Richard Nixon/Frank Gannon Interviews,
June 13, 1983 [Day 8 of 9]

interviewer: Frank Gannon
interviewee: Richard Nixon
producer: Ailes Communications, INC.
date: June 13, 1983
minutes: approximately 200
extent: ca. 287kb
summary: This interview, comprising four video tapes, or approximately 3 hours, 20 minutes, is the eighth in a series of taped interviews with former president Nixon. The focus of the conversation is the American presidency. Nixon's relationships with and assessments of the administrations of Harry S. Truman, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson are discussed extensively. Also discussed are Ted and Bobby Kennedy, Nixon's 1950 campaign against Helen Gahagan Douglas, Nixon's feelings about money, his drinking habits while president, political assassinations, and J. Edgar Hoover.
repository: Walter J. Brown Media Archives, University of Georgia Libraries (Main Library)
collection: Richard Nixon Interviews
permissions: Contact Media Archives.

Day Eight, Tape one of four, LINE FEED #1, 6-13-83, ETI Reel #55
June 13, 1983

Day 8, Tape 1
00:00:53
[Action note: Screen goes black.]

Day 8, Tape 1
00:00:55
[Action note: Picture appears on screen.]

Day 8, Tape 1
00:00:59
[Action note: Screen goes black.]

Day 8, Tape 1
00:01:01
[Offscreen voice]

All right, Frank.

[Frank Gannon]

'Kay.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:01:18
[Action note: Picture appears on screen.]

Day 8, Tape 1
00:01:21
[Richard Nixon]

Tell you when you want to [unintelligible].

Day 8, Tape 1
00:01:23
[Frank Gannon]

Do you remember the first time you met Harry Truman?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:01:26
[Richard Nixon]

Well, I'll never forget it, because it was the first time I was ever in the White House. Having been just elected to Congress in 1946, we were invited to the reception that the president traditionally gave then, and even now, for the new members of Congress, and, for that matter, all members of Congress. I remember we had a little bit of a family problem then, because we were pretty strapped financially after the campaign, but the s--this event was black tie for the men and long dresses for the ladies. And Mrs. Nixon felt she had to have a new dress, and she certainly did have to have one, and I said, "Well, go ahead." And she said, "Well, I'm going to get it because it's probably the only time we'll ever be in the White House." So she got the new dress. We went. It was a mob scene, of course, with so many there, but we will always remember it. I remember when we met President Truman that he and Mrs. Truman were standing together, in the Blue Room, as I recall. And he shook hands in the way that people often shake hands in receiving lines when they wanted to get you through. He'd take your hand and just push you on to the next one, and push you on to the next one. And it went pretty fast.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:02:34
[Frank Gannon]

What’s your hand-shaking technique?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:02:36
[Richard Nixon]

I always believe it's very important for even one--ten seconds, for that matter--look them straight in the eye, and then on, and very strong. The fish handshake, I think, is something that I--just turns me off. Now, some people have it. Our British friends usually use it, but I think that an American should shake hands strongly and firmly and look people in the eye.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:03:00
[Frank Gannon]

What--what were your impressions of him as a--as a man, or as a president, as a leader?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:03:06
[Richard Nixon]

Well, my impressions, I think, were colored a great deal by my first meeting with him. On this occasion, of course--was not a meeting. It was a handshake. But in July of that year, that first year of 1947, a group of four freshman Republican congressmen met with Truman in the Oval Office. The way it came about is that Charlie Kersten from Wisconsin requested an appointment, and it was given. Incidentally, at the time, since we were members of Congress, we all thought we were important enough to deserve to be invited down to see the president. But as I look back at it in retrospect, I really marvel that Truman ever did it. But then I think that tells us something about him. He was a very good politician. He knew that the Republicans had an overwhelming majority in the House and in the Senate. He needed Republican votes. He also knew something else, that the four of us--and I'm sure that our records were checked before we ever got into the Oval Office--had supported the Greek-Turkish aid program, whereas many liberal Democrats had opposed it. He needed us as friends. And then I think he might have been impressed by the fact--he just liked the fact that we had the temerity to ask. And so he sort of appreciated that, because that's the kind of thing he might have done.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:04:26
[Frank Gannon]

What were your feelings as you stepped over the threshold of the Oval Office for the first time?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:04:31
[Richard Nixon]

Well, my feelings were, of course, one [sic] of profound respect for that place. It's a hallowed place. I'd read about it and seen pictures of it. But I think my recollection of the meeting is more of the man than of the office. President Truman, before we went there, was one who had not received a particularly good press. When he succeeded Franklin D. Roosevelt, there were many in the media, and many in the country, for that matter, who said, "Can this little pipsqueak from Missouri, poorly educated and so forth, step into the shoes of Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was a great heroic figure for so many years?" And many wondered whether he could. I would say that nobody could have filled the shoes of Franklin Roosevelt, but Harry Truman made his own footprints in the sands of history. At this particular point, however, having read about him as being somewhat uneducated, rather crude, and--and rather limited, I was impressed by the fact that he had a sense of history. He demonstrated that by taking us over to the globe which was there in the office and turning it to Manchuria and pointing out, which was quite prophetic at that time, how important Manchuria, in terms of its natural resources, could be in the future, and how important that whole area of China could be in the future for this country, and for the world, for that matter. And then he turned the globe a little further to the Soviet Union, and he said, "You know, I--I like the Russian people. They got along very well--the Russian soldiers did--with our soldiers at the Elbe." He said, "As far as I am concerned, they can have any kind of a system they want, provided they don't try to impose it on us." He spoke not in a dramatic way, but almost in a matter-of-fact way--that the most difficult decision he'd ever made was to drop the atomic bomb--a decision which I think, incidentally, was his greatest decision, the most courageous one, and was totally right. I would say, too, that in terms of his manner, at that point, before he was elected in his own right in 1948, he was somewhat humble, very direct, but not at all overbearing, not at all cocky, as he sometimes later came to be. So, all in all, I would say that he made a good personal impression on all of us. I thought right then that those that criticized him because of his lack of education failed to recognize a truth which I have always felt was the case where many leaders are concerned. Education sometimes can strengthen the brain and weaken the backbone. Harry Truman had a pretty good brain, but I can say that his backbone was strong, and that's what sustained him through those years.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:07:24
[Frank Gannon]

He was a--a terrifically crusty figure, and I know there was a lot of shock at the time that the--that your White House tapes were revealed about the language that went--that--that was spoken in the Oval Office, and yet the records indicate that Truman, possibly next to Johnson, had the most salty language, and he was also, by the time he left office, a very unpopular figure. And yet for the last ten years or so, there seems to have been a tremendous revision of opinion about him. Do you--do you have any insights into that?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:08:01
[Richard Nixon]

Well, I would say that, as far as President Truman is concerned, that the revision is taking place for several reasons. One, because as far as those who write that kind of article, who write instant history--most of them are liberal. Most, also, when they do have partisan affiliations, are Democrats. He, in terms of his domestic policy, was very liberal. His Fair Deal was more liberal than the New Deal, and in terms of his partisanship, of course, he was a very partisan Democrat. I think that helped in terms of the revision--the fact that those that are writing it approved of what he was trying to do in those particular areas. In addition to that, I think the fact that Truman was so refreshingly candid--he was an interesting personality. The things that made him unpopular at the last of his service--unpopular because it was combined with the Truman scandals, the war in Korea, which was not being waged effectively, many people thought--those things that made him unpopular then, that crusty, arrogant--what th--many thinks thought arrogant and too cocky attitude made him far more interesting to instant historians today. So, under the circumstances, I would say that the revision is--that that is part of the reason for the revision. Another part of the reason for the revision is that, whatever you want to say about President Truman, whatever about--we want to say about his manners, about the Truman scandals--"the mess in Washington," as Adlai Stevenson called it--and so forth, he was a strong president. He made three great decisions, and that's what the man's hired for--to make the great decisions.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:09:48
[Frank Gannon]

What were the three?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:09:49
[Richard Nixon]

The three--first, of course, was dropping the bomb, which saved at least a million lives, according to experts--if we had gone to take over Japan through conventional arms rather than the nuclear weapont--weapon that was available. The second one was the Greek-Turkish aid program, the so-called Truman Doctrine, which later developed into the Marshall Plan. It was unpopular, and therefore a difficult decision for him politically because it was unpopular with his liberal wing of his party. But he stood up to them, and with the help of some of us who were Republicans, we got the bipartisan support that was needed. And his third, curiously enough, was going into Korea. Now I was critical of him, as were many Republicans, and I think properly so--of the way the war was waged at times. But the decision to go in was right. It was necessary because, had the Communists been allowed to overrun Korea, Japan would at that early point be a sitting duck for Communist takeover. So I would say these three great decisions are ones that make the revisionism with regard to Harry Truman and his place in history most justifiable.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:11:00
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think that there is some kind of inexorable law of--of presidential revisionism that if--that if you can wait long enough or live long enough the distance lends enchantment and reputations are revived? It seems to have happened with Hoover by the time Truman came into office. It happened to Truman by the time you were in office. Do you think it'll happen to Johnson?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:11:24
[Richard Nixon]

Yes, perhaps to a less [sic] extent and much further on down the road. I--I should point out th--however, in terms of the revisionism by the historians, that it is more likely to happen to one who is a liberal and one who is a Democrat, due to the fact that most historians are liberals, and, where they do have party affiliation, are Democrats, than it will, for example, to Herbert Hoover. There's been some revision on Herbert Hoover, but not among the elitists. There's been some on Eisenhower, justifiably so, and there should have been long before. But insofar as--as a place in history for a president is concerned, he has twice as good an opportunity or chance to have a higher place as time goes on if he's a--a liberal rather than a Democrat.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:12:12
[Frank Gannon]

Rather than a Republican.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:12:13
[Richard Nixon]

Yeah, rather than a Republican.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:12:15
[Frank Gannon]

How long's it going to take for Nixon?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:12:18
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, I have no idea about that. I won't speculate.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:12:22
[Frank Gannon]

Harry Truman once said that "[t]here are only two men in the whole history of the country that I can't stand." One was a governor of Missouri that he had helped get elected and then screwed him politically, and the other was guess who. Why do you think he disliked you so much?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:12:40
[Richard Nixon]

Well, the major reason for his dislike goes back to the Hiss case. Certainly when we were there in July of 1947--the four congressmen--he liked us politically because we had given him support on the Republican side that he couldn't get from his liberal Democrats. He liked that. But later on it was my responsibility to conduct the investigation of the Hiss case. That embarrassed Truman. I want to s--make it clear that, as far as Truman is concerned, there was no question that he was an anti-Communist. But where the Hiss case was concerned, he had condemned the Committee on Un-American Activities as trying to bring a red herring into the campaign of 1948. He felt that the--that the investigation was politically motivated, and even though un evidence was brought to his attention that clearly indicated that Hiss had turned over top-secret documents to Soviet agents, he still persisted in condemning the committee, and therefore condemning me. I remember s--so well being told by Bert Andrews of the New York Herald Tribune that when the so-called Pumpkin Papers were brought to Truman's attention by an Assistant Attorney General of the United States, he looked them over, and he said, "The son-of-a-bitch. He re--pr--betrayed his country. The son-of-a-bitch. He betrayed his country." And then he went right out that same day in a press conference, and somebody asked him, "Do you think--still think the investigation's a red herring?" He said, "Yeah. It's a red herring." That's Harry Truman, vintage Harry Truman--politics in terms of trying to evaluate an investigation of that sort.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:14:20
[Frank Gannon]

Didn't he think, though, that you'd added insult to injury by impugning his patriotism by accusing him of being a traitor?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:14:30
[Richard Nixon]

Yes.

[Frank Gannon]

Didn't he carry that on through--

Day 8, Tape 1
00:14:31
[Richard Nixon]

Yes, he--he

[Frank Gannon]

--[unintelligible] something he held against you?

[Richard Nixon]

--felt that was true. It--it wasn't true, of course. As far as the Hiss case is concerned, I earned what he gave to me. Earned it be--it happened that I was right, and of course there was nothing more difficult for a politician than to have somebody else prove him wrong. But beyond that, in this case it happened that his dislike for me was motivated by a wrong impression of what the facts were. The facts were very clear. In a speech in the 1952 campaign at Texarkana, Texas, I made the point that Truman, Acheson, and others in the current leadership of the Democratic Party were traitors to the high principles in which many of the nation's Democrats believed. I didn't say he was a traitor to the country. And so, under the circumstances, it came to his attention. He short-handed it to "traitors to the country" and said Nixon called him a traitor, even though several of my friends who were his friends tried to set him right.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:15:38
[Frank Gannon]

Why do you think an otherwise intelligent, tough-minded man remained impervious to this kind of proof that what you had said was not what he had thought you'd said? Because to the end he carried this idea that you had accused him of being a traitor.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:15:51
[Richard Nixon]

Well, it wasn't just me that he was that way with. He--he was very personal. He just wasn't a Democrat, and a partisan Democrat, he was a personal partisan Democrat. For example, he never forgave Eisenhower for the fact that Eisenhower, after Truman urged him to run as a Democrat, proceeded to become a Republican a--and then to become a Republican president. And that's why he said that--very disparaging things about Eisenhower. After praising him earlier, he said, "He doesn't know as much about politics as a pig does about Sunday." And so, under the circumstances, therefore, he--he--he--he had a tendency to do--to--I would say that that's an indication--in talking about Eisenhower, you could say, "Well, Eisenhower was a Republican, and he was a Democrat." But he had some of the same kind of pithy comments with regard to Adlai Stevenson. He said, "He's an indecisive fellow. He doesn't know whether to go to the bathroom, or when. He can't decide." So I'd say that--that Harry Truman had his likes and dislikes, and they became imbedded in him. He was one who did not forgive, usually.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:17:02
[Frank Gannon]

How did Eisenhower feel about him? Was that feeling reciprocated?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:17:06
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, it was reciprocated in spades. That's why Eisenhower never had him to the White House in those eight years. I think it was a mistake not to have had him. For example, I had Johnson and the Kennedy clan and all the rest to the White House when I became president, but, on the other hand, Eisenhower also had very strong feelings. When somebody impugned what he thought, his intelligence, or his integrity, or so forth, he didn't forgive them.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:17:31
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think Truman disliked you personally?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:17:35
[Richard Nixon]

No, I don't think so. I don't think it was a question of personal dislike. I didn't know him that well to dislike me personally.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:17:43
[Frank Gannon]

He didn't know you well enough to dislike you, as--as the saying goes.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:17:46
[Richard Nixon]

And the point was that he--his--his dislike was basically partisan and political, the Hiss case in the first instance, and the view, too--I--I think you have to have in mind that he was--he was a good Democrat fighting for his candidates. Eisenhower was not a target that would be a very attractive one, because Eisenhower was too popular. I was carrying the load politically for the Republicans, and so, consequently, he zeroed on me--in on me, and I zeroed in on him. But I did not become personal with him. I didn't take him on, for example, for some of the things that he did.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:18:24
[Action note: Gannon starts to speak.]

[Richard Nixon]

I attacked "the mess in Washington," of course, and so forth.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:18:28
[Frank Gannon]

Was Eisenhower a--a long, hard grudge-holder? Was he a good hater?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:18:35
[Richard Nixon]

Not a hater, no, that--Eisenhower is not--I wouldn't classify him that way, the same way you would classify a--a usual partisan. But, on the other hand, he had a long, long memory, and sometimes, because he was not a politician, or--he would take things personally that a politician would let roll off the back. That was why, also, he didn't want to have Stevenson come to the White House, because he thought Stevenson had said some things that were beyond the pale in the campaign of '52, and he wouldn't let his staff bring Stevenson in to see him, even when he felt--they felt that Stevenson coming to the White House might help Eisenhower get through a program for foreign aid. That was the way Eisenhower was.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:19:23
[Frank Gannon]

Your relationship with Harry Truman wasn't entirely grim. I think there were a couple of lighter moments to it.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:19:31
[Richard Nixon]

Yes, we--we had some lighter moments. One I particularly remember was when I was the Republican speaker at a Gridiron dinner--this is after Truman had left the presidency--and before the dinner, they have a custom of having the head table all get together in a small room just before you go into the main dining room, at the [Statler Hilton Hotel], where those dinners were held at that time. I was at that reception, and I saw Harry Truman sort of standing over by himself, alone. Sometimes a former president can become very lonely. And as I saw him standing there, I went over to the bar--I knew the bartender well--and I said, "Make Mr. Truman his drink." And he says, "Oh, it's bourbon." So he poured bourbon on the rocks. I took it--it was Jack Daniel's, incidentally, a very good bourbon. I took the drink and took it over to Harry Truman. I said, "Mr. President, here's a bourbon for you." And he said, "Thank you, sir. You're a real gentleman." Then we went in to make the speeches, and I made the Republican speech, the usual ten-minute speech, part of it serious, a--and ending usually on what is supposed to be a half-serious, or humorous, note. And so I related that incident to the press people and the other bigwigs that were there for the dinner. The theme of the dinner that night was that--"Everything Is Made for Love." All the songs were "Everything is Made for Love." And so I said, "I know the theme of this particular dinner. I want to tell you an incident that proves that that theme is correct." I said, " I went in and I saw Harry Truman tonight. I brought him a bourbon, and you know what happened? He took it and thanked me for it. And I can assure you that when Harry Truman will take a glass of bourbon from Dick Nixon and drink it without asking somebody else to taste it first--that's love."

Day 8, Tape 1
00:21:29
[Frank Gannon]

D--do you think the theme was right? Is everything made for love?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:21:32
[Richard Nixon]

It has--you have to say that now and then. But as far as war and politics are concerned, love plays very, very little part.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:21:43
[Frank Gannon]

We have some film of an event in your presidency, when you went out to Independence, Missouri, and took with you, to present to President Truman for the Truman Library, the piano that he had played in the White House. Do you have any recollections as you see this film?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:22:01
[Richard Nixon]

Well, the piano was on the second floor of the White House.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:22:04
[Action note: Film clip begins.]

[Richard Nixon]

It was sort of a beaten-up thing in any event, but that wasn't the reason we took it. As a matter of fact, Harry Truman wanted that piano--I am sure he wanted it not because he had played it, which he had, but because his Ma--daughter Margaret had also used it. Of course she had become quite an accomplished singer. And so, under the circumstances, I just loaded the piano onto Air Force One. We flew it out to Independence and presented it to him. And then I see a picture there of me playing the piano, and there's Harry Truman standing behind me clapping. But let me tell you, he--he was not one to go overboard. After all, I had a f--I play by ear now, and I had a few blue notes. I was playing "The Missouri Waltz," and he didn't say, "That's excellent." He says, "That's pretty good."

Day 8, Tape 1
00:22:53
[Frank Gannon]

What was--did you have any dealings at all with Mrs. Truman, any impressions of her?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:22:58
[Richard Nixon]

Only at a distance, of course, and meeting her at--at the White House reception, and meeting her, of course, then, and when I went out to President Truman's funeral. I liked her. She was down-to-earth, Midwestern, no airs, very strong. I think she was a very good influence on him. Incidentally, in that connection--this may be an apocryphal story, but it's, to me, one of the most amusing ones. Truman could get very rough in campaigns. They think I'm rough, but I campaigned on issues. I would be rough on people on the issues, but as far as Truman is concerned, he could get very, very personal. And at one point, he--out on the stump, he said, "The Republican platform ought to be a manure spreader." And one of his aides talked to Mrs. Truman, according to this story, and said, "Mrs. Truman, you know, it--it would be better i--i--if you could have him say, 'fertilizer spreader.' 'Manure's a little crude." She said, 'Look, you don't know how many years it took before I could get him to say 'manure'!"

Day 8, Tape 1
00:24:07
[Frank Gannon]

Looking back at that '52 campaign, do you see the--any of the language you use and--used, and particularly the--the line about "traitors to the high principles of the Democratic Party," as being inflammatory or excessive, because, after all, at that time the whole issue of loyalty and of Communist infiltration was a--was a tough issue being used against the Democrats. Even to use the word "traitors to the high principles"--was that a--was that a buzzword that--

Day 8, Tape 1
00:24:37
[Richard Nixon]

It wasn't intended to be, under any circumstances. As a matter of fact, in that same campaign, an issue that developed was that Bill Jenner, the senator from Indiana, had a--had coined the phrase of "twenty years of treason." And I made the point that there was only one party of treason in the United States--the Communist Party. So I constantly tried to reassure audiences that the problem was not a party--one party being the party of treason and the other party being the party of loyalty. And I--I must say that in all campaigns the rhetoric gets excessive. I think, for example, a--in retrospect, that I was too rough on Acheson. Acheson was wrong on the issue. He never understood it. He didn't go there enough, if at all, when he was secretary of state. But he was right on Europe, and deserves high mark for the leadership he provided on the Marshall Plan and in other areas. And I was overly rough on him, just as Harry Truman might have been a little overly rough on me.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:25:47
[Frank Gannon]

There's a book that's recently been published about the Rosenberg case, which, if it's true, upsets the liberal pantheon in that, based on government and other documents, it indicates that the Rosenbergs were, in fact, guilty, al--at least Julius Rosenberg was specifically guilty and Ethel to a--perhaps to a lesser extent. But it also indicates that the government went overboard in framing a case against them. Does that--did that shock you as you read about that, or surprise you, or f--make you feel vindicated?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:26:23
[Richard Nixon]

No, as far as the Rosenberg case was concerned, of course, that final decision, the decision not to delay the sentence, was President Eisenhower's. I was in the room when it happened. It was in the Cabinet Room, and I recall very well the attorney general, Herbert Brownell, and Bill Rogers, the deputy attorney general, bringing the facts to the president, to his attention, and the decision was made. Not in that room--he made it later--

Day 8, Tape 1
00:26:48
[Frank Gannon]

[Unintelligible.]

[Richard Nixon]

--as he always did.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:26:49
[Frank Gannon]

Did anybody argue for--

Day 8, Tape 1
00:26:50
[Richard Nixon]

No.

[Frank Gannon]

--clemency?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:26:51
[Richard Nixon]

No. The evidence was clear. There was no question about their guilt, as even this book--in which the authors started out convinced they were innocent and then came around to c--becoming convinced they were guilty.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:27:03
[Frank Gannon]

Does it bother you, though, that some of the evidence--although they were apparently guilty--that some of the evidence was--was cooked by the F.B.I. to make them appear even more guilty--

Day 8, Tape 1
00:27:12
[Richard Nixon]

If we had--

[Frank Gannon]

--which might have affected the judgment on clemency, at least for Ethel Rosenberg?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:27:15
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, certainly. If I had known--if we had known that at the time--if President Eisenhower had known it, he might have taken a different view with regard to her. In other words, tainted evidence, even though a person is totally guilty, is a reason to get him off. Take Daniel Ellsberg. Daniel Ellsberg was guilty of t--of illegally taking top-secret papers from the Pentagon and turning them over to be published in a newspaper. And yet, because the evidence was tainted, he's scot-free, making a lot of monies on the lecture circuit, particularly at the elite Ivy League colleges. So, as far as Mrs. Rosenberg was concerned, she was entitled to get off on that basis, too.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:27:54
[Frank Gannon]

Does it disillusion you about J. Edgar Hoover that presumably he--it wouldn't have been done without his knowledge, if, indeed, without his direction--that the F.B.I. was cooking evidence in such a way?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:28:04
[Richard Nixon]

Well, I wouldn't--I f--I followed that book that you refer to. And the case they made for cooking the evidence is--is pretty weak. It's--it's a question of, really, a--a matter of judgment, and there isn't any c--if--if you look at the times then, at you took--if you look at the fact that the Soviet Union acquired the atomic bomb two to three years before we thought they could, all the evidence points to the fact they wouldn't have gotten it if it hadn't been for not only our atomic spies, but the British atomic spies. You can see why overzealous prosecutors, and those that are assisting prosecutors, like J. Edgar Hoover, would certainly tilt their prosecution and their investigation in a way toward guilt, rather than toward innocence. Now if you look at it coolly, in retrospect, at this point, certainly we would have preferred that it not be done. But at the time I understand why it was done. And let us understand--Mrs. Rosenberg was guilty. This wasn't a case of somebody not guilty going to the chair.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:29:11
[Frank Gannon]

Do you remember your first meeting and your first impressions of John Kennedy?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:29:19
[Richard Nixon]

Well, our first meeting, actually, was in the committee. He was a member of the Education and Labor Committee. He was from a liberal district in Massachusetts, and I was a member of that same committee, and I was a conservative Republican from California. In the new Congress, the way you determine seniority for a committee is to draw straws. He drew straws on the Democratic side. He drew the last straw. In other words, he became the l--became the low man on the totem pole. I drew straws on the Republican side. There were seven new members on the Republican side. I got the last straw, number seven. So I was the low member on the Republican side, and, as somebody might have put it, we were bookends on that committee--political booklends--ends--and literal bookends. On the committee I learned to respect him, and I think he learned to respect me, because by the time the questioning got around to those of us at the end, all the good questions had been asked, so we really had to do a great deal of work in order to have good, precise questions to ask. We worked together, not conspiratorially, but independently, particularly in questioning labor leaders who had infiltrated--labor leaders that--or C--or Communist-leaning labor leader--leaders that infiltrated the labor unions. His questioning was extremely good, and independently I had come to similar conclusions, and so we played each other very well at that point.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:30:46
[Frank Gannon]

He was a strong anti-Communist then?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:30:48
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, yes, very strong, very strong. Well, later on, because we were members of that committee, we both received an invitation, with no honorariums, incidentally. This was before the days of honorariums of any significance. Frank Buchanan--I remember him so well--the silver-haired liberal Democratic congressman from McKeesport, Pennsylvania, right outside of Pittsburgh, said y--there's a big civic dinner up there, that they wanted to have the Taft-Hartley bill, which I had supported and Kennedy had opposed--they wanted to have it debated and wondered if we would go up and debate it. Well, independently, he agreed to do so, and I agreed to de--do so. And so we went up to McKeesport, Pennsylvania. I don't recall the debate. I don't think anybody that was there would particularly recall it, because we were nothing then. We were just a couple of junior senators. I think most of those who were there, because the audience was primarily business-oriented, although some labor leaders were there as well--most of them agreed that I had, perhaps, had a bit better of the argument, I think--had the better of it, because, I think, had the better case. And, incidentally, I don't think he had his heart in that case, either. While he came from a liberal Democratic district, he was concerned about the excesses that some labor unions had been guilty of, and he wanted some restraints on them. Well, the debate was over, and it was late at night, and that's before w--there were good airplane flights from Pittsburgh to Washington. And so we took the night sleeper train. I can remember very well that particular occasion, and again we had to do some drawing of straws because the only two bunks left were in the same compartment, an upper and a lower. And I drew, and he drew, and this time I won. I got the lower berth, he got the l--upper berth. Didn't make a lot of difference because we didn't sleep all the way back. We talked, and mainly about what we agreed on. You always do that when you're in Congress, and with people that are personal friends though political opponents. And so we talked about foreign policy, about the problems in Europe, and the problems that might come up in Asia and the rest. I don't remember anything--any discussion whatever of domestic policy.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:33:03
[Frank Gannon]

Didn't he become a--an unlikely contributor to your Senate campaign?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:33:10
[Richard Nixon]

Yes. In fact, I should point out that, while our relations were not buddy-buddy--in fact, except for a very few, he didn't have buddy-buddy relations with anybody. He was not that--he was not the gregarious type that Teddy Kennedy is, for example. But they were--they were friendly and personal.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:33:28
[Frank Gannon]

Who was he buddy-buddy with?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:33:30
[Richard Nixon]

George Smathers was a very good friend of his, for example. I would say, however, that in terms of--of his--our personal relationship, I could summarize it this way. He invited me, or, I should say, Eunice Kennedy, his sister who was his official hostess before he got married--to his--to his home, his Georgetown home, for a stag dinner, or I think there may have been another one as well. And they were very gracious, and the conversation was very spirited. I recall, too, being invited to his wedding--this was later on--and there were occasions when we had the opportunity of meeting on a--on a--on a very impersonal, social basis. But--but John Kennedy was not one of the group that played handball down in the gym. I did that. He was not one that--

Day 8, Tape 1
00:34:26
[Frank Gannon]

Were you any good?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:34:27
[Richard Nixon]

I was fair, but--not as good as some, but I couldn't play enough. So, in any event, we had a good personal relationship in that respect. I remember, incidentally, to show you how things can change in terms of political affiliations and the rest, the first time that I met his father, Joe Kennedy, the legendary Joe Kennedy, it was in 1960. This was before the nomination, and Joe Kennedy and Teddy Kennedy were standing outside the Colony Restaurant in New York City, and I shook hands with them. And this is the first time I'd met Joe Kennedy, and he said, "I just want you to know how much I admire you for what you've done in the Hiss case and in these--this Communist activity of yours." He says, "If Jack doesn't get it, I'll be for you." Teddy didn't say anything, but I hoped that he felt the same way. I saw Joe Kennedy later, incidentally, that same year. I was on my way to California by plane, and he was on the same plane with a beautiful girl. Oh, she was a raving beauty. And so I saw him, and I shook hands, and he introduced her to me as his niece. I don't know whether he had a niece out there or not, but she was a beauty. But as far as--as Kennedy himself was concerned, for example, he used to bring me--he'd bring me a book on occasion. I remember particularly, and I still have it in my library--he brought me the book To Light a Candle by [Father Keller], about the Christophers. It was inscribed by Father Keller. This is an indication of the kind of relationship it was.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:36:16
[Frank Gannon]

Did you consider that you were friends?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:36:18
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, yes, we were friends--not close friends, but we were not enemies by any ch--by any stretch of the imagination. We never had a hard word between ourselves, never.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:36:30
[Frank Gannon]

You'd started to tell about the--the 1950 campaign.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:36:34
[Richard Nixon]

Well, this--in 1950, he came into the outer office. My secretary buzzed and said, "Congressman Kennedy is here." And so, of course, he came right in, and he handed me an envelope. He said, "You know, I know you've got a tough campaign against Helen Gahagan Douglas, and the family'd like to contribute." So he handed it to me, and it was a thousand dollars in cash. Later on, I think it was quite embarrassing to him, and he wanted it made very clear that the contribution was from his father and not for him personally. But he was delivering it. There was no question that--whose side he was on, and later on, after the election, when he was speaking at Harvard, he said that he was not unhappy about my defeating Helen Gahagan Douglas, because he had not found her one that he'd like to work with in the Congress of the United States.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:37:23
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think the money was, in fact, from him, or was it from his father?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:37:28
[Richard Nixon]

Doesn't make any difference. The Kennedy money is all in one pot, and he got--he had a chance to get it. I think--let me put it this way. Unless he had wanted me to beat Helen Gahagan Douglas, that money would never have come, because I didn't know his father at that time. I'm sure what happened is that he s--told his father that--"Well, this is one of the coming lights here," and his father was anti-Communist and felt, because of what I'd done in the Hiss case, which was already under the belt at that point, that he'd like to be on that side. No, I don't think he was an errand boy for his father. The money may have come from this father, but he wanted it done, too. There was no question about that. He was on my side in that campaign.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:38:10
[Frank Gannon]

It's been written that--or a lot has been written about the patriarch's tremendous influence on the Kennedy family--that Joe set the--the tone and the pace for the entire family, and indeed it was his thwarted presidential ambitions that led him to expect his son Joe, Junior, and then when he died, John, and then when he died, Robert, and now Edward--that the--the mantle sort of fell to them. It's also been argued, or written, that the fact that he was very open in his--you mentioned his--his niece, but there are stories that, when Gloria Swanson was his mistress, he actually had her on a boat to England with Rose Kennedy, and she simply had to accommodate herself to the--to the women that he brought around. And it's been argued that that influenced the Kennedy family's attitude towards women generally. Do you see anything to that in your observation of him or them?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:39:07
[Richard Nixon]

No. As far as he was concerned, I, frankly, wasn't particularly interested in what his extracurricular life was. And I must say this. Insofar as the time before he went to the White House, and I can't speak for what happened then--he was quite circumspect about it. I mean, he didn't flaunt it around and run around with the--the babes, particularly after--after he was married.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:39:37
[Frank Gannon]

Do y--m--my guess is--I don't want to--

Day 8, Tape 1
00:39:40
[Richard Nixon]

Yeah.

[Frank Gannon]

--wrong anybody, but that there's not much action on the streets of McKeesport after dark--but after that debate, or in your experiences with him at that time, did you see--with John Kennedy--did you see any of the ladies' man that the reports subsequently indicated were there?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:39:57
[Richard Nixon]

No, I really didn't. As I said, it isn't something that I discussed with him. Maybe we were--we weren't that close. Maybe that's something that a very close friend, like maybe a George Smathers, might have talked with him about, but I--I can never dis--I can never remember a discussion with him about girls. I don't recall his being known having a reputation around the House--the House of Rep--Representatives--that is, around the office building--as being one who's chasing the girls. I am sure, based on what we have read since, that he was rather active, and, he of course apparently came by it through inheritance, through his father, who was quite a swordsman.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:40:46
[Frank Gannon]

In 1952, when you were nominated at the Chicago convention, John Kennedy wrote you a letter which you reprint in your memoirs, and I wonder if you'd read it for us.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:41:03
[Richard Nixon]

This is a handwritten letter, incidentally. "Dear Dick, I was tremendously pleased that the convention selected you for vice president. I was always convinced that you would move ahead to the top, but I never thought it would come this quickly. You are an ideal selection and will bring a great deal of strength to the ticket. Please give my best wishes to your wife." I must say, incidentally, that our communication in that respect was not just one-sided. I--I wrote to him in 1956, after he had tried to gain the nomination on the Democratic ticket, and he made a very good run for it--almost got the nomination but was turned down, probably because he was a Catholic, at that point. But, in any event, I wrote to him afterwards and congratulated him on a very good race, and I think he appreciated that fact.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:42:10
[Frank Gannon]

Could--

[Richard Nixon]

That's something that you do in politics. I--I wrote to Hubert Humphrey after he lost the nomination back in 1972. I write, as I've often said, to losers as well as winners, because I had been both.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:42:27
[Frank Gannon]

Could you read again just the last? You left out one--

Day 8, Tape 1
00:42:31
[Richard Nixon]

Let's see--

[Frank Gannon]

--section of the very last paragraph there.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:42:37
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, yes. Want me to read the whole thing again? I--see, I didn't bring my glasses. I forgot about them.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:42:43
[Offscreen voice]

Let's read the whole thing again.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:42:44
[Richard Nixon]

All right.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:42:45
[Frank Gannon]

Okay.

[Richard Nixon]

This was a letter that was, incidentally, written by hand, and it said, "Dear Dick, I was tremendously pleased that the convention selected you for vice president. I was always convinced you would move ahead to the top, but I never thought you could come this quickly." No, th--sorry. "Dear Dick, I was tremendously pleased that the convention selected you for vice president. I was always convinced that you would move ahead to the top, but I never thought it would come this quickly. You were an ideal selection and will bring great strength to the ticket. Please give my best to your wife, and all kinds of good luck to you."

Day 8, Tape 1
00:43:32
[Frank Gannon]

You've described your first meetings--meeting with and impressions of John Kennedy--Congressman John Kennedy. Do you remember your last meeting with President John Kennedy?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:43:46
[Richard Nixon]

Well, the last meeting was not a meeting. It was a telephone call. We were in Rome at the time on a family vacation in 1963, and he was in Rome on a state visit. And it happened that we were in the same hotel, and he was there for a meeting, and I was, of course, staying there. And he called on the phone. It was a very--just a--a friendly call. He said he hoped we had a good vacation, and I wished him good luck. And six weeks later, of course, he was dead.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:44:19
[Frank Gannon]

Do you remember how you heard about his death? For--for one generation of Americans, just like for an--for an earlier one--everybody remembers where they were when F.D.R. died and--in your generation. In my generation, I think, everybody remembers where they were when they heard about President Kennedy's death. Do you remember?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:44:39
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, yes. I was in a taxicab. I had been in Dallas that very morning, as a matter of fact. I'd been out there for a board meeting of the Pepsi-Cola Company, of which I--our firm was general counsel. And I remember driving through the streets of Dallas. They were deserted, and the barricades were up for the parade that was to go through the city. I got a cab from the airport--was driving in and--at the--I think it was right at the 59th Street Bridge, where y--from Queens on fifty-nine--strike that. I remember that our cab was stopped at--in Queens just as you come into 59th Street, and--at a stoplight, and a man ran over from the curb and said to the cab driver, "Do you have a radio in your car?" He said, "No." He said, "President Kennedy's just been shot!" Well, we didn't have a radio, and the cab went on, and I--all the way back in--took an--tw--another twenty, twenty-five minutes before we got to the apartment, I wonder what in the world has happened. So we got into the apartment, and I immediately got on the phone. I got J. Edgar Hoover on the line, and I said, "What happened? Who was it? One of the right-wing nuts?" And Hoover responded, "No, it was a Commonest [sic]." He never said "Communist." He always said "Commonest." And that's how I learned it.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:46:07
[Frank Gannon]

Didn't--you've written that he later told you that you might have been the target.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:46:12
[Richard Nixon]

Yes. Hoover told me later that Mrs. Oswald said that she locked her husband the day before into the bathroom because he had a gun and said he was going to get me, because, of course, I was--happened to be in Dallas the day before at this board meeting. Apparently, if this story is true, and I have no reason to believe that Edgar Hoover made it up, it means that this man was a little bit off his rocker and was out to get anybody that he thought was possibly against what he stood for.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:46:50
[Frank Gannon]

What--what was your personal reaction when you found that President Kennedy was, in fact, dead?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:46:57
[Richard Nixon]

Well, it was the reaction of, I think, most everybody, that--first, one of sadness, profound sadness, the tragedy of it all, a man so young with so much life ahead, the tragedy for him, for hims--his family, for his supporters and friends, for the free world generally, the tragedy for the country--that a--an assassination could take place and be allowed to take place. That certainly was something that ran through my mind. I didn't have any feeling that there but for the grace of God go I. I had--I had--after all, I'm very fatalistic about life in general. And as far as I'm concerned, I always feel that what you have to do is to live life to the hilt. You have to--I always start out each day figuring this day may be the last, and live it right to the hilt. If you shortchange life, you shortchange yourself. You never look back, but always go forward. I think President Kennedy, John Kennedy, felt the same way, and the tragedy that he had to have his life snuffed short, to an extent, I think, is balanced by the fact that he lived it to the hilt.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:48:20
[Frank Gannon]

How do you feel about the use of the insanity plea in assassination attempt cases? For example, John Hinckley has recently and successfully used it in his attack on President Reagan.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:48:32
[Richard Nixon]

Well, I suppose the--what I consider the responsible su--proposals to modify the plea, so that it just isn't used--made up--"temporary s--insanity." If you have temporary insanity, you can say that everybody, any cold-blooded murderer, is temporarily insane. At the present time, the plea covers far too many people who, frankly, should pay for their crimes.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:49:01
[Frank Gannon]

We--we--I think we've anticipated the answer to this question, but I'll--I'll ask it anyway. We have a ph--a photograph of you and Mrs. Nixon standing next to the catafalque at the Kennedy lying in state in the Rotunda of the Capitol. Do you remember what you were thinking or what was going through your mind as you stood there looking at his coffin?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:49:33
[Richard Nixon]

Well, I'm not one that is going to say that I had profound feelings at such a time and so forth. That isn't the way it was. I--I think my feelings were the same--any person who was, as I had been, a personal friend, one who respected him, although he had been my political opponent--respected him as a man and particularly as president of the United States. I think the primary feeling was one of the tragedy of it all, of a life being snuffed out. Even though he was against me, even though he was an opponent, in our system the better the competition, the better the eventual leader's going to be. And he was a great competitor, and in that sense the loss to the country was irreparable. Then, of course, just the human tragedy of it all.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:50:30
[Frank Gannon]

A lot has been written and spoken, and--and even sung, about the -- the Kennedy style, that sort of collection of events and attitudes and conduct which for one brief shining moment created Camelot on the--on the Potomac. One might expect that you have a--a slightly different approach to the Kennedy style. How would you describe the Kennedy style?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:51:03
[Richard Nixon]

Well, I would describe it first as being suave, smooth, debonair, and that appealed, of course, to many in the media, who--who are more, frankly, suckers for style than average people, for that matter.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:51:21
[Frank Gannon]

Are they suave, smooth, and debonair themselves?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:51:23
[Richard Nixon]

No, but they want to be. They always admire it, but i--in Kennedy they saw somebody that they would like to be and so consequently it--it appealed to them. Also that th--I guess, the Kennedy style had to do with the fact that he was considered to be an intellectual.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:51:46
[Frank Gannon]

Was he?

[Richard Nixon]

He--I would rate him more so than most in that office. He was a good phrase-maker. He read books. Many don't. And--and whether he was or not is not so important as that he enjoyed the company of--of intelligent people, of intellectuals. He made them feel important, and that was the case. But th--I think another thing that appealed to the media was that he was more than simply a suave, smooth intellectual, or l--Ivy League l--intellectual. He was Ivy League, but he was also Boston Irish, and that was a big difference. I think the fact that--that John Kennedy very much approved of the designation that was given to him by Joe Alsop tells us about--tells us one of the reasons why he had this charisma. He was a "Stevenson with balls," and therefore he was one that attracted the--the people who wanted a young, courageous man in the presidency and yet one who was smooth and graceful. Basically that's the mark of royalty.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:52:02
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think that the Kennedys are American royalty?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:52:07
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, in their minds, certainly. And I think that tells part of the story. And in the minds of many of the media, yes. Nothing else can explain the way that Teddy Kennedy, despite the defeats he has suffered and despite his background, is still a very formidable potential candidate for president of the United States. It's the Kennedy mystique. It's still there. It's going to last as long as one of them's living.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:52:36
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think that Americans long for the grandeur and the pageantry and the s--and the security of a royal family? Do they look for that in leaders?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:52:45
[Richard Nixon]

Some do, yes.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:52:47
[Frank Gannon]

Is that healthy?

[Richard Nixon]

Whether the majority do or not--I don't think it's particularly unhealthy. I--it depends on--on how you--how it's really defined. I would say that, generally speaking, you find that many Americans--that they want their leaders to be somebody different from themselves. The--the present-day politician thinks that the way to lead is to be like the other people, just to be like the man next door. Well, people aren't going to vote for the man next door. They want their leader to be somebody who is different, bigger than life, different from themselves. Not one that is like them.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:54:26
[Frank Gannon]

Some of the Kennedy people--in fact, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., is the man who gave it the phrase--have said that the Nixon presidency was an imperial presidency. Was that your attempt to give the American people that aspect of a--of a royal family in your kind of leadership?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:54:44
[Richard Nixon]

No. I would say that--I would say the Kennedy presidency is the one that qualifies as the imperial presidency more than any other. It had the glamour. It had the trappings. It had the--the--the--the phrases and so forth of the imperial presidency. I think in our case we tried to--to be--to run the office in a way that was dignified, but not in a way that made us--made it necessary for people to bow down and--and in effect treat us as the royalty. I never thought of it that way.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:55:25
[Frank Gannon]

I think the real point of the Schlesinger book was that--that your administration's use of power, your approach to the power of the office, was an imperial one. How would you compare your approach to power and your administration's approach to power to the Kennedy administration's approach to power?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:55:40
[Richard Nixon]

Ineffective.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:55:42
[Frank Gannon]

Who--what--which was ineffective?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:55:44
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, ours.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:55:45
[Frank Gannon]

Compared to theirs?

[Richard Nixon]

Oh, yes, yes, yes. They--they really know how to use power, and they used it ruthlessly. Well, let's--let's use a couple of examples. You heard about wiretapping, and people would think that the first time anybody was ever wiretapped was in our administration. Now, this is going to surprise a lot of people, but the highest number of wiretaps, even higher than those that were necessarily applied for national security purposes in the Korean War and those that were applied for national security fur--purposes in the Vietnam War--the highest number of "national security"--so-called--wiretaps was in 1963 by Bobby Kennedy when he was attorney general for John F. Kennedy. And they used the wiretaps were for what I would say were questionable national security purposes. For example, they wiretapped one reporter that they found was writing a book on Marilyn Monroe that might have some derogatory comments about Kennedys in them. I don't think you can find any of that in our case. Some of ours may not have b--should not have been applied, but we tried to have a national security justification for them. Leaks, for example, of classified material was the [or "a"] primary reason we had for wiretapping. The--the handling of the press, for example--there is a great deal of discussion about the fact that we were s--trying to use the power of the presidency to silence the press, and so forth. But let's look at how they used it so effectively. Their--a story appeared, apparently--carried on se--on C.B.S. after the 1960 elections, indicating that the Catholic vote had been stirred up by the Kennedys during the election so that there was a pro-Catholic backlash among Protestants and the rest. And Kennedy was furious, and he called in [Frank Stanton], the president of C.B.S., and took him to t--on the carpet about it. And Stanton said, "Well," he said, "look. We weren't using this for the first time. The print media's used this story before." And then Kennedy looked him in the eye and said, "Yes, but they aren't lion--licensed by the federal government." And inc--of course, predictably, C.B.S. soft-pedaled the story thereafter. Now that's the use of power, and using it effectively. And in campaigning we have some pretty good examples. I think of Dick Tuck and others like him--th--the c--what they did, the way they would foul up schedules, the way they'd have demonstrators and hecklers and so forth, to follow us around on the campaign trail. And they made poor Donald Segretti and his little group of collegiate people look like a--like the amateur hour. What I am suggesting is that, while the Kennedy campaign did not develop--did not initiate or invent dirty tricks, they were the most professional in using them of any campaign that I know of.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:58:52
[Frank Gannon]

You--you tell these stories with such seeming relish. Do you envy this toughness, and almost ruthlessness in--

Day 8, Tape 1
00:59:02
[Richard Nixon]

No, I--

[Frank Gannon]

--campaigning?

Day 8, Tape 1
00:59:03
[Richard Nixon]

No, the only thing I envy is the effectiveness. I think things sh--I think--I think if you're going to engage in activities for which you are going to be held account, as you should, that they should be effective. That's why, for example, in the field of foreign policy, it turns me off to have congressmen and senators, or other leaders, huff and puff about the Communists and so forth, and then when it comes to doing something effective, they back away. I'm interested in a policy being effective above everything else. And let me say, the Kennedys got it done. They got the job done. They were very effective.

Day 8, Tape 1
00:59:40
[Frank Gannon]

There are those who argue that President Reagan is not u--

The following text appears in the original transcript but does not appear on a tape. It has not been edited.

[Frank Gannon]

--nlike these congress--in light of the recent shooting down of the Korean Airlines jet--is not unlike these congressmen you mentioned--that he's talked about the "evil empire" in the past, that he's huffed and puffed about the Soviets, but that when it came to actually going on television and doing something about it, he talks about suspending landing rights for a certain amount of time. Has his reaction been properly tough in these terms, do you think, in terms of being effective?

[Richard Nixon]

Well, any criticism I would have, I, of course, would make to him personally, because I follow the ground rule of not criticizing the president in the foreign policy area.

[Frank Gannon]

Have you done so?

[Richard Nixon]

No. I'm not--I haven't criticized him. My view is that, once it's done, then you look to the future. I think in this case he's between a rock and a hard place. He had to be tough with regard to what--

Day Eight, Tape two of four, LINE FEED #2, 6-13-83, ETI Reel #56
June 13, 1983

Day 8, Tape 2
00:00:53
[Action note: Screen goes black.]

Day 8, Tape 2
00:00:57
[Action note: Picture appears on screen.]

Day 8, Tape 2
00:00:59
[Richard Nixon]

--was done. It was an unconscionable action. But in terms of what he could do, he had to recognize that whatever we might want to say, even after this incident, things remain the same. I mean, after all, those that murder their way to the tops in the K--to the top in the Kremlin are not going to have any qualms about murder in the sky, and that's all this indicates. The Soviet [sic] have been this way before. This is the latest example of it, but they are there, and what we have to do is to find a way to give them incentives to keep the peace and incentives against this kind of activity in a hard-headed way.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:01:38
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think this went to the top in the Kremlin, or do you think it was a local error--callous, brutal, but in--a local error?

Day 8, Tape 2
00:01:44
[Richard Nixon]

Local error. No, there is--I don’t know Mr. Andropov personally, but from everything that I know about him he's a highly intelligent man. He has a good sense of public relations for one who lives in that kind of closed society. He was trying at this particular time to sort of cool things down between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and they were reaching out in terms of trade and other areas. They need us, let's face it. He's trying to disarm the armament movement in Europe, and in the United States, for that matter. He's trying to help the peace groups. And he's--he's not a stupid man. He's not going to shoot himself in the foot. No. I think he--I wouldn't be surprised to see somebody executed for what happened here, just for stupidity.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:02:36
[Frank Gannon]

Will we ever--

Day 8, Tape 2
00:02:37
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[Frank Gannon]

--know about that?

Day 8, Tape 2
00:02:38
[Richard Nixon]

No.

[Frank Gannon]

Would they make that public?

Day 8, Tape 2
00:02:39
[Richard Nixon]

Never.

[Frank Gannon]

But that--that would be the s--the strength of their response to a mistake like this--

Day 8, Tape 2
00:02:42
[Richard Nixon]

That's right.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:02:43
[Frank Gannon]

--and the nature of their--

[Richard Nixon]

That's right.

[Frank Gannon]

--kind of response?

Day 8, Tape 2
00:02:44
[Richard Nixon]

It is possible that it would be that way. On the other hand, there was a similar incident to this about--in nineteen--five years ago, in 1978. A Korean--another Korean plane got off-course. It was downed. Two people were killed. What happened there--that there was investigation, apparently, in the Soviet Union, and at least two of those responsible for allowing the plane in and the handling of the matter were executed. The point is you're more likely to have an execution of one of those on the ground who allowed an intruder to get into Soviet airspace than one who, even mistakenly, shot it down. I am simply saying he would have no qualms about it. My guess is, however, that he is very, very paranoiac about having any intrusion in the airspace, and he would hesitate to take action that would discourage people--his own people on the ground--from avoiding it.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:03:50
[Frank Gannon]

Is Sakhalin Island like Dr. No's island? Is there something going on there that's so secret that they're--that they're super-sensitive about that particular place?

Day 8, Tape 2
00:04:01
[Richard Nixon]

I don't know, but I would hope that investigation is being made in that direction. I und--I would think that it is a very, very important base, or otherwise they wouldn't be quite that paranoiac about it.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:04:13
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think Andropov is capable, if it had come up to him, of making a decision to take out--to take down a--an unarmed passenger plane if he had been told that it was over this sensitive area?

Day 8, Tape 2
00:04:26
[Richard Nixon]

No doubt about it. No, after all, we have to remember, in the Soviet Union, I don't know of any Soviet le--lu--leader who's been the head of the Soviet Union that didn't murder his way to the top. I don't mean by that individually, here and there, but executions, participating in purges, and so forth. That is one of the requirements for going up in the Soviet hierarchy. He was the head of the K.G.B. They not only execute people, murder them, entrap them, send them to clinics where they use all co--sorts of psychological pressures on them, and the rest--psychiatric, I should say. But of course they would do it. They--they will do anything that serves the cause. On the other hand, he's not going to engage in activities that he feels are going to be harmful. Let me put it another way. When we talk about--when we try to influence the Soviet by appealing to their morality, it's like two ships going in the night. They have a different view of morality, a different view of the world, than we have--what is right and what is wrong. For example, a pathetic gesture like taking it to the United Nations, figuring that world opinion is going to make them change. Condemning the Soviet Union in the United S--Nations is like making faces at the Sphinx. It isn't going to affect them. Now, what may affect them, from a pragmatic standpoint, is the realization that if world opinion is totally against them--that then--that will lead to a bigger arms buildup in the world and less progress in areas that they want. But they’re not going to be affected by an argument that it's moral or immoral to have somebody killed. After all, Lenin--every Soviet leader that has ever lived has indicated that there are times when lifes [sic] must be sacrificed for the greater good. Any means to an end.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:06:37
[Frank Gannon]

There were some criticisms that President Reagan had used this incident to push his own defense program, the--the M.X. and the Pershing. Do--do you s--see anything to that criticism?

Day 8, Tape 2
00:06:54
[Richard Nixon]

Well, I hope he did use it for that purpose. I don't know what these idiots are thinking about. When you have this--this--a Soviet leadership exposed for what it is--this incident, which is an indication of the problem that we have--that's a very good argument to develop our strength. And I am--I totally approve of President Reagan asking the American people and our allies abroad to realize the kind of a world we live in. It's very, very dangerous, and we have to recognize that if they're going to engage in this kind of activity, we've got to have the military strength, because that will deter them. They are not going to be deterred by a resolution in the United Nations. They may be deterred by the fact that we would be able to react or might react more strongly than such a revolu--resolution. So when President Reagan addresses the issue in that way, he's right on, in my opinion.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:07:53
[Frank Gannon]

But you do distance yourself from the conservatives who--the--if it's not redundant, the right-wing conservatives--but you do distance yourself from the conservatives who argue that he should cut off all relations and take much stronger actions?

Day 8, Tape 2
00:08:07
[Richard Nixon]

They're out of their minds. I mean, they--they just don’t understand how the real worl--world works. So we break relations with the Soviet Union. I remember de Gaulle said to me once--we were talking about what was called "détente"--hard-headed détente, as I would call it, not the soft-headed kind that was practiced in the later administration--but de Gaulle said, "What is your choice? If you are not prepared to break down the Berlin Wall, then you have to talk. And the thing to do is to be--talk from--in a position of strength." Now what we have to understand is that when the--the--what I call--they--they call themselves "the hard right" or "the far right," et cetera--when they say "break diplomatic relations, cut off all trade, isolate them," what are they going to build? I know what they think. They think, "Well, if we just do that, the rotten system will collapse." I wish it were, but it is not going to collapse. They're just going to squeeze their people more. What we have to realize is that this incident itself demonstrates why you have to have contact. If war comes, it's going to come not, in my opinion, by the Soviet Union launching a massive strike. They don't want a world--even though they want to conquer the world, they don't want a world of destroyed cities and dead bodies. It's going to come through accident, through miscalculation, or through third-party small nations drawing the big powers into war. And as far as accident and miscalculation is concerned, you've got to have more contact rather than less. And this plane incident shows how very close to the edge we are. An incident of that sort--suppose that it involved not a Korean plane but an American transport? It would have been pretty tough.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:09:57
[Frank Gannon]

What would--what would you have done in a case like that, if it--if it were--

Day 8, Tape 2
00:10:01
[Richard Nixon]

Well, I'm not going to--

[Frank Gannon]

--would that have made the response difference?

Day 8, Tape 2
00:10:03
[Richard Nixon]

I'm not going to comment upon what I would have done about that, because that gets me into this, and, as I said, I s--I don't comment upon what the president should do.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:10:11
[Frank Gannon]

At this point we take a break.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:10:15
[Richard Nixon]

I'm not sure it's useful, Frank, to get all this in, because that's--

Day 8, Tape 2
00:10:18
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Day 8, Tape 2
00:10:33
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Day 8, Tape 2
00:11:44
[Action note: Screen goes black.]

Day 8, Tape 2
00:11:45
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Day 8, Tape 2
00:11:55
[Richard Nixon]

Now we've covered Truman's legacy enough.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:11:58
[Frank Gannon]

Yes, I think that the decisions and--

Day 8, Tape 2
00:12:04
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Day 8, Tape 2
00:12:20
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Day 8, Tape 2
00:12:24
[Frank Gannon]

You--you mentioned Marilyn Monroe. Are you aware of the--the widespread rumors that Marilyn Monroe was the mistress of either President Kennedy or Robert Kennedy or--or both, and that her last phone call on the--on the afternoon of her death was to Peter Lawford, and her last words were, "Say goodbye to Bobby. Say goodbye to the President. And say goodbye to yourself, because you're a nice guy"? Do you have any knowledge or insight into the relationship between the Kennedys and Marilyn Monroe and why this--why th--why the rumors about their fears about her diary exist and whether they might be justified?

Day 8, Tape 2
00:13:04
[Richard Nixon]

No, I've never gotten into that. I--I don't read those movie magazines and the reports and so forth. Probably should, but I just have never found time for it.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:13:17
[Frank Gannon]

One of the--t--one last thing on the--the idea of the imperial presidency. One of the charges ab--against the Nixon administration was the--the uniforms, the dress uniforms, the comic opera dress uniforms for the White House uniformed guards. Why'd you do that?

Day 8, Tape 2
00:13:38
[Richard Nixon]

Well, as a matter of fact, that was done at the staff level. I was pretty surprised when I saw them, and I think just some bright-eyed fellow down below thought that would look great. O--I--all I knew is that I had wanted it upgraded, because, having been to so many foreign countries and then coming back to the United States as vice president, as I had, and to see the--the way that we receive foreign guests in such a very undignified way I know made a terribly bad impression on them, and I said I just wanted it shaped up, because I--I would say at this particular point, the--at the time that I became president, the only more unkempt, if I may use those two words together, security people than the ones at the White House were the ones in the Congress. It's really disgusting to see these overblown, fat people that are basically political hacks running around there to protect the congressmen, and that's the way the White House looked. Th--thank heaven it's shaped up now, and we do a very good job on our protocol. I was only interested in the protocol. As far as the uniforms, I never look at the uniforms. I don't know anything about uniforms.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:14:47
[Frank Gannon]

Did you know when you knew Congressman Kennedy--and then Senator Kennedy--about the health problems, the serious health problems he had that were later revealed?

Day 8, Tape 2
00:14:57
[Richard Nixon]

In fact, not only did I not know, but in the discussions I've had with him, he never mentioned it, which I think is a compliment to him. I understand that throughout the years he was in Congress and in the Senate that he was--had a great deal of pain from what is called Addison's disease, and also a back problem of some sort. But he never talked about it--never talked about his troubles. Not to me.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:15:23
[Frank Gannon]

Do you feel that his health problems were sufficiently serious that he shouldn't have run--shouldn't have put himself in the position of running for president?

Day 8, Tape 2
00:15:33
[Richard Nixon]

No. I think the proof of the pudding there is in the eating, and in this respect, where health becomes an issue, and where it should be an issue, is when it may have the effect of not allowing the individual to be an effective leader. But let's look at--look at the history of that here. Franklin D. Roosevelt had had polio. He was crippled. He became one of the outstanding presidents. Whether you like him or not, he was an outstanding president, a great leader. You talk about age. Some thought Eisenhower was too age [sic]. Many think Reagan is--no. Some thought Eisenhower was too old, and many, of course, campaigned against Reagan at an earlier time on the ground that he was too old. The question is not his age, but the question is can he do the job. The same was true of Eisenhower after he'd had a heart attack. Many would suggest that--"Well, he's had a heart attack. Maybe he can't do the job." But he went ahead, he ran, and he did the job. Now in the case of Kennedy's health, I would say also in the case of Johnson's health, because the Kennedy people were trying to make an issue of Johnson's heart attack in the 1960 primary campaigns--but in the case of both, the proof is can they go through a campaign. A campaign is more difficult than being president, and anybody that can go through a presidential campaign is healthy enough to be president. And that's what I say about Kennedy. I say it about Roosevelt. I say it about Eisenhower. I say it also about Johnson.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:17:09
[Frank Gannon]

Jack Valenti has told a story about being in Texas when President Kennedy gave a speech, and in fact being crouched beneath the podium, and seeing President Kennedy's hand when it was down beneath the podium, and that it was--it was shaking that--o--out--out of control. The press must have seen a lot of this by that point, and must have known about the braces he had to wear. Do you think they should not have reported that? Do you think that the public doesn't need to know that kind of thing as long as, ostensibly, the job is being done in an orderly way?

Day 8, Tape 2
00:17:41
[Richard Nixon]

You've stated my position very well. I didn't know about Franklin Roosevelt being crippled until after the war. I think that was proper. He was doing the job all right. As far as President Kennedy was concerned--he was then, of course, as a candidate, and then thereafter as president--the fact that he had Addison's disease, or whatever it was, unless it affected his mind I do not believe it is a legitimate issue. Now I must say I think the press, or the media, perhaps were a little less hard on him, if I may use British understatement, than they were on me on some issues. But as far as the health issue was concerned, I think that was proper. And let me say, too, that in respect to what is called the sex issue. Now, apparently it's been disclosed that there was a lot of hanky-panky going on in the White House in the Kennedy years and so forth, and the bedrooms being used for extracurricular purposes. I don't want to see any of that. I don't want to even see it now. I think what matters is what kind of a president he was. I think the important thing, however, is that a president, whether it involves that sort of activity, or whether it involves profanity or what-have-you--the important thing is for him to set an example and not blatantly to destroy the myth that people need to have about whoever's president.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:19:14
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think that candidates should be required to make public their medical records in a campaign, or before or during a campaign?

Day 8, Tape 2
00:19:22
[Richard Nixon]

I don’t believe so, but I don't mind it. I never minded it because mine--naturally, from a personal standpoint, because I--from the standpoint of my opponents I'm disgustingly healthy and will probably outlive them all. But, on the other hand, these days when you've got all these psychiatric experts running around and so forth. I think before we get through we're going to have--to have presidents go through a psychiatric examination, spend two, three days on the couch--I mean with a psychiatrist, not a babe--and then see what happens before you can allow them to be president. It's gone too far, in my opinion. Maybe a routine health examination so that they haven't got terminal syphilis, but beyond that I'm not for it.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:20:08
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think that having undergone psychiatric therapy should exclude a--a person from running for president or should influence people's decision whether or not to vote for that person?

Day 8, Tape 2
00:20:21
[Richard Nixon]

Well, you had that problem with the Eagleton case, and I would say it would not exclude him unless the--the prognosis after the therapy indicated that there--r--a recurrence might occur of a psychiatric problem. And--but otherwise, these days that would probably rule out half the population among those that would be qualified to run for president, because of--the so-called "upper set" or the "better" people and so forth not only go onto the couch themselves but send their kids on the when--couch ins--rather than disciplining them.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:20:55
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think discipline would be better and more effective?

Day 8, Tape 2
00:20:57
[Richard Nixon]

Far better. Far better. I think, as a matter of fact, if priests and ministers and parents and teachers were doing a better job, you'd put th--nine-tenths of the psychiatrists out of business.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:21:13
[Frank Gannon]

What--what kind of role did money play in John Kennedy's career?

Day 8, Tape 2
00:21:20
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, very effective. He, of course, had all the money he needed for personal purposes. He never had to fight his way up. He never had to worry about losing in a campaign for fear that he wouldn't have a job. The second thing is that it provided him the opportunity to--to buy the brightest and the best. Now let me make a differentation [sic] there--not only by buying them, because he was able to pay them, but also, in his case, however, he had the added advantage that once bought, they stayed bought. He was able, to his great credit, to inspire an enthusiasm and a loyalty which, for example, Nelson Rockefeller was unable to do. Nelson Rockefeller bought the brightest and the best, too, but Nelson Rockefeller ended up--when a Rockefeller campaign was over, they went to greener pastures. Not with the Kennedy--once the Kennedy supporter, virtually all were that way in the future. Now, that's on the plus side. You have enough money that you don't have the trials and tribulations of--of life that people who don't have money have, and you're able to buy--a--af--afford a campaign. You're able to buy a good staff. On the minus side, however, sometimes it's very important for a potential leader to go through the fire. I've often said that before you win, you've got to lose--that that's how you learn how to win. And so the trials of life can toughen a person up, make you stronger, so that when you have crises you will have already been through enough that you can take--handle them in an effective way. And as far as staff is concerned, I think I'm a prime example of the fact that money is not that necessary if you have a good cause. For example, after 1966, when I began to ran--run for president for the second time--and this'll be hard for people to believe today, when people spend millions just to get into the House, let alone the Senate or the presidency or what-have-you--at that particular time I had four paid people on my campaign staff--Rose Mary Woods, my secretary, Dwight Chapin, who handled appointments, Pat Buchanan, who worked with the press, and Ray Price, who was a speechwriter. Four--that's all. Rockefeller had several hundred full, paid staff. We beat him. We beat him because mine were totally dedicated, and then we added to that with volunteers. Another reason why a big staff, bought and paid for, is not always an asset is that the bigger the staff, the less thinking the man does himself. And when you get into that top job, they're not hiring your staff. They're hiring you. And the more you have to make those decisions--write your own speeches, or at least if someone else writes them, edit them--the more you have to think the problem through, the better you will be in handling the problem when it comes up.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:24:26
[Frank Gannon]

What was it about, do you think--about John Kennedy that--that drew--or kept the people that he drew to him with him?

Day 8, Tape 2
00:24:37
[Richard Nixon]

I think there were two factors. One was the fact that he, insofar as creative people were concerned--was that he had imagination. He wanted new ideas. He was an intellectual, so to speak, and he appealed to intellectuals, just as Woodrow Wilson, who was an intellectual, appealed. I wouldn't put John Kennedy, or any other president, for that matter, in the category of Wilson, who was, of course, the most dominating intellectual figure in our history. But, nevertheless, he had that appearance to people, and he enjoyed their company, and they appreciated that. I think beyond that, though, in terms of the workers in his campaign--I mean, not just the speechwriters and the idea people and the rest, but those that had to do the grinding work of organizing the campaign, working out schedules, advance men and so forth and so on--what appealed to them was not what he stood for but the method, the macho image that he projected, a--a man that was going to go out and risk all to gain all. In other words, his--his Harvard side appealed to his speechwriters, who rendered great service to him. His Irish side appealed to the campaign workers, and the combination became unbeatable.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:25:56
[Frank Gannon]

To whom did you appeal? What kind of supporter did--did you attract, and--and what did they--what did they look for and find in you that--that kept them with you in--in that way? Did you have people with the same intensity--

Day 8, Tape 2
00:26:08
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, yes.

[Frank Gannon]

--that the Kennedys did?

Day 8, Tape 2
00:26:09
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, yes, and--and I still have them. In other words, the difference between what we call the Nixon hard core and the Rockefeller hard core is that his is gone now. Oh, there are a few Rockefeller people around, but--but not really that'll carry the torch. Mine are still there, even despite what I have been through. We still have a very good hard core of people, some in government, some outside of government, some in business, some even in the media, and so forth and so on.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:26:34
[Frank Gannon]

Who are they, and--and why are they for you?

Day 8, Tape 2
00:26:36
[Richard Nixon]

The--the--the reason that they're for me, I think, is perhaps threefold. First, that I think primarily there are those who were for me because they believed in what I stood for. I always tried to attract people to a cause rather than to the man. I used to, in campaign speech after campaign speech-- I said, "Don't vote for me as the man. Vote for what I stand for. If you believe what I stand for, then vote for me." And I think the cause, the--my--my--what I would call responsible conservatism at home, my internationalism but hard-headed attitude toward the Soviet threat abroad-- this drew people to me. They saw me as one who could stand f--for and present the cause that they deeply believed in. That's probably the main group there. From the personal standpoint, too, I think that I had appeal, curiously enough, to some intellectuals, but they're very rare. It happens that most of the people with brains don't go into politics in the intellectual side. They go into business. They can make more money. But in those rare instances where you have intellectuals in politics on the conservative side, I had an appeal to them, because my--my appeal was primarily cerebral, rather than emotional. And so, consequently, I didn't have very many, but those that I did have in my speechwriting and other staff were very, very good. I'm very proud to have been able to attract them. Those things--and then, of course, there were a certain number who, for what reason or another, had a personal attraction, I assume, but I'm not able to speak to that point.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:28:27
[Frank Gannon]

Two of those three reasons are cerebral and intellectual rather than emotional or charismatic. Are you making a virtue of adversity to--in charismatic terms? If--on a ten-point charismatic--charisma scale, if you were put against--head-to-head with JFK, where do you think you would stand?

Day 8, Tape 2
00:28:51
[Richard Nixon]

No, I wouldn't--I wouldn't judge that. I--that--that’s something that's--that people have voted on and expressed their judgments, and apparently, I--I think, on that score it would come out about even. That's the way the election came out--thirty-five million to thirty-five million.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:29:07
[Frank Gannon]

Would--if you had had money, would that have made a big difference to your career?

Day 8, Tape 2
00:29:13
[Richard Nixon]

I'd probably never gotten so high. I--I am convinced, as I said, that money can be a mixed blessing. I think these days, incidentally, it may be more important. I'm--I noticed when I was in the Senate I don't think there were more than four or five that were s--in the million class. Today, there may be twenty. Of course, the--the million isn't as big then as it now--isn't as big now as it was then, I should say. But, on the other hand, I think what has assisted me in my political career is that I've had to go through adversity. You develop strength through adversity. It's like what Chou En-lai said when we met. He said, "Men who travel a smooth road never become strong." And my road has not been smooth.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:29:59
[Frank Gannon]

One of the standard operating interpretations about Richard Nixon is that you're obsessed by money, by wealth, by the lack of it, or the lack of enough of it, or impressed with it in other people. Do you see that at all in yourself?

Day 8, Tape 2
00:30:13
[Richard Nixon]

Well, if I were, I'd have some. My--my income is relatively modest, and I don't have any, except from--for--for what I write, because I don't take honorariums, and I don't--I'm not a member of any board or any of that sort of thing. I'm very comfortable, because my books have been very successful, and my real estate investments, the only thing I've ever invested in, have come out better than most. But I don't have a great deal, but if I--I were interested in money I would hope that I would have been far more successful than I am.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:30:44
[Frank Gannon]

It's--it's always struck me as an irony of your career that for someone who claims to be--and in fact, the--the records which you have made public at various times bear out your claims--someone who has had a--a very modest, straightforward and open-book financial history. Indeed, when you write about leaving the vice presidency that you left with an Ol--

Day 8, Tape 2
00:31:07
[Richard Nixon]

Forty-seven thousand dollars.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:31:08
[Frank Gannon]

--forty-seven thousand dollars equity and--

Day 8, Tape 2
00:31:09
[Richard Nixon]

And s--and a--

Day 8, Tape 2
00:31:10
[Frank Gannon]

An Olds--

[Richard Nixon]

--secondhand Oldsmobile.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:31:12
[Frank Gannon]

That was true, but you were very carefully conscious--maybe because you felt it was going to be exposed at some time--about keeping records and-and living very frugally and--and--and honestly. And yet you were surrounded by people in the Congress--take Lyndon Johnson as an example of a man who, from the early forties when he went to the Congress, never was on any other than a government payroll, and he left a fortune when he died, estimated between fourteen and twenty million dollars. There were a number, if not a lot, of people in the Congress at the time you were there who were, without necessarily doing anything illegal, were just--were--were making a lot of money. You didn't, and yet a lot of people still suspect that you've got an un--you know, an--an listed Bahamian or Swiss bank account that--wh--why--it's ironic that the least likely person against whom these charges should be made is the person against whom they are made.

Day 8, Tape 2
00:32:03
[Richard Nixon]

Well, of course, it goes clear back to the famous f