arises.

Thus, from Spinoza's theory of the passions, descriptive psychology takes not the living part directed to the future, but the dead part directed to the past. In Dilthey's opinion, the only way the new psychology can get beyond seventeenth century anthropology is for it to apply a comparative method in the study of expressive movements and representation symbols for mental states. But these give us only a new auxiliary technique for solving the very same problem, which does not take us in principle beyond the seventeenth century psychology of the passions. So it is that by one stroke of the pen, almost three centuries of development of psychological thought and knowledge are crossed off. The movement backward to the seventeenth century, to the depths of history, is declared to be the only path of scientific progress in psychology.

In a certain sense, descriptive psychology which puts teleological and structural investigation of mental phenomena in the place of causal explanation takes us back to the epoch of the

philosophic thought that was dominant before Spinoza. Specifically, Spinoza struggled for a natural deterministic, materialistic, and causal explanation of human passions; he struggled against an illusory explanation based on goals. In short, Spinoza was the first thinker to philosophically establish the very possibility of a true scientific explanatory psychology of man and to mark out a path for its subsequent development.

In this regard, Spinoza stands against all contemporary descriptive psychology as an irreconcilable enemy. He constantly struggled with the Cartesian dualism, spiritualism, and teleologism, which have been revived again in modern descriptive psychology. In considering the relation between Spinoza's theory of the passions and the contemporary psychology of the emotions, it is important to contrast sharply Dilthey's conception of this relation with the real relation. It is especially noteworthy that in posing the basic problems of a psychology of man, the new approach had to turn to the psychology of the seventeenth century, which had profoundly directed its attention to the true center of spiritual life and to the content of our affects, and that the new approach invokes the name of Spinoza as a guiding light for new research. In Spinoza, the partisans of the new approach find not only a nomenclature and a classification of the passions, but also certain basic relations which run through the whole life of feelings and motivations. These basic relations have decisive significance for an understanding of man, and they comprise themes for a precise descriptive method. An example of such a basic relation is the fact that both the Stoics and Hobbes, as well as Spinoza, took the instinct of self-preservation, or growth of the "I," to be a striving toward a completeness of spiritual states, toward a mastery of the self, toward a development of one's forces and motivations. Thus not only the method but also the content of the Spinozistic theory of the passions is proposed as a starting point for research in a new direction — in the direction of comprehending man.

This appeal to Spinoza, however, is based on the same mixture of truth and falsity that we met in Dilthey's conception of

the relations between Spinoza's theory of the passions and the contemporary psychology of the emotions. In order to grasp the full significance of Dilthey's idea that a descriptive psychology of feelings should be a successor of Spinoza's psychology, we must recall that Lange, too, cited Spinoza as the thinker who most nearly approached his developed physiological theory of the emotions. The reason for this is that not only did Spinoza not consider the corporeal phenomena of emotions as dependent on spiritual movements, but he put the corporeal phenomena side by side with the spiritual movements, and indeed almost put the corporeal phenomena in first place.

Thus Lange and Dilthey, and the descriptive and explanatory psychologies of the emotions, which form the two contradictory poles of contemporary scientific knowledge of human feelings, turn in the same way to their sources, to the Spinozistic theory of the passions. This coincidence cannot be accidental. In it lies the deepest historical and theoretical meaning, which we will elucidate in the third part of our investigation. Even at this point, however, there is an essential element which we should grasp in this turning of two contradictory theories toward a common base in Spinoza.

We have already spoken above of the connection of Lange's theory of emotions with Spinoza's theory of the passions, and we have established that the notion of a direct historical and conceptual link between Spinoza's theory of affects and the James-Lange theories is based on an illusion. Lange himself vaguely understood the false similarity between his own theory and Spinoza's. With a feeling of delight he finds the complete vasomotor theory of the corporeal phenomena of emotions in Malebranche, who with the penetration of a genius discovered the true connection between the phenomena. It is true that in Malebranche we do find a scheme of an emotional mechanism, expressed in the vague language of yesterday's physiology, which can be translated into the language of contemporary physiology and combined with the James-Lange hypothesis. This factual coincidence was long ago established by Airons, who pointed out that Descartes held the same position as James. We see that the latest research, in particular the work of Kerzh, com-

pletely confirm this opinion. But this is not enough. In the course of our investigation, we have tried to show not only that a factual description of the mechanism of emotional reaction gives birth to these theories, which are separated by almost three centuries, but also that this factual coincidence itself is a consequence of a deeper methodological kinship between them. This is a kinship based on the fact that contemporary physiological psychology as a whole inherited from Descartes the naturalistic and mechanistic principle of interpreting the emotions. Cartesian mechanism, automatonism, and dualism are the true bases of the hypothesis of Lange and James, and this gave Denlap every right to call the Great Philosopher the true father of all contemporary reactological psychology.

We thus see that, in essence, Lange's theory goes back not to the Spinozistic theory but to the Cartesian theory of the passions of the soul. We can thus say that when Lange invoked the name of Spinoza in a concluding note to his work, he did so in vain. This was, we may recall, the conclusion of our earlier investigation of this question.

Let us supplement this conclusion with still another more substantial and important feature, which appears clearly in the light of the contradiction between the descriptive and explanatory psychologies of the emotions. The new feature that we learn from this contradiction is this: in a certain respect, the Spinozistic theory really has a much closer kinship with explanatory psychology than with descriptive psychology. This means that the Spinozistic theory should be more closely related to Lange's hypothesis, in which the basic principles of the explanatory psychology of the emotions find their clearest expression, than to the program of Dilthey's descriptive psychology of feelings. In the argument between a causal and a teleological psychology, in the struggle between a determinist and an indeterminist conception of feelings, in the collision of the spiritualist and the materialist hypotheses, Spinoza should indeed be placed on the side of those who defend the scientific study of human feelings in opposition to the metaphysical study.

It is specifically at the point where the Spinozistic theory of

the passions intertwines with the explanatory psychology of the emotions that it deviates most irreconcilably from descriptive psychology. At this point it was Dilthey, not Lange, who summoned in vain the name of Spinoza at the very beginning of his program of future research. Indeed, what can there be in common between these investigators who consciously revived the teleological and metaphysical conceptions of seventeenth century anthropology, against which Spinoza continually struggled with the strict determinism, causality, and materialism of his system? As we have noted, it is not for nothing that Dilthey gives first place to the most antiquated, formal, and speculative part of Spinoza, i.e., to his nomenclature, classification, and definition. Dilthey's psychology not only cannot accord with the great principles of the Spinozistic system, it must actually oppose them in a most bitter struggle. After what we have seen, there can be little doubt that in reviving the spiritualistic and teleological principles of the seventeenth century, descriptive psychology is moving essentially toward Descartes and not toward Spinoza. It is in Descartes' theory of the passions of the soul that descriptive psychology finds its complete and true program.

Indeed, Spinoza stands not with Dilthey and Munsterberg, not with their theories of the autonomous and independent which exist exclusively by virtue of the purpose connections and meaning relations of mental life. Rather, Spinoza stands with Lange and James in their struggle against unchanging and eternal spiritual essences, against viewing emotions not as emotions of man but as beings of forces which lie beyond the bounds of nature, as demons which possess man. Indeed, Spinoza would never say — and on this point Lange is undeniably right — that a mental passion in itself can explain why one pales or why one trembles. Like James, Spinoza takes description and classification to be the lower stages in the development of a science. He takes the study of causal connection to be a deeper investigation, an investigation of a higher order. But the matter is more complex than this, because however fallacious may be the attempt to base a descriptive psychology of feelings on the

Spinozistic theory of the passions, the attempt does indeed contain a certain element of truth. We tried to see this above in the fact that the problem which the descriptive psychology of feeling poses is the problem of the specific features of human feelings, the problem of the vital meaning of feeling, the problem of what is higher in the emotional life of man. All these problems — to which explanatory psychology is blind and which in their very nature go beyond the bounds of mechanistic interpretation — were really presented for the first time in their full stature by Spinoza's theory of the passions. In this respect the Spinozistic theory turns out to be on the side of the new psychology against the old. It supports Dilthey against Lange.

Our final summary is necessarily bewildering in its complexity. We see that the lines of Spinoza's thought find their historic continuation in both Lange and Dilthey, in both the explanatory and descriptive psychologies of our day. Each of these competing theories contains something from the Spinozistic theory. By striving for a causal natural scientific explanation of emotion, the James-Lange theory solves one of the central problems of Spinozistic materialist and determinist psychology. But as we saw, descriptive psychology, in emphasizing the problem of the sense and vital meaning of human feelings, tries to solve the fundamental and central problems of Spinozistic ethics.

Let us summarize briefly the true relation of the Spinozistic theory of the passions to the explanatory and descriptive psychologies of the emotions. Spinoza's theory strives to solve a single unitary problem — the problem of a deterministic, causal explanation of the higher elements in the life of human passions. In so striving, Spinoza's theory partially contains an explanatory psychology which preserves the idea of causal explanation but throws out the problem of the higher elements in human passions. Furthermore, Spinoza's theory also contains a descriptive psychology, which discards the idea of causal explanation and preserves the problem of the higher elements in human passions. Thus, in its deepest and innermost core, Spinoza's theory contains what is missing in the two disassociated parts of contemporary psychology of the emotions: it contains

a unity of the causal explanation and the problem of the vital meaning of human passions, a unity of the descriptive and explanatory psychologies of feelings. Spinoza is thus totally relevant to the most urgent and angrily disputed problems of contemporary psychology of the emotions, to the problems which hang over our heads and envelop us in a paroxysm of crisis. The problems of Spinoza stand in plain view and await their solution. And without their solution, our psychology won't see tomorrow's day.

Both Lange's explanatory psychology and Dilthey's descriptive psychology, however, shy away from Spinoza's theory in their solutions to this problem. As we indicated above, both psychologies are wholly contained in the Cartesian theory of the passions of the soul. Thus the crisis of the contemporary psychology of the emotions, which is divided into two irreconcilable and antagonistic parts, represents for us the historical fate not of Spinozistic but of Cartesian philosophic thought. This is clearest of all in the basic point which serves as the watershed between explanatory and descriptive psychology, in the question of the causal explanation of human emotions.

Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta,
seriia filosofii, 1971, No. 2

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ON THE QUESTION OF THE INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN SCIENTIFIC-TECHNOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION

The fundamental question in the Marxist theory of revolution is that of the socioeconomic and class content of a revolution. Under today's conditions this question takes on primary significance and is central to the ideological struggle. Compelled to recognize the role of revolution in the development of society, bourgeois sociologists strive, however, to give the concept of revolution a new content, eliminating its class essence. Inasmuch as the revolution in science and technology now in progress is significantly changing the face of the contemporary world, it is characteristic of leading Western sociologists that they seek to present the changes resulting from the technological revolution as a qualitative change in the existing system, a "transformation" of capitalism. "It is a fact," writes the prominent American sociologist and economist Adolph Berle, "that during and after the First World War the entire world was steeped in revolution, and that its base was substantially more technological than social." (1) Technological and not social changes in society are thus proclaimed to be the most important problem of our time.