THE NIXON/GANNON INTERVIEWS

< Back to Nixon/Gannon Interviews

Transcript: Richard Nixon/Frank Gannon Interview, May 27, 1983 [Day 6 of 9]

interviewer: Frank Gannon
interviewee: Richard Nixon
producer: Ailes Communications, INC.
date: May 27, 1983
minutes: approximately 180
extent: ca. 280kb
summary: This interview, comprising four video tapes, or 3 hours, is the sixth in a series of taped interviews with former president Nixon. The conversation initially continues Day 5's focus on China and the Soviet Union, then moves on to the Mideast. Nixon discusses his dealings with and/or impressions of Nasser, Sadat, Dayan, Begin, Ben-Gurion, Meir, the shah of Iran, King Faisal, King Hassan of Morocco, and Arafat. Also discussed are the differences between men and women, both generally and as leaders, whether the United States will ever have a woman president, the Arab oil embargo, President Carter's handling of the Iranian hostage situation, and the political attitudes of American jews.
repository: Walter J. Brown Media Archives, University of Georgia Libraries (Main Library)
collection: Richard Nixon Interviews
permissions: Contact Media Archives.

Day Six, Tape one of four, LINE FEED #1, 5-27-83, ETI Reel #41
May 27, 1983

Day 6, Tape 1
00:01:02
[Action note: Screen goes black.]

Day 6, Tape 1
00:01:04
[Action note: Picture appears on screen.]

Day 6, Tape 1
00:01:08
[Offscreen voice]

Stand by.

[Richard Nixon]

We can do the double ones, but I think--gives you more time to prepare, gives me more time to prepare. And then you don't have that much to think about.

Day 6, Tape 1
01:01:15
[Frank Gannon]

Yeah.

[Richard Nixon]

See what I mean?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:01:16
[Frank Gannon]

Well, and you can--you can--

[Offscreen voice]

Ten seconds. [Unintelligible.]

Day 6, Tape 1
00:01:17
[Action note: Screen goes black.]

[Frank Gannon]

You can build up for it, and--

Day 6, Tape 1
00:01:19
[Richard Nixon]

Yeah.

[Frank Gannon]

--and you're not--

Day 6, Tape 1
00:01:20
[Action note: Picture appears on screen.]

[Frank Gannon]

--bifurcating your--

[Action note: Screen goes black.]

Day 6, Tape 1
00:01:21
[Richard Nixon]

That's right. [Unintelligible.]

[Frank Gannon]

Your psych--

Day 6, Tape 1
00:01:22
[Richard Nixon]

When you do one--

[Frank Gannon]

[Unintelligible.]

Day 6, Tape 1
00:01:23
[Offscreen voice]

Three, two--

[Action note: Picture appears on screen.]

[Offscreen voice]

--one. Frank?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:01:28
[Frank Gannon]

Did--did you find that the Chinese treated your party differently from the Russians?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:01:35
[Richard Nixon]

Yes, I did. I can't say whether or not it was an act or not, but I noted, for example, that when I was in China, when they had the big state dinner, the one that was on television here with Chou En-lai and I clicking glasses, the famous mao-tai--that not only were the top people in our party there, but everybody who had come over with us was there. The stenographers, the aircraft mechanics were all present, being treated exactly the same as the others. I would say that, as far as the Chinese are concerned, they tend certainly to practice what they preach--equality. I'm not sure it wasn't just an act for us, but certainly all the time we were there there was equal treatment for everybody who came, as well as for the V.I.P.s.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:02:26
[Frank Gannon]

The Soviets don't practice that?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:02:28
[Richard Nixon]

When I was in the Soviet Union, I never recall an occasion when lower-level people were included. It was always high-level, and I didn't have any opportunity to meet any of their lower-level people--in the government, that is. I would say, however, as far as China--the Chinese were concerned, I did have an opportunity to meet some of them, because they not only had our lower-level people, but they had many of theirs. They had people that were described as workmen and artisans and so forth. Again, I must emphasize that the Chinese are very skillful at propaganda, and it could not have been on the level. But I'm inclined to think that there is more of a tendency there to have equality in practice as well as preaching it. I think perhaps we can get a good idea of how the Chinese feel about it by a conversation I had with the chairman of the Chinese congress in 1976, when I went back for the first time after our visit in 1972. We were in a long plane ride, and he was railing about the Soviets--how they were revisionists. And he said, "They are no longer Marxists." He said, "What they are doing is making millionaires out of actors and of artists and athletes, and that is not, certainly, in the Marxist tradition."

Day 6, Tape 1
00:03:50
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think the time will come when the Chinese will make millionaires out of actors and athletes?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:03:57
[Richard Nixon]

The problem that the Chinese have in that respect is that as they begin, certainly very gradually, to liberalize to an extent and to allow people, for example, to have their private plots in agriculture, their own private businesses and so forth, inevitably classes, economic classes, will result. The Chinese will not want it to happen, but it will result, and under the circumstances we will probably see--probably not going as far as it did in the Soviet Union, but I think it's going to come.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:04:30
[Frank Gannon]

What do you think Chou En-lai learned about you from reading Six Crises?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:04:37
[Richard Nixon]

Well, I was frankly quite surprised when in our conversation with Mao Tse-tung he mentioned that he had read Six Crises, and then, in a rather deprecating way, but self-deprecating as well, he says, "It's not a bad book," which was a very high compliment coming from him. Chou En-lai had had Six Crises--and I learned it only when I got there--he had had it translated into Chinese. And I wondered why, and then as I talked to him I discovered why. It wasn't because of the political issues I discussed, because he disagreed with my political views certainly totally. It was because the book was about struggle and also that it was about defeats as well as victories. He used to come back time and again to the theme that adversity is the best teacher and the greatest teacher. He would refer to the Long March and how they were all strengthened by that march. And then he--he very generously referred to my own career. He said, "It is really quite remarkable that after two defeats, the defeat for president in 1960 and then governor in 1962, you came back." He said, "That is very rare, not only in America, but in a--but in any other country." And I responded to that by saying, well--that I had learned more from my defeats than I had from my victories, but then I went on to say that, "I hope when my life is over, I'll have one more victory than defeat." And he kind of summed it all up by saying that those who travel on a smooth road all their lives don't gain strength.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:06:15
[Frank Gannon]

When you were in--

Day 6, Tape 1
00:06:16
[Richard Nixon]

Let me repeat that. And he summed it all up by saying that those who travel on a smooth road all their lives do not become strong.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:06:26
[Frank Gannon]

When you were in China, Mao's wife was still in pow--powerful, if not in power. Did you find that she was deferred to or feared or--or jeered by the people you met?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:06:41
[Richard Nixon]

Well, I was there twice, of course, when she was still in the public arena. She is no longer there. She, of course, is in so-called "house arrest," I would say. In 1972 and 1976, she was obviously feared. I did not sense that she was respected. I didn't find that any of the Chinese I talked to referred to her with respect, if they referred to her at all. But they feared her because of who she was--not only because she was Mao's widow, or wife, or widow, as it later turned out--no, strike that. They feared her not only because she was Mao's wife, but because in her own right she had a powerful position within the party, and she was a very tough cookie.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:07:32
[Frank Gannon]

Did--you've told a story about your visit to the Forbidden City and an incident that happened there.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:07:41
[Richard Nixon]

Well, when we talk about the influence of Mao's wife, it of course leads us to reflect on the position of women generally in China, and, for that matter, in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. They talk a great deal, of course, about the fact that there is no discrimination whatever, not only in races and religions, et cetera, but also between men and women. But as a matter of fact, I found that in the Soviet Union and in China, that on all the visits I have made to both places, I have never met a woman in a high position. There's not a woman on the Soviet Politburo, and, as far as I know, there were none, certainly, that I had the opportunity to meet in my various visits to China. That doesn't mean that women do not have power, and I think the Chinese were illustrating that and--with their rather delightful sense of humor when they took Mrs. Nixon and me to a famous palace there. A boy emperor had used that palace, and they took me into the throne room. There was the throne where the boy emperor sat. Behind his throne was a screen, and sitting behind the screen was his mother. And they pointed out that when petitioners came to the throne room and petitioned the emperor for something, the mother would respond from behind the screen. And then they turned and delightedly laughed, and they said, "You know, that was the beginning of the back-seat driver." I would say at the present time, I didn't see any front-seat drivers in either Moscow or Peking. But I would not say that women were not influential. As back-seat drivers, they can have great influence--not only there, but anyplace else in the world.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:09:26
[Frank Gannon]

Chou En-lai seemed to have some kind of sense of humor, at least about the Sino-Soviet split. You've mentioned a story he told you about a hotline exchange.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:09:39
[Richard Nixon]

One of the things I found particularly delightful about the Chinese is their very subtle sense of humor. They're very easy--they laugh easily. They like to tell stories on themselves, and I remember so well when Chou En-lai was talking about the hotline that he said they had--that China had with Moscow. He said, "Of course, it became cold after 1959," when Moscow withdrew aid from China. But in 1969, there was a very serious border dispute in which lives were lost on both sides. And with great delight, Chou En-lai told me this story. He said Kosygin called Peking on the hotline, and the operator answered. He said, "I want to talk to Chairman Mao. It is urgent." And the operator said, "I will not connect you. You are a revisionist," and hung up on him. Then the--the--he called again on the hotline--Kos--and he said--and then Kosygin called again on the hotline, and he said, "Since I can't talk to Chairman Mao, I'd like to talk to Premier Chou En-lai." She said, "You are a revisionist. I will not connect you," and hung up on him again. Well, the message that got through to me on that was that the discipline that the Chinese Communists are famous for was shown operating right there. They had without question brainwashed the operator and everybody else. They all were putting out the same line.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:11:11
[Frank Gannon]

You made a--a diary note about Mao Tse-tung's hands. What did you notice about his hands?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:11:18
[Richard Nixon]

Well, when you think of Mao, you think of him in many different ways. He was an ideological leader. He was one who changed a nation and affected the world. There were people who worshipped Mao, not only in China, but in revolutionary areas across the world. He--he was also one who was responsible for the deaths, in one way or another, of millions of his own people. But when you went in to see him, what impressed me and others in our party was that he had hands--the--rather than being the hands of a peasant, and he came from peasant stock--were the hands of a literary man. They were very delicate, very fine and very expressive. His gestures were very expressive.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:12:09
[Frank Gannon]

Do you--

Day 6, Tape 1
00:12:10
[Richard Nixon]

Incidentally, not that either would appreciate it, but his hands reminded me of the hands of the first pope I met, Pope Pius Pacelli, the twelfth [Pius XII], who had very delicate, almost saintly hands. I would describe Mao's the same way.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:12:25
[Frank Gannon]

Mao's--at least his hands were saintly.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:12:27
[Richard Nixon]

That's right.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:12:28
[Frank Gannon]

D--y--one of the interesting things about you, it seems to me, from seeing your diary entries and your writings, is that you're sensitive to this kind of nuance of personality. Do you consider yourself a--a sensitive person to that kind of thing, or do you think all leaders observe that kind of thing? Do you think Mao sat at night talking about your hands, or that Brezhnev noticed your doodles on a pad while you were negotiating?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:13:00
[Richard Nixon]

Very hard to know what they would have thought or what they did. I think Chou En-lai would. He was a very observing kind of person. I'm not sure Mao would've. I--I would say if a leader is consumed with himself, he isn't likely to notice too much about whoever he is negotiating with. I think, as far as I was concerned, I've always found that--that you learn a lot by observing people, not just by listening to what they say, but how they say it--their manners and so forth. Not that that is decisive, but it tells you something about them. Also, I think I like to do that because it's very interesting to do so. It's very dull just to sit and talk in front of translators and notetakers and the rest. You might as well write it down. You've got to get the feel of the room, the feel of the person.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:13:56
[Frank Gannon]

Do you consider yourself a sensitive person?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:13:59
[Richard Nixon]

No one can judge himself. Some think I'm not, and some think I am.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:14:05
[Frank Gannon]

Do you recall your last meeting with Chou En-lai?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:14:12
[Richard Nixon]

Yes, I recall it quite vividly. We were meeting in the marvelous guesthouse where we stayed when I went to China in 1972 and again in 1976. And he was in a rather contemplative, philosophical state of mind at that point. He was reflecting on the trip and what it meant, and what it could mean in the future. And Mao, who, incidentally, as I should say--incidentally, while most people are aware that Mao was a poet, many are not aware of the fact that Chou En-lai was as well. His widow gave me a book of his poems when I saw her after his death in 1976. A--and so he was quoting some of Mao's poetry to me as we were meeting there, and one poem that he thought was particularly beautiful--and I did as well--I have here with me. Let me read it to you as to what it was. He pointed out before quoting this poem that it was in my dining room, in the upstairs dining room of the suite in which I was staying, i--in Mao's calligraphy. And it read as follows: "The beauty lies at the top of the mountain." And then he went on to say, "You know, you have risked something to come to China, but there is another Chinese poem that spells that out, and it reads as follows: 'On perilous peaks dwells beauty in its infinite variety.' And then he said, "There is another poem that I would also have liked to have put up in your suite. It is, again, one of Mao's." And he pulled out the little red book, Mao's [red book]--it was in that--a--and read what he called "The Ode to a Plum Blossom." It's actually a very beautiful poem, and the meaning which he gave to it is quite interesting. "Spring disappears with rain and winds and comes with flying snow. Ice hangs on a thousand feet of cliff yet at the tip of the topmost branch the plum blooms. The plum is not a delicious girl showing off, yet she heralds spring. When mountain flowers are in wild bloom, she giggles in all the color." And then he said, "What this poem really means is that he who takes the initiative is not one who will then reach out and stretch out his hand, because by the time the flowers are in full bloom, they are ready to wither and die." And then he said, "You have undertaken this initiative. You have undertaken it at considerable risk. You may not be there to witness its--its success, but we will welcome your return." Incidentally, he proved to be quite perceptive. I returned to China in 1976, and at that time I was out of office and Chou En-lai was dead.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:17:41
[Frank Gannon]

In your last toast--do you want me to--? (Offers sheet of paper.)

[Richard Nixon]

No, that's all right. [Unintelligible.] I'll put it right here.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:17:48
[Frank Gannon]

In your last toast in China, in Shanghai, you said, "This was a week that changed the world." Was that hyperbole, or how much hyperbole was it?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:18:00
[Richard Nixon]

Well, first, I believed it to be true. I believed it to be true because I knew that the world balance of power had shifted as a result of the initiative that we had undertaken along with the Chinese. And an indication of the fact that it did change the world i--is just to imagine what would be the situation in the world today if we had not gone and if the Chinese, not because they wanted to but because they had no other choice, were back in the arms of the Russians? The world balance of power would be against the West, and I think almost in--in over-- in a way that would not be overcome.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:18:44
[Frank Gannon]

Before you went to China in 1971, the French writer André Malraux came to the White House and spent some time with you, and also, I think, had dinner there. Do you remember that day, his visit?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:19:00
[Richard Nixon]

Vividly. I remember, too, meeting him for the first time. President Ga--de--(Clears throat.) Vividly. I remember, for example, meeting him for the first time, when President de Gaulle visited the American Embassy residence in 1969. He introduced me to Malraux, and I noticed then that Malraux--whose books I had read--not all of them, but some of them, before--had suffered a debilitating stroke, and when he came to the White House it was just painful to watch him talk, because his whole left side of his face was drooping, and the words could hardly come out. But when he talked about China, and when he talked about Mao, a torrent of words came out, even though I knew it was painful for him to get the words out.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:19:50
[Frank Gannon]

What did--whose idea was it to invite him?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:19:53
[Richard Nixon]

It was mine. It was mine, because he had written several of the books about China that I had been exposed to, and I wanted to meet him, to get his views.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:20:06
[Frank Gannon]

What did you--you had the State Department and C.I.A. and other briefings, and your own years of experience. What did you think you could learn from Malraux?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:20:15
[Richard Nixon]

I could learn from Malraux something that I couldn't get from the State Department people. After all, he had been to China. He knew Mao. He knew Chou En-lai, a--and also I knew, from the fact that he was very close to de Gaulle, that he was a thinker in global terms and not just in parochial terms. It's very hard to find thinkers of that type who have that kind of experience. I wanted to see what this man, with all of his experience, had to advise with regard to the visit to China.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:20:46
[Frank Gannon]

What did he have to say?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:20:49
[Richard Nixon]

Well, he said--he started right out by saying this trip was inevitable. And I said, "Even in spite of Vietnam?" He said, "Even so." He said, "The Chinese have never helped anybody. Not Pakistan, not Vietnam. Chinese foreign policy is a brilliant lie. The Chinese don't believe it. They believe only in China, only in China." And then after that introduction, he went on to talk about the trip, as to what it meant, and particularly about Mao.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:21:27
[Frank Gannon]

Did--how did he prepare you for Mao? And did he turn out to be right?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:21:34
[Richard Nixon]

Hard to know whether he turned out to be right, because he was giving basically an introspective evaluation of the man, rather than the things that you could learn from reading what Mao had said and what he had done over his lifetime. For example, he said that, "When you meet Mao, you will be facing a colossus, but a colossus facing death. He is a man--when you are talking to him, you will think he is addressing you, but he will be addressing death. It's worth the trip." And then he went on to say that--he said, "You, Mr. President, operate in a rational framework. Mao does not. There is something of a sorcerer in the man. He is inhabited by a vision. He is possessed by it."

Day 6, Tape 1
00:22:35
[Frank Gannon]

What was the vision?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:22:38
[Richard Nixon]

Wait a minute--the, uh--hold just a second. I think--there's--it's got to be another entrée here. (Coughs.) We don't get into that, but it--I'll--I'll pick it up the way--well, when he--and when he said that, I said, "Well, it's interesting to note that many great leaders have been known to be somewhat visionary." And then I told him Carl Sandburg's description of Lincoln's last cabinet meeting, the day before he was assassinated. And Lincoln said that he'd had a dream the night before, a dream that he had always had during the war years before a great victory. And the dream was that he was on a singular indescribable vessel moving with great rapidity toward a distant, uncertain, invisible shore. And I said that--(pauses)--wait a minute--we missed something here. You see what I'm getting at is that we had the--the--the--the--it wasn't the vision, it was--this is what happened later. You see what I mean?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:23:56
[Frank Gannon]

Mm-hmm. This was at the end of the conversation.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:23:58
[Richard Nixon]

No, but--that--this--this is the end.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:24:00
[Frank Gannon]

Yeah.

[Richard Nixon]

You see, there wasn't--or did you have something else you wanted in there?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:24:02
[Frank Gannon]

Didn't he--he talked about Mao as being the last of the emperors. I thought that was interesting.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:24:05
[Richard Nixon]

All right, fine. (Coughs.) Let's pick up there again. (Pause.) Let's see. How far back do you want to go? You want to go to the beginning of it again?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:24:24
[Frank Gannon]

Let's--

Day 6, Tape 1
00:24:26
[Richard Nixon]

Eh, we can. All right, fine. Let's--let's try to--to pick up. Y--is it--the first question was with regard to what--I remember--I remember he started right out by saying that this trip was inevitable. And I said, "Even with Vietnam?" And he said, "Even so." He said, "The Chinese have never helped anybody--not Pakistan, not Vietnam. Chinese foreign policy is a brilliant lie. The Chinese don't believe it. They believe only in China, only in China." And then he came to Mao, and his description of Mao was, I thought, fascinating. He said, "You will be meeting a colossus, but a colossus facing death." And then he went on to say that--"You will think that he is talking to you, but he will be addressing death." He pointed out that Mao considered himself to be the heir of sixteenth-century Chinese emperors. When someone asked him whether or not he was the heir of sixteenth-century Chinese emperors, he says, "Of course I am." He said, "The man has a fantastic destiny, and"--oh, [scheis]--"the man has had a fantastic destiny"--now if we can pick up from there.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:25:52
[Frank Gannon]

That he was a sorcerer.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:25:54
[Richard Nixon]

Yeah. (Pauses.) No, we've left something out here. Let me--let me come back--just give one more shot at it, and then we won't have to do it again. "Y--you"--"you will think you'll"--"you will think that he is talking to you, but he will be addressing death. It's worth the trip." He said someone asked Mao whether or not he considered himself to be the heir of the sixteenth-century Chinese emperors, and he said, "Of course I am their heir." "The man has had a fantastic destiny, and he is acting out the last act of a lifetime." And then he made a very interesting observation about what kind of a person Mao was. He said, "You operate from a rational point of view. Mao does not. The man has something of a sorcerer in him."

Day 6, Tape 1
00:26:55
[Frank Gannon]

What--did he reach some kind of conclusion about Mao's vision or--or what the purpose of--

Day 6, Tape 1
00:27:02
[Richard Nixon]

W--wait a minute.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:27:03
[Frank Gannon]

--receiving you was?

[Richard Nixon]

"The--the man has"--let me--I--I get your point. "The--the man has something of the sorcerer in him. He is inhabited by a vision. He is possessed by it."

Day 6, Tape 1
00:27:15
[Frank Gannon]

Did he explain what that--what he thought that vision was, or did you get a sense of what he thought it was?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:27:22
[Richard Nixon]

No, I th--that was not the point that--let me see here, we c--we're off again. We have to get off of this. "He is possessed by it." And when he said that, I said, "Well"--I replied to Malraux that often I--that--when he--when he said that the man was possessed--goddamn it, we got this thing wrong. 'Cause we've gotten confused.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:27:47
[Frank Gannon]

Just up to the--to the--

Day 6, Tape 1
00:27:48
[Richard Nixon]

Yeah.

[Frank Gannon]

--to Lincoln.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:27:49
[Richard Nixon]

Yeah, yeah. Well, you've got that already, don't you think, or you want to use it again. All right, fine.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:27:51
[Frank Gannon]

[Unintelligible.] We stopped it.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:27:53
[Richard Nixon]

Okay. All right, fine. He said, "You operate"--he said, "You operate from a rational fram--you op--now I got it. "You operate within a rational framework, Mr. President. Mao does not. There is something of a sorcerer in the man. He is inhabited by a vision. He is possessed by it." And then I said, well, it had been my observation that many times great men are somewhat visionary, and I pointed out that Carl Sandburg, in his biography of Lincoln, wrote about Lincoln's last meeting with his cabinet. And Lincoln told his cabinet that he'd had a dream the night before, a dream that he had had several times before, before great victories during the Civil War. And the dream was that he was on a singular indescribable vessel moving with great rapidity toward a distant, uncertain shore. And I said that the point that we have to bear in mind is that I do not know where or what the shore is, but I do know that what we must try to do is to avoid the shoals. And then Malraux responded, "Yes. Both you and Mao must avoid the shoals. Neither of you know what or where the shore is, but he knows that his harbor is death." And after that, the dinner broke up, and I escorted him to his car. And before he got into the car, he turned to me, and, speaking very warmly, he said, "I am not de Gaulle. No one is de Gaulle, but if de Gaulle were here, I know what he would say. 'Everyone who understands what you are embarking upon salutes you.'"

Day 6, Tape 1
00:29:54
[Frank Gannon]

When you were in Leningrad during the first Soviet summit, what were your impressions of that town?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:30:06
[Richard Nixon]

Well, Leningrad is very different from Moscow. Moscow is very grey. Leningrad is more of a European city--beautiful buildings, more color than in Moscow. And the people are more forthcoming than they were in Moscow. But I think the most vivid impression I had of Leningrad was a visit to the cemetery there. It's a huge cemetery, over a hundred thousand buried in a mass grave, many of them killed during the siege in World War II, but most of them buried there apparently had been starved to death. We were running late that day when the guide took us through the cemetery, pointing out the various points of interest and so forth. And my aides kept pushing me and saying we would have to cut off the last event scheduled on the cemetery visit, which was to go to a small museum which they had there. But when they told the girl guide who was with us, she practically broke into tears, because she wanted me to visit the museum, and so I overruled the aides, as I often did. We went into the museum. And what she wanted to show me was a diary. It was the diary of a twelve-year-old girl by the name of Tanya, and she read for me--she read for me pages from the diary. And the entries were certainly ones which moved me very greatly. She reported day after day as members of her family died. First, her grandmother died, and then her uncle, and then one of her aunts, and then her father, and then her mother, her brother, and her younger sister, and the last entry read, "All are dead. Only Tanya is left." And the girl turned to me, and there were tears in her eyes. And, I must say, in mine, too. And when I spoke on Russian television to the Russian people, in closing my remarks I quoted from that diary. And I went on to say that what we were trying to do was to build a new world, a new world in which the children and grandchildren would grow up and not have to go through what Tanya had gone through. I know later that it seemed to have had some impact on the Russian people. I can't tell, because I didn't get to s--talk to him, but Brezhnev said that he had tears in his eyes when he heard it. Now, let me make it clear--it could have been a setup in order to get across a point that they wanted to get across. But, on the other hand, a setup has no credibility unless it has a grain of truth in it. And in Leningrad, we have to bear in mind that more people lost their lives there in World War II than the United States lost in all the wars fought in our whole history, including the Civil War. So they have been through a lot, and they don't want war again. And I think--I think perhaps--excuse me, that's enough.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:33:09
[Frank Gannon]

I--is--is somebody as--as tough and as experienced as you really moved by--by something like that, by an experience like that? A lot of people would take that as an example of the kind of hokey sentiment that they feel you--you use but don't feel that you really believe or are moved by, touched by.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:33:31
[Richard Nixon]

No, I seldom--as I think e--even my critics would recognize, I--I seldom resort to anecdotes or sentimental thing just for the purpose of making a point. I only recount this because it tells us something about the Russian people, how they felt--maybe something about Brezhnev. It may also tell something about me. No. There's no question that it would move me, or I couldn't possibly have--have recounted it as I did in my television speech.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:34:06
[Frank Gannon]

We move on to the Middle East.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:34:09
[Richard Nixon]

No, you--I think you had a--one--didn't you [unintelligible]?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:34:11
[Frank Gannon]

The--the top of the world.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:34:13
[Richard Nixon]

Mm-hmm.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:34:14
[Frank Gannon]

De--

Day 6, Tape 1
00:34:15
[Richard Nixon]

[Unintelligible]--the attitudes.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:34:16
[Frank Gannon]

A--apro--apropos Tanya. That's right. Do you think that the--the the--

Day 6, Tape 1
00:34:21
[Richard Nixon]

The Russian people.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:34:22
[Frank Gannon]

--the Russian--

[Richard Nixon]

Want peace.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:34:23
[Frank Gannon]

Yeah.

[Richard Nixon]

[Unintelligible]--Americans, and so forth.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:34:25
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think that the----that the Russian people really have the same desire for peace that you feel the American people have? Do they operate in the same kind of context of information that enables them to have that kind of desire for peace?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:34:40
[Richard Nixon]

Let me again make it clear that I did not have the opportunity to talk to Russian people hour f--after hour, as I did to their leaders. But from the opportunity to observe them in my travels, particularly outside of Moscow, there is no question in my mind b--that not only they do not want war, that they want peace, but also they want, if possible, friendly relations with America. I base this on several examples that I could give, but two, perhaps, will suffice. 1959--I recall so well traveling through the Ural Mountains, and we got to a point at the top of the mountain, which was described as the top of the world--at the top of the world, because the rain on one side of the mountain went into Asia, the rain on the other side of the mountain fell into Europe--a very historic and important point. And when we arrived there, children came out and threw wildflowers into our car, and they shouted, "Friendship! Friendship!" Now the Russian word for "friendship" is druzhba. In fact, over and over I would hear the Russians who had already been trained and so forth for our arrival shouting, "Mir [e] druzhba," which mean "peace and friendship." But these children were saying, "Friendship!" Our escort on that occasion was [Troyanofsky,] who now is the Russian ambassador to the United Nations here in New York. And Troyanofsky, as we went on, said, "The first word in the English language that Russian children learn is 'friendship.'" Now, again, this may be a setup, but I think it had some meaning. I recall another vivid example. This was when I was out of office. The year was 1967. I was in Samarkand, which is next to Persia--a very interesting city. And I visited a market there. There had been no publicity whatever that I was coming, because I was out of office. I was just another tourist. But a one-legged Russian veteran--he turned out to be a veteran when I talked to him--recognized me, and he rushed up to me and threw his arms around me, and I--he said, "We love the Americans." He said, "I shook hands with Americans at the Elbe. We do not want war with America." It was not a setup. I am sure of that. You ask a--when someone asks me whether or not the Russian people want peace as much as we do, my guess is they want it more, because they know what war is far more than we do. War, fortunately, has never been visited upon the American homeland. Russia has been invaded, in World War I and World War II, and not just thousands and hundreds of thousands, but millions have died. They've been wounded. They've starved to death. And so there's no question but that they want peace. Now the question, however, is whether or not their leaders in a Communist country--leaders who are not affected by polls, leaders who do not come up for election by the people--whether they have to reflect the views of people. And I would say in this respect they don't have to, but in the long run, to a certain extent, they will reflect those views, or otherwise, even they may not survive. I think that explains why the Soviet leaders constantly prepare for war, but they always talk about peace. And, unfortunately, too often in the United States, we talk about war and prepare for peace. And the Soviet can't understand that.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:38:45
[Frank Gannon]

Isn't some commissar in the bowels of the education department in Moscow letting his side down if the first English language word that Russian students learn is "friendship"?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:38:58
[Richard Nixon]

It's possible, although I would certainly say that the--I would certainly say in this instance I sensed no negative reaction from [Troyanofsky] or any other Russians on that point. Naturally, it was--it served our purposes.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:39:18
[Frank Gannon]

Do you remember your first meeting with Ben-Gurion?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:39:25
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, yes, I remember Ben-Gurion well. He had been described to me previously by President Eisenhower, and President Eisenhower said, "When you meet him, you will conclude, as I did, he looks just like an Old Testament prophet." He is not a very big man, or was not a very big man--only five-three, as I recall, but he had a huge head, with his hair flowing and so forth, and his eyes were sparkling and almost fierce, certainly hypnotic, I thought. I could see how he had been a very effective leader. He came out to our home, and he was very, very kind, I remember, to Tricia, who was studying the Hebrew / Christian religion in her c--course at the Friends School. And he proceeded to describe the differences between the Old Testament and the New Testament and so forth for a half-hour, which made me realize that he was a very thoughtful person. Incidentally, Ben-Gurion was a very remarkable person in many ways. He knew nine different languages, and he learned Greek after he was fifty years of age, because he wanted to read Plato in the original. He also was a very wise man--wise, in my opinion, because he used to say, when he opposed those who wanted Israel to expand into other territories, that that would be a great mistake. He used to say, "Israel is a unik--unique state." He--strike that. He used to say, "What makes Israel unique is that it is Jewish and democratic. If it expands and takes over other territory, it will no longer be Jewish, and it can no longer be democratic. It can no longer be Jewish because the non-Jews were--will outnumber the Jews. It can no longer be democratic because it will not be possible to keep the non-Jews under the government without resorting to means that would not be democratic."

Day 6, Tape 1
00:41:31
[Frank Gannon]

What do you think, then, that he would think of today's Israel?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:41:37
[Richard Nixon]

Ben-Gurion today would take the line that Israel should, in order to have security--should give up demands on territory. He would be concerned about Begin's policy of annexing the West Bank, Galilea--Galilee, and Judea, because--he would be concerned because already there are three hundred thousand non-Jews within Israel itself. They are increasing in population at a far greater rate than is the Jewish population, and if Israel expands to include occupied territories, it, in the long term, he would think, would become neither Jewish nor could remain democratic in order to keep control of the people.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:42:26
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think that that vision of Israel is the right vision? Do you share that view?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:42:34
[Richard Nixon]

In terms of Israel's short-range security, no. Short-range, if I were an Israeli leader, I would say that, "We've got to have buffers around us, and if we don't have friendly buffer states that we control, we will have friendly populations that we will dominate." But in the long term that's a disastrous policy, because in order to mainkain--maintain control over the occupied territories, it is necessary, inevitably, to have two classes of citizens. It is necessary to resort to repression, and in the long term--it's been the history of nations and the conflicts between nations from the beginning of time--occupied territory always plants the seeds for more war. And a policy of continued war is good in the short term, but in the long term, it's disastrous.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:43:35
[Frank Gannon]

If you were the prime minister of Israel, how would you get from the short term to the long term?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:43:42
[Richard Nixon]

I would negotiate very, very hard, but in the--I would, however, not be afraid to negotiate about the territory. I would see to it, for example, in the negotiations, that certain guidelines were laid down. One, Israel cannot tolerate the setting up of an armed Palestinian state right in its gut. But, two, on the other hand, I think it is possible to have the Palestinians in the occupied territory have self-government, preferably in association with g--with Jordan, as President Reagan has recommended, but possibly even in another way. Israel deserves a neutral state and one that is not unfriendly to it on its border. And that would be better than having Israel dominating those occa--occupied territories with all of the cost that it will take to keep those people under control.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:44:36
[Frank Gannon]

Did you know Moshe Dayan?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:44:38
[Richard Nixon]

I met him and, of course, was very impressed by--by him, when I visited Israel right after the June war in 1967. Of course, everybody remembers the patch over his eye. He was on the cover of Time Magazine. And--and when you see him with the patch over his eye, you think of him as a--a warrior type, but the interesting thing to me was that he was not that at all in conversation. He was not that way. He was a very sensitive man, very philosophic in his approach, and so forth. I think he would have taken more Ben-Gurion's view, rather than Begin's view, with regard to Israel's future today.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:45:16
[Frank Gannon]

Did you consider that you had a special relationship with Golda Meir?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:45:21
[Richard Nixon]

Yeah, quite special, quite special, because i--it--we both came into office at about the same time, and we both left office b--th--at about the same time. We also shared something else--we both had phlebitis. I didn't know that she had it at the time that I visited her, and I don't think she knew that I had it.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:45:41
[Frank Gannon]

Do you recall your first meeting with her and your first impressions of her?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:45:45
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, I recall it very vividly. She came to the Oval Office--I believe it was in 1969. A--and what impressed me about Golda Meir was the contrast between her and Indira Gandhi. The contrast was really quite vivid. Indira Gandhi was a very intelligent woman, a very strong leader, but she wanted in her leadership--b--g--wait a minute. Indira Ganadhi [sic]--Indira Gandhi was a very intelligent woman and a very strong leader, but she was one who acted like a man, with the ruthlessness of a man, but wanted always to be treated like a woman. That wasn't the way Golda Meir was. Golda Meir acted like a man and wanted to be treated like a man. I remember so well when we sat down in the chairs in the Oval Office, and the photographers came in, and they were running their tape and so forth, and we were shaking hands, and she was smiling, and making the right friendly comments--"How are you? How's the family?" and the rest. Photographers left the room. She crossed her leg, lit a cigarette, and said, "Now, Mr. President, what are you going to do about those planes that we want and we need very much?" And from that time on, we had a very good relationship. It wasn't that she was not one who was very feminine, because she could be. She used to wear her hair in a bun. She told my daughter Julie the reason she did it was that her husband liked it that way, even though that wasn't the fashion, at least in--in certain places. She--she was very feminine in another way. She never forgave. She never forgave those that had opposed her, she thought--where they thought--she thought it was unjustified. She never forgave Ben-Gurion because he had opposed her when she was on her way up. She never forgave Pompidou, because Pompidou had said some disrespectful things about Israel and her--she thought so--a couple of years previously. But there is no question that she was a very strong, intelligent l--leader in her own right.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:47:55
[Frank Gannon]

Would you ordinarily treat a woman leader different from a man?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:48:02
[Richard Nixon]

You just do. It's--it's very difficult not to. And I--I have-- I have--I--I--for example, with Indira Gandhi, it was--when she was in to see me, as she was on occasion, and when I saw her in India, I treated her not only as a woman but as a lady. I thought that was the proper thing to do. Now, we had some good talks, but, on the other hand, it wasn't the same as with Golda Meir. A much more healthy situation when a--a--a woman asks no quarter and gives no quarter because she's a woman Incidentally, that is exactly the impression I got when I met Margaret Thatcher. She's--she is not like Indira Gandhi. She's exactly like Golda Meir in that respect.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:48:54
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think women bear grudges longer and harder, and more intensely than men?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:48:59
[Richard Nixon]

Yes, they do. I--i--it isn't that they bear grudges. I'd put it another way around. They're highly idealistic. They are--they're more loyal. They do not forgive disloyalty. They're very, very hard losers. Men tend to be more pragmatic. Men tend to flit from flower to flower. The woman tends to be very loyal, a--and she does not forgive whenever she feels that somebody has done her in.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:49:27
[Frank Gannon]

Is there a risk involved, then, in having a woman leader in a country in terms of this kind of personality?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:49:37
[Richard Nixon]

I don't think so. I--I think what happens is that, once a woman gets into a position of leadership--that she develops--that--that she w--that--that she grows into that position, and she develops the abilities to handle the situation. I know that Margaret Thatcher is charged often with being too abrasive and too single-minded, too unpragmatic, but, on the other hand, she's a very effective leader.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:50:09
[Frank Gannon]

Are you a sexist?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:50:11
[Richard Nixon]

I don't know what that means.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:50:14
[Frank Gannon]

Maybe that answers the question.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:50:15
[Richard Nixon]

No. I would say, too, with regard to Golda Meir, she had a very good sense of humor, which most people were not aware. I remember that, after I appointed Henry Kissinger secretary of state, that somebody had said to her, "Well, now both Israel and the United States have Jewish foreign ministers. She says, "Yes, but mine speaks English." And she's--[unintelligible].

Day 6, Tape 1
00:50:40
[Frank Gannon]

Golda Meir became the prime minister of Israel at the age of seventy. What do you think drove her? What motivated her towards power and towards leadership?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:50:54
[Richard Nixon]

It's hard to--to judge anybody in terms of how they are motivated unless you are much closer to an individual in a personal way than I was even to her, although I knew her much better than I did most leaders, because of our many contacts. I think what drove her, first, was a--a deep dedication to her country, a--a deep dedication to the need and the right of the Jews, particularly those--the victims of the Holocaust and so forth, to have a homeland. After all, you--we have to remember, she was born in Russia. She remembered vividly, for example, and told me about it--the times when, on Saturday nights, drunken Russian policemen would come by their house and beat up her father because he happened to be a Jew. And then she went to the United States. And then she came from the United States to Israel. And she came there because she wanted to do something for the Jewish people around the world, and she wanted to build a strong country in Israel. I think that's what motivated her. I don't think--I don't think in her case it was a question of her wanting to be prime minister just to be prime minister. She wanted to be prime minister so--so she could do something, a--and I know, for example, when my daughter Julie interviewed her, she asked her, "How does it feel to be the first woman prime minister?" And she says, "I don't know. I've never been a man prime minister."

Day 6, Tape 1
00:52:30
[Frank Gannon]

One of--to my mind, the most uncharacteristic thing that you have ever written is something you wrote about Golda Meir in Leaders. You were talking about your toast to her at the Knesset in 1974, and you wrote, "It was an emotional moment for her, and it also was for me. That toast was truly from the heart. I could have said, "To Golda, with love," and I think she would have known I meant it." Did you love her?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:52:57
[Richard Nixon]

Yes, in the--in the sense that we had shared so much together. I admired her. I knew her as a person and not just as a leader. I knew her human qualities, her very fine human qualities--her warmth, her generosity, and so forth. And when you speak about love, not in the very personal sense that we think of love in marriage, but when you think about love between individuals, men and women at high levels and so forth, it has to do with far more than agreeing on policy. It has to do with those personal qualities, the whole man or the whole woman. And in that s--respect, certainly I loved her.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:53:44
[Frank Gannon]

Do you recall your last visit to her when--in 1974, when both you and she were out of power, and it turned out to be the last time you saw each other?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:53:54
[Richard Nixon]

Yes, I recall it very well. I recall visiting her at her home, and--

Day 6, Tape 1
00:54:00
[Frank Gannon]

What was her home like?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:54:01
[Richard Nixon]

Very simple. It kind of reminded me, curiously enough--and neither would appreciate this particular reference, e--although both are dead. Neither would appreciate it if they heard it. It reminded me of Nasser's home, very humble. It was nice, comfortable, but--and she made the coffee herself, which was another way she demonstrated that--her rather womanly qualities. But I think the high point of that visit was when I addressed the Knesset, and in addressing the Knesset, I paid a tribute to her. I said that in twenty-seven years, meeting over eighty heads of state in government, I have never met one who is more dedicated, more determined, and more intelligent than Golda Meir. She was deeply moved, and responded in kind. Now, the reason that meant a lot to her was that she had been thrown out of office just two weeks before. A--and the Israelis, they're pretty cold about people. Whether they're up or down makes a great deal of difference. But that Israeli audience, I think, was moved by that toast.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:55:08
[Frank Gannon]

In this last meeting, with her just out of power and you, within a matter of months, to be out of power because of Watergate, did she refer to your domestic political troubles?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:55:21
[Richard Nixon]

No, not really. She--she, as a matter of fact, I think, rather stuck her neck out, because she said that, in effect--that she had appreciated what I had done, and she used--she wrote it thereafter, and she told many people who interviewed her that without the decisions I had made in the June war--I'm sorry--without the decisions I had made in the 1973 war--that Is--Israel could not have survived. But in her return reply toast, she said, "I want to raise my glass to a good friend and a great president." And to refer to me as a great president in the context of Watergate was sticking her neck out pretty far.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:56:06
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think history will assess Golda Meir as a major figure?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:56:11
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, without question. And not just because she was the first woman prime minister of--of Israel and one of the first great woman leaders of the modern period. Because you ha--we have to understand that she went back quite a ways. She had been foreign minister. She had been very active, of course, in the U.N., representing Israel there, as well, on occasion when she spoke there. And as prime minister, she presided over a very difficult time, the war of 1973. But I think history will record--although she was thrown out of office after the war was over--history will record that--the fact that she had developed a good relationship with me helped to save Israel at that time. Otherwise, h--had we not had that relationship, the possibility of my going as far as I did in ordering the airlift and the alert, the alert which kept the Russians out--that might not have happened. The personal relationship had a great deal to do with it.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:57:12
[Frank Gannon]

I think we've reached the end of our first hour.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:57:15
[Offscreen voice]

Okay, guys, let's, uh, hold there. Everybody stay in position. Frank, if you and the president will just continue to talk to each other for a second [unintelligible].

Day 6, Tape 1
00:57:25
[Richard Nixon]

Sorry we got that--that Mao thing mixed up, but I had a--I was trying to think of something else to put in there, but I--cut it down. I think it's all right, though.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:57:34
[Frank Gannon]

Yeah. There's one thing I--I meant--I meant to ask you about her. I wanted to get you to talk about--to tell the Tito and Churchill--

Day 6, Tape 1
00:57:45
[Action note: Screen goes black.]

[Frank Gannon]

--anecdote, about--I was going to ask you--

Day 6, Tape 1
00:57:47
[Offscreen voice]

Turn the lights down--

Day 6, Tape 1
00:57:48
[Frank Gannon]

--if--

[Offscreen voice]

--for ten minutes.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:57:49
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, the--Tito?

Day 6, Tape 1
00:57:50
[Frank Gannon]

Yeah, I was going to ask you if she seemed to have changed out of power, and that you had told the story about what Tito told you [unintelligible].

Day 6, Tape 1
00:57:56
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

Day 6, Tape 1
00:57:57
[Frank Gannon]

I think that's--

[Action note: Sound fades.]

Day Six, Tape two of four, LINE FEED #1, 5-27-83, ETI Reel #42
May 27, 1983

Day 6, Tape 2
00:01:07
[Action note: Picture appears on screen.]

[Frank Gannon]

--except they wouldn't offer it.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:01:08
[Richard Nixon]

No, I don’t think--I don't think he could. I don't think even Henry--

Day 6, Tape 2
00:01:12
[Frank Gannon]

There's too much…policy there.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:01:14
[Richard Nixon]

That's right. Well, he knows he's--

Day 6, Tape 2
00:01:17
[Offscreen voice]

Uh, c--cue them on one, Roger?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:01:21
[Frank Gannon]

I'll lead in to the Churchill-Tito.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:01:23
[Action note: Screen goes black.]

[Richard Nixon]

Fine.

[Action note: Picture appears on screen.]

[Richard Nixon]

Do you want to get the tennis star thing in while you're doing it?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:01:26
[Frank Gannon]

Yeah, we'll s--why not start with that?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:01:28
[Richard Nixon]

Yeah. Churchill-Tito I hadn't thought of.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:01:32
[Frank Gannon]

That's a good story.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:01:33
[Richard Nixon]

We already got the "plus ten percent," didn't we?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:01:35
[Frank Gannon]

Yes.

[Offscreen voice]

Stand by, uh, Frank.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:01:36
[Richard Nixon]

That's a--you should work into this, too.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:01:37
[Offscreen voice]

[Unintelligible.]

[Offscreen voice]

Ten seconds to studio. Stand by.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:01:39
[Richard Nixon]

And the Golda Meir.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:01:40
[Frank Gannon]

Mm-hmm. The golden rule.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:01:42
[Richard Nixon]

Yeah.

[Frank Gannon]

The golden rule.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:01:43
[Richard Nixon]

How about--and then--

Day 6, Tape 2
00:01:44
[Offscreen voice]

Four.

[Richard Nixon]

--w--did we--

Day 6, Tape 2
00:01:45
[Offscreen voice]

Three.

[Richard Nixon]

--get in the--did we get in the Pompidou description of her as a--

Day 6, Tape 2
00:01:49
[Frank Gannon]

No.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:01:50
[Richard Nixon]

--a woman?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:01:51
[Frank Gannon]

No.

[Richard Nixon]

I mean--are you sure?

[Offscreen voice]

[Unintelligible.]

Day 6, Tape 2
00:01:54
[Richard Nixon]

Would you like that?

[Offscreen voice]

[Unintelligible.] Do it again.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:01:57
[Richard Nixon]

You know what I'm referring to?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:01:58
[Frank Gannon]

Yes.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:01:59
[Richard Nixon]

That was a famous story, you know. Her--"W--w--we have trouble in two parts of the world." I think it's worth getting in.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:02:05
[Frank Gannon]

[Unintelligible.]

[Richard Nixon]

Because it's about Indira Gandhi, too. (Clears throat.) Pompidou--

Day 6, Tape 2
00:02:08
[Offscreen voice]

[Unintelligible] light change. [Unintelligible.] We're going to cue you, okay?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:02:12
[Offscreen voice]

Keep your eyes on me.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:02:14
[Frank Gannon]

Yes.

[Offscreen voice]

After the light change [unintelligible].

Day 6, Tape 2
00:02:15
[Offscreen voice]

Ten seconds out. Roll tape.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:02:17
[Richard Nixon]

It's a good, funny story. And you're right--

[Action note: Screen goes black.]

[Richard Nixon]

--the more I think of this stuff from a commercial standpoint--

[Action note: Picture appears on screen.]

[Richard Nixon]

--not that--

Day 6, Tape 2
00:02:22
[Frank Gannon]

This is the--

Day 6, Tape 2
00:02:23
[Richard Nixon]

All they want's froth. Shit, they don't care about--

Day 6, Tape 2
00:02:25
[Frank Gannon]

It's not f--but as you said, you can learn a lot from--

Day 6, Tape 2
00:02:28
[Richard Nixon]

Well, I have to say that. I don't believe it. [Unintelligible] I say it.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:02:31
[Frank Gannon]

Is it--is it ironic that the Sino-American relationship, which began with a table tennis match, should have reached some rocky shoals with the granting asylum to a tennis--Chinese tennis star? Should we have done that?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:02:50
[Richard Nixon]

Well, I have often thought how ironic it is that the--let me start again.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:02:58
[Frank Gannon]

Le--let me start again.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:02:59
[Richard Nixon]

Yeah, yeah, because I wanted to--

Day 6, Tape 2
00:03:00
[Frank Gannon]

Sh--

[Richard Nixon]

--tell that story.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:03:01
[Frank Gannon]

Should we have--the--the Sino--the Sino-America--the Sino-American relationship was strained recently when we granted asylum to a Chinese tennis star. Should we have done that? Did that strain the relationship in an unhealthy way?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:03:16
[Richard Nixon]

Well, it seems rather ironic to me that what, as far as the public was concerned, indicated that there was going to be a new relationship, was when the Chinese received an American table tennis team in Peking, and then, ten years later, in 1982, that relationship is strained when the United States allows a Chinese tennis star who is visiting the United States to stay here. Now, the difficulty with the handling of the matter, from the Chinese point of view, is not that a tennis star or anybody else comes to the United States and stays here. A--as a Chinese friend recently told me, from Peking--he says, "After all, we've got too many people! We don't mind your taking a lot of them." I--I think what really turned them off was that the tennis star was portrayed as being giving--being given political asylum, and that, of course, was a loss of face for them. To think that one who was a tennis star, and therefore, perhaps, receiving better treatment than many others--wanted to leave China and come to the United States was a loss of face. I would say that in the future it's very important to handle such matters with great discretion. There are going to be times in the future, I'm sure, where visiting Chinese may want to stay, but we should work it out so that it doesn't embarrass the Chinese government for another reason. I think it's vitally important that we continue to have this people-to-people contact. Ten years ago, no Americans were visiting China. Last year, a hundred thousand went there. Ten years ago, there were no Chinese students in the United States. Last year, there were twelve thousand. I want there to be--to increase in that way, because, while that isn't going to change our relationship immediately, over the long haul that people-to-people contact brings us closer together.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:05:11
[Frank Gannon]

Didn't President Pompidou raise a--a question about Golda Meir's feminine qualities?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:05:20
[Richard Nixon]

Well, when we speak of Golda Meir and the fact that she is very tough and strong and acts like a man, it's always reminded me of a conversation that we had with President Pompidou in the Azores. This was in 1971, and at that time we were having problems in South Asia between India and Pakistan, and also in the Mideast, and Bill Rogers, who was sitting by Pompidou, was trying to lighten up the conversation at dinner, and he reflected on the fact that th--things were going pretty well in the world except in stu--in two areas. And, he said, in both areas women are in power. He said, for example, "In South Asia, between India and Pakistan, we have Indira Gandhi in power. And then in the Mideast, in Israel, we have Golda Meir, another woman." Pompidou sort of raised his eyebrow and said, "Are you sure?"

Day 6, Tape 2
00:06:22
[Frank Gannon]

Did--didn't Pompidou, though, in fact, have a very strong respect for her qualities?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:06:28
[Richard Nixon]

I should not leave the impression that President Pompidou said that in a--a downgrading way, or in an im--as a matter of fact, disrespectful way. He respected her. He described her to me as "un femme formidable," and he's--he felt that she was a strong person, a very formidable person, and he respected that. And this fact--he was simply saying that he appreciated the fact that she did not try to use her w--feminine wiles in order to get her things across. Pompidou did not like Mrs. Gandhi. I know that. I think he respected and maybe even liked Golda Meir.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:07:09
[Frank Gannon]

Did you like Mrs. Gandhi?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:07:11
[Richard Nixon]

I didn't think of her in terms of liking or disliking. I thought of her in terms of representing a country, India, with six hundred million people, that was a very important country in that part of the world and with which the United States wanted to have as good relations as possible. And under the circumstances, therefore, I respected her, but that I n--I never knew her on a personal level. Let me put it this way. I didn't know her personally in a way that I would like her or dislike her.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:07:46
[Frank Gannon]

Are there leaders that are susceptible to feminine wiles and other leaders--could there be an advantage to a country of having a female leader when it came to a summit conference or a face-to-face meeting?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:07:59
[Richard Nixon]

Well, I think there is a tendency on the part of many men not to want to push a woman too far in a meeting. Let's face it. There are different rules. Oh, I know in these days, in--anybody who says that, he's supposed to be a sexist, or whatever they call it, and this and that and the other thing. But I do know that most of the leaders I have met have great respect for women, and they're going to treat them differently from w--the way they treat men. The way I'd put it is this way. I--I've played a little poker in my time, and, believe me, don't ever let me in a poker game where I've got to be easy on somebody else. Unless you can be ruthless in a poker game, you're going to lose. And in negotiations, it's, I think, s--to some advantage to have a woman on your side, because you need every inch that you can get in the negotiations, and if she can win you an inch by the fact that her opponent or your opponent is going to treat her a little differently, a little more respectfully, not as toughly as he would a man, that's something to be said for it.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:09:05
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think we'll have a woman president in this century?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:09:09
[Richard Nixon]

Possibly. A woman vice president, certainly. I would expect a woman vice-presidential candidate to make a pretty good run at it in eigh--'84--the possibility of there being one. I think in '88, there probably will be a woman vice president--more likely, incidentally, Republican than Democrat.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:09:27
[Frank Gannon]

Why is that?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:09:28
[Richard Nixon]

Because the Republicans have been running very poorly among women in recent years, and that's a way to reach out. I'm not sure that it would help, but many people think that it would, because you've got to remember there are many women that don't want a woman vice president, just as many men don't. But be that as it may, there are many women that do. I think what really is going to count is whether a woman comes along who is strong enough that people would th--feel comfortable that she would make a leader--one like a Margaret Thatcher, for example. I would say by the end of the century, the likelihood of a woman president is considerable. But before that happens, a woman must be vice president or secretary of state or secretary of defense. Those are the three top jobs that are stepping stones to the presidency. Until that happens, no woman is going to go, ec--unless they come from those stepping stones, directly to the presidency. But it will happen, inevitably.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:10:25
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think the fact Golda Meir had lived in the United States before she went to Israel affected her conduct at all as Israeli prime minister?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:10:35
[Richard Nixon]

I--it affected her conduct only in the sense that she understood the United States better than some other Israelis might have understood it. She knew America. She knew the political forces that operated here. She knew how to talk to Americans, and that certainly im--improved her chances to get along.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:10:56
[Frank Gannon]

Did it ever--do you think it ever created a situation where she had divided loyalties or divided instincts?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:11:03
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, no, not at all. Never. Golda Meir was for Israel first, last, and always. There was no question about that. Now, she happened to believe that the United States having a policy that favored Israel was in the U.S. interest as well, but, believe me, if the choie had to be between the U.S. and Israel, if she ever had to make that choice, it would have been Israel. No question whatever.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:11:25
[Frank Gannon]

Did--d--despite your special relationship with her, d--did you--do you feel that she mobilized or appealed to American Jews or to the Jewish lobby, the political lobby in America, to affect your decision-making?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:11:40
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, I am sure she did, and--

Day 6, Tape 2
00:11:42
[Frank Gannon]

Were you--did you feel that?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:11:44
[Richard Nixon]

Well, I--I don't--it isn't a question of whether I felt it. The fact is that American Jews support Israel, and I understood that. And the fact is that every Jewish prime minister that I have known has enlisted American Jews to bring as much pressure as possible in the political process on American presidents. That's understandable. I don't object to it. Now, a president must not go along with it on occasion, because some--l--let me--let me explain something about what is called "the Jewish lobby" in this country. In the first place, Jews, understandably, in the United States, because of what happened in World War II, because of the Holocaust, are going to pe--put first priority on the survival of Israel. Now, as good Americans, as they are, they believe that America's survival and security is directly related to Israel's. In other words, their belief is that being for Israel first means that does not mean you're putting America second, because they think it goes together. An American president, however, has to approach it in a different way, in my opinion. He's got always to think first of what is best for America, and that's true whether it has to do with the Israelis or whether it has to do with the Irish or the Germans or what-have-you, or the Poles, et cetera. Usually what is best for America is also best for Israel, and vice versa. But a--on occasions--for example, an American president must make a decision that does not, in effect, give the Israelis a blank check. And one example of that is a decision that I made. I decided early on in our administration that we were going to seek good relations with Egypt and other--others of Israel's neighbors. Many of my Israeli friends didn't like that, because they wanted a special relationship with Israel and Israel only. But I have always said that Israel's interests are better served to have the United States a friend of Israel's neighbors and potential enemies than to leave a vacuum which the Soviet Union would fill. I still believe that, and I think that should be American policy today.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:14:04
[Frank Gannon]

I've heard you tell a story about when--when you talked to President Tito about his observation of Churchill out of office.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:14:16
[Richard Nixon]

Well, when you--when you see Golda Meir--you look back on her, and the last time I saw her, she was in her early seventies, you wonder how she must have felt when she was out of power. I recall one of my favorite stories, as a matter of fact, was told to me by Tito's wife when she was on a state visit with Tito to the White House in the early seventies. And she remarked about the last time that Tito had met with Churchill, and Churchill looked at Tito and observed the fact that Tito was drinking his Scotch and smoking the big cigars, and Churchill at that time was not in the best of health and couldn't drink as he used to, and he also noticed his black hair, Tito's black hair, incidentally, which obviously had been colored, but nevertheless it was black. And he said, "What keeps you so young? What keeps you so young?" And then, without waiting for an answer, "I know what it is--power. Power is what keeps a man young." And Churchill--after he left office, I know he tended to shrivel, because I saw him after he left office. The power was gone. But not Golda. Golda was still as strong and as vital when I saw her after she had been thrown out of office as she was in office. She didn't need the power to be in office--to exude power.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:15:48
[Frank Gannon]

Why was the Suez such a turning point in world history?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:15:55
[Richard Nixon]

Well, it was a turning point primarily not for what it did to Israel and Egypt and the relations between those two, but for what it did to Europe and particularly to the French and the British. It came at the wrong time. As a matter of fact, there isn't any question in my mind, in retrospect, and there's no question, in my view, that Eisenhower felt the same way in his later years, that the Israelis, the British, and the French were justified in attacking the Egyptians when they tried to take over the Suez Canal. But, on the other hand, it came just a few days before an American election, and it came right after the Russians had moved tanks into Budapest and were shooting down the workers who were rebelling against the Communist government there. And we couldn't be in a position, or at least we felt we couldn't, of condemning the Soviet Union for using force to resolve a situation in Budapest and then approving our allies, the British, the French, and the Israelis, who were not allies but at least were supporting our point of view, using force to resolve what was a political problem with Egypt. So, under the circumstances, President Eisenhower took the position that we would oppose it, and we forced their withdrawal. Now, what happened is it didn't help us with Nasser. He had been anti-U.S. before. He banked that and then kept on being anti-U.S., because that served his purposes in the radical Arab world. It hurt us with Israel, but not permanently because we continued to help them. But it had a devastating effect on France and Britain. From that time on, France and Britain could no longer play a decisive role on the world stage, and that was not a good thing. I hope the time returns when they might be able to play a more decisive role that they do today.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:17:49
[Frank Gannon]

What do you remember about your meeting with Nasser?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:17:54
[Richard Nixon]

Nasser, I had heard before I had met him, from friends who had visited him, was very different from the public impression of him. The first time I really met Nasser I didn't see him at all. I heard his voice. I heard it on the radio. Now, this is on a trip in 1957 I took as vice president, and as I visited the coffee shops and the bazaars and so forth, there were pictures of Nasser--I wasn't in Egypt, but they were in Tunis, and they were in Morocco, and they were in the Sudan, and they were in Libya. This was before Qaddafi, of course. And his voice hypnotized people. So I knew his voice before I ever got there, and I felt I knew him. But when I met the man, he was not the flame-throwing kind of revolutionary radical that I had expected. He was very soft-spoken--very handsome man, incidentally--very reasonable--reasonable except when he spoke about Israel, and then, of course, he could be very aba--runees [sic]--unreasonable. Spoke very warmly of Eisenhower. This, now, is in 1963 that we're talking about. I am convinced that if Nasser had concentrated his enormous abilities and energies on building a better Egypt, rather than in foreign adventures in Yemen and other parts, that he would have contributed enormously to Egypt's future. As it was, he--rather than concentrating on what was good for Egypt within, he believed in exporting his brand of revolution abroad.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:19:30
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think America played him wrong--that if--that if our policy had been accommodating and more sensible, he wouldn't have turned to the Soviets as he did?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:19:40
[Richard Nixon]

In my view, I think the decision with regard to the Aswan Dam was wrong. We did it because he was tilting toward the Soviet and was making unkind remarks about us, but I have a different view than many of my friends in the foreign policy establishment with regard to the use of America's ec--economic power. It's the area where we have the greatest advantage. It's the area where we should take some risks. It [sic] the area where we should not insist that we will give aid only to those that are one d--hundred percent for the U.S. Let's use that power to get a foothold. We won't win 'em all, but we'll win more than by saying no and then letting the Russians come in and build that dam. That was a tragedy for Egypt, as it turned out, and it certainly was not helpful to us in that part of the world.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:20:32
[Frank Gannon]

You've written that Nasser was defensive about the amount of Russian involvement in building the dam.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:20:39
[Richard Nixon]

Well--quite defensive. As a matter of fact, he said, "W--we're building the dam." And he sent his plane, with his own pilot--it was a DC-3--down to the Aswan Dam to look it over. We got there--incidentally, we were there in the summer, and it was about a hundred and thirty degrees in the shade, so we visited it at midnight, when it was only a hundred degrees--and I remember the huge, huge searchlights on the bulldozers down in the bowels of the earth. This is while the dam was under construction. I did not notice--and fortunately Mrs. Nixon did, because she's very observant--who was riding those bulldozers. They weren't Egyptians. They were Russians, but the Egyptians were very sensitive about Russian involvement.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:21:23
[Frank Gannon]

Was President Sadat more like President Nasser than not?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:21:28
[Richard Nixon]

No, very, very different from him. I remember when Nasser died, I was in the Mediterranean on one of our carriers, and I asked one of the people with us there what kind of a fellow this new man Sadat was. And they said, "Well, he's sort of a colorless clod compared to Nasser. He'll never be able to fill his shoes." Well, he did not fill Nasser's shoes, but he left his own footprints, of course, on history a very different way. Nasser was a man of the people and from the people--charismatic--he touched the heart. Sadat, on the other hand--highly intelligent--was one somewhat apart from people. He was above them to an extent, and I think people sensed that. He was a man of high intelligence, of great boldness, and great courage, and he was very different from Nasser in a fundamental respect. Instead of engaging in foreign enterprises as Nasser had, he concentrated on what was best for Egypt, and that is why he made the famous trip from Cairo to Jerusalem. Incidentally, one who influenced him enormously in that direction was King Faisal. Faisal leaned on Sadat to break off from the Russians, telling him he couldn't trust the Russians. Faisal, of course, was strongly anti-Communist.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:23:00
[Frank Gannon]

Do you--why do you--why do you think that Sadat is revered in the West but is very highly criticized in the Mideast?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:23:14
[Richard Nixon]

There are several reasons. The first reason is that Sadat broke ranks with other Arabs in going to Jerusalem. He broke ran--ranks with other Arabs in making a deal at Camp David. They resent that.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:23:28
[Frank Gannon]

Didn't he call them "monkeys" and "hissing vipers"?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:23:31
[Richard Nixon]

As a matter of fact, they not only resented his doing that, but it was what he did after that. I talked, for example, to Hassan, the king of Morocco, and to other leaders in that part of the world, and they all, to a man, said that he had not leveled with them about it, and that his rhetoric, they thought, went m--far overboard when they criticized his going to Camp David. And, incidentally, I've never used--heard him use this kind of language, but they said that he referred to them as "monkeys" and "hissing vipers." Well, they're a very emotional people--the Arabs are--and very sensitive people, and they never forgave him for that. I think another reason he may not have been revered is that they had the feeling--the Egyptian people--that he was not really one of them, that maybe he'd grown away from them. As a matter of fact, I don't believe that was the case, but the appearance was there, because he lived very well. His wife, who is a--is a lovely lady, was beautifully groomed, a beautiful woman, as a matter of fact, but she did not relate as much to the people, although she was very active in supporting hospitals and charitable causes and so forth, as some others might have. At least that is what I have heard. But in any event, there's no question that when Nasser died, there was an enormous outpouring of affection and grief, and when Sadat was assassinated, the streets were quite still in comparison.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:25:08
[Frank Gannon]

You went to that funeral, didn’t you?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:25:11
[Richard Nixon]

Yes. I would say that--when s--people would ask me to appraise Sadat--that I can report that this was one man that three former presidents talked about among each other and all agreed upon, to a man. We had a long plane flight from Washington to Cairo, over ten hours. It was all night long. We didn't have any bunks in the plane, so we talked all night, except for getting a few snatches of sleep from time to time.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:25:45
[Frank Gannon]

Was it the first time the three presidents--Ford, Carter, and Nixon had been together?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:25:52
[Richard Nixon]

I--it was the first time--not really the first time, no. It was the first time that Ford, Carter, Nixon, and Reagan had been together, but the first time we were together was at Humphrey's funeral. We were there--although we never had any talks then. This was the first time we'd ever had a talk. So all night long we talked about Sadat and the Mideast and what he meant. We agreed that he was one of the most intelligent men we'd ever met. We had agreed that he was one of the boldest and most courageous men, and we agreed, too, that he had shown great vision, vision in looking over the problems of the moment and looking to the future in making his trip to Jerusalem and agreeing to what he did to--at Camp David. But I knew him in another respect that the other two did not know him. And I told them this on the plane, and I thought they were quite moved by it. That was not the first time I had gone to a funeral in Cairo. It was only about a year before that I had gone to the shah's funeral, which was in Cairo. And when I was there, I--I was the only dignitary of any rank who came to the shah's funeral, because here the shah, who--before everybody was bowing and scraping before him, the heads of state in government and so forth, because he was rich and powerful and so forth, and now they all avoided him because he was out of power. And I never forgot that, as I was standing there in the big tent where all the V.I.P.s--usually ambassadorial level, not head of state level--were standing, Sadat came walking in , resplendent in his uniform--general's unif--uniform. He saw me, his eyes lit up, and he walked over, held both hands out, and said, "How good of you to come. How good of you to come." And I said, "Mr. President, it was very courageous of you to receive the shah after virtually every other country did not grant him sanctuary." And he said, "Courageous, sir? It isn't courageous to stand up for a friend." And that loyalty went further than that, even. I remember I had a long talk with him after the funeral up at Alexandria--that is, the summer palace--and we were talking far into the night. And when we were talking about what had happened at Camp David and so forth, he referred to his friend Jimmy Carter. Now, let's understand when this was. This was at a time before the elections in 1980, when Carter's stock was very, very slow, when it appeared that Reagan was going to win, and when he knew I was for Reagan, because I had told him so, and told him that I thought Reagan would be very reasonable toward him, despite the fact that he was a little concerned that Reagan seemed to be totally pro-Israel, as he had in some of his statements. But he refused the opportunity to do what most politicians do--do--to say what he thought I might want to hear, that Carter was not all that good. He said, "My friend, Jimmy Carter." Now that's Sadat. That's quite a man.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:28:58
[Frank Gannon]

How did Jimmy Carter react to you or treat you on this plane ride, the first time you'd had a chance to talk to him personally as a f--as an ex-president?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:29:10
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, very well. He's a--he was a--a gentleman, and--and--and Mrs. Carter, who was on the plane, was a lady. We hit it off very well, I thought.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:29:20
[Frank Gannon]

Did you consider bringing Mrs. Nixon?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:29:22
[Richard Nixon]

No. She can't take these long flights. She could, but--you understand, it was even hard on me--ten hours on an airplane without a bunk and so forth. She can't do that any more.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:29:35
[Frank Gannon]

How--

[Richard Nixon]

And Mrs. Ford did not come either.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:29:38
[Frank Gannon]

How did President Carter react to the story about the--the shah's funeral, because, after all, he was--he had a vested interest in that story in that he had not let the shah come--

Day 6, Tape 2
00:29:51
[Richard Nixon]

Well-

[Frank Gannon]

--into the U.S.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:29:52
[Richard Nixon]

To President Carter's credit, he didn't react negatively when I told that story. I think, deep down, President Carter felt very badly that he could not let the shah stay in the United States, because of his concern about what would happen to the hostages. And I understood that. Deep down, President Carter had said some very flattering things about the shah just a year before the shah was overthrown--had praised him as one of the great statesmen of the world. And so, under the circumstances, I think that he felt very badly that this had happened. It was a political decision on his part, and I think, frankly, he admired Sadat for standing up and doing what Carter really would like to have done except for the political consequences as far as the hostages were concerned.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:30:39
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think that the shah was the President Diem of the latter day--that the--that the United States, openly or covertly, destabilized him?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:30:53
[Richard Nixon]

I would say that as far as what happened to the shah is concerned, that I think the shah's own appraisal of what brought him down is the best evidence. I saw the shah the last time in Mexico, at Cuernavaca, Mexico. He was then in the last phases of terminal cancer, although he would never admit it or talk about his own problems at all. But he was quite thin and quite pale, but his head--still as active and sharp as it'd always been. He's a very intelligent, introspective man. And he said that what concerned him about the way he was treated by the United States was not that the United States was for him or against him but was the uncertainty of the policy. He says, "There's nothing worse when you are confronted with revolutionary and rebel forces and uncertainty insofar as support is concerned." One day, for example, he said, statements would come in, public and private, from Washington indicating total support, urging him to stand firm. The next day there would be some story leaked from a high-level aide, printed all over the world and par--given particular credence in Tehran, to the effect that lower-level or second-level people in the administration were meeting with Khomeini and others who were out to knock the shah o--off--or out, as the case might be. And then the next day i--i--there would be a story to the effect that, in the event that the shah left Iran or was overthrown, the United States would be prepared to accept any government that the people chose. Well, he said, all of this had the effect of encouraging his enemies and, of course, discouraging his own supporters. He said that was a mistake, and I believe it was a mistake, too. As a matter of fact, what happened to the shah, I think, could only be interpreted in that part of the world, and in other parts of the world as well, is that it is dangerous to be a friend of the United States, and it may pay to be an enemy. I think what we have to understand is that the shah was the best friend of the United States in that area and the whole Persian Gulf area, and it was Israel's only friend. The shah, we must remember, in the 1973 war, furnished oil for our Mediterranean fleet when the other countries in the area had cut it off. And the shah tied down the Iraqi forces by supporting the Kurds against the Iraqis so that they never got involved in the '73 war. And I know that the kah--the shah, when he spoke in Mexico about what had happened--that he--he could not understand why it was that, among his critics in the American media, there were some of Jewish background--not all, but some who were among his most violent critics, because they were liberals, and they thought he was too reactionary and the rest. And he just couldn't understand that, because he was the only friend that Israel had in that whole area of the world.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:34:02
[Frank Gannon]

Why did you go to his funeral?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:34:06
[Richard Nixon]

First, because I knew him better than any world leader I had met in thirty--over the past thirty-seven years of public life--in and out of it. I met him first back in 1953, when I was a young vice president and he was a very young shah--in his early thirties--a--and I met him over ten or twelve times after that. I found him to be a very sensitive man, a very intelligent man, one who understood the world as well as any leader that I had met, who--who could talk about India or Pakistan or China or Latin America with, frankly, as much perception and sophistication as any American leader could possibly talk about it. And I had great respect for him. And I think the r--major reason I went, though, I must say, was because I was concerned that our own government, again, I suppose, because of the hostage situation, was not going to be represented at the funeral by a high--high-level person.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:35:12
[Frank Gannon]

Were you concerned that your going might embarrass President Carter?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:35:15
[Richard Nixon]

No, not at all. As a matter of fact, i--it occurred to me that as President Carter probably, deep down, wished he could have gone, but he couldn't. He didn't feel that he could, because of the hostage situation. No. I went because the shah was my friend, he was a friend of the United States, and I thought that some high-level individual from the United States ought to be there. You see, the important thing that we've got to get across to the people in countries that are wavering between standing with us or going in the other direction or remaining neutral is that the United States is not a fair-weather friend, that we will stand by our friends and allies when they are down as well as when they are up. Now, that may not make good diplomacy, but I think it--in the short run, but in the long-term I think it's absolutely essential if we're going to build the kind of support and respect and confidence in the United States that we need to have.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:36:20
[Frank Gannon]

The shah is--is generally accepted as having been a very repressive and oppressive ruler. His [Savak] tortured and killed. He lived in considerable splendor and opulence while there was terrible poverty in his country. In your book Leaders, you write that he was not ruthless enough in quashing those who threatened his nation's stability. Do you think he should have been more ruthless?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:36:46
[Richard Nixon]

Yes, I do, particularly in view of the fact that his opponents were not those who were basically more liberal, but--because basically they were reactionary. They were the true reactionaries. L--let's look at the shah for just a moment, and look at him very fairly. He actually was a progressive, a progressive in a number of ways. He instituted a land reform program. He instituted a literacy program. He sent thousands of students from Iran to the United States, and particularly to the United States, to study, and in other countries as well. He liberated women. The irony was that those he liberated, the women and the students he sent abroad--they came back and joined the revolutionary forces. And the irony was that the shah, being progressive, was attacked as being reactionary and conservative on these particular issues, whereas his opponents were the reactionaries. Putting it very bluntly and very simply, the shah was trying to move Iran into the twentieth century. His opponents, Khomeini et al., wanted to move Iran back into the Dark Ages, and that's what they've done. Now, there was some repression, true. Now there is total repression. There may not have been enough land reform. Now there n--is none whatever. What I am simply suggesting is this--that when we look at the shah, we have to look at him in terms of what he confronted, and he conturned [sic]--confronted revolutionary forces there that were not working, in my view, for what was best for Iran, and certainly not best for ourselves. And, most important from the United States standpoint, instead of having a friend in Iran, we now have one that is not only not a friend, but one that is--considers us to be the Great Satan.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:38:40
[Frank Gannon]

Could you say that if you had stayed in office that you would not have allowed the shah to fall?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:38:45
[Richard Nixon]

I would not have, no. I would have been steadfast throughout. I--I would have made it very clear down through the bureaucracy that where--there was to be absolutely no c--contact with those that were trying to overthrow him. I would have had a very good study made of Khomeini's background and would have found that--exactly what kind of person he was, because by studying his background, they could have known that he was going to do exactly what he was going to do. The man i--i--is a radical reactionary. He's not a progressive in any sense of the word.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:39:20
[Frank Gannon]

If you had been con--

Day 6, Tape 2
00:39:21
[Richard Nixon]

You see, the choice basically was not between the shah and somebody better. The choice bas [sic] between him and somebody worse, and it's very easy for me to make that choice.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:39:31
[Frank Gannon]

If you had been confronted with the worst case from that point of view, and the shah had been overthrown and hostages taken, and you were president, would you have taken him into the United States?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:39:42
[Richard Nixon]

Absolutely. I would have--take him into the United States, and, as far as the hostages was concerned, I would have handled that a little differently, too. I don't say this in criticism of President Carter, because he certainly went through a lot on the hostage situation. He believes it may have cost him the election. I don't think it did. I think the economic issues were the major ones. But be that as it may, it didn't help him. But as far as the hostage iss--situation was concerned, American foreign policy can never be made hostage to hostages. That's why hostages are taken--for purposes of blackmail. And we mustn't let that happen. And, for example, the--when President Carter was asked about the hostage situation, he went overboard in saying that our first and then only concern was the safety of the hostages. Now, that is a concern, but our major concern is what happens to Iran, what happens to the relations between the United States and Iran. And in this respect, I would never have said, as President Carter did, that "I rule out the ru--use of force in order to get the hostages back." All that did was to encourage those that had captured them and were holding them in captivity not to give them up. I remember President Eisenhower, during our administration and--and the vice-presidential days, used to say on occasion that he had learned as a military commander that it's very important never to tell your enemy what you're going to do, because then he'll be ready for you. But he says it's just as important never to tell him what you're not going to do, because then that will encourage him to do things he otherwise might not do. And in this case, it was a mistake, in my view, to do that. The other thing I would say is that, with regard to the hoskage [sic]--the hostage rescue operation, that President Carter and the Pentagon--I assume they are the ones that joined in the decision--made a mistake and are not, again, following out an Eisenhower dictum, and that dictum is that when you make a play of that sort, you always assume the worst. Y--and you cannot assume that your intelligence i--is going to be absolutely accurate. I have a very interesting reaction in that respect that Eisenhower had at the time of Lebanon in 1958. As everybody will recall, in 1958 in Lebanon there was a crisis because the government there was under attack. There was a possibility that the Soviet Union might intervene, and Eisenhower had to make a decision as to whether or not to send Marines in in order to establish peace. And I remember the briefing that occurred in the Oval Office, and Eisenhower heard Allen Dulles, the head of the C.I.A., and Foster Dulles, the secretary of state, brief him, and to recommend that we send in a Marine group in order to keep order. And in they--when they gave their report, they indicated that they did not think there would be any intervention from the standpoint of the Russians and that it would be a peaceful operation. And Eisenhower sat back, and after they had given this report, he said, "Foster, let me ask you something. Let us assume our intelligence is wrong. Are you prepared to take the next step?" And Foster Dulles thought a long time. He said, "Well, Mr. President, I'm ninety percent sure that there will be no problem. But if there is, yes, we should be prepared to take the next step." The point of that anecdote is that Eisenhower would never have made the mistake of the Bay of Pigs, when the intelligence proved to be wrong, and there wasn't the wa--uprising that--that he had--they had hoped at the time, and when it was necessary to have committed more air strength than had been planned, or at least not to cut back on what had been planned. In other words, in the hostage situation, rather than sending enough helicopters plus one, you should say twice--send twice the number to be sure that if there were, as there turned out to be, mechanical or other difficulties, you'd be pared--be prepared to carry out the operation to a successful conclusion.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:44:03
[Frank Gannon]

If you had still been in office, would you have taken the risk of the rescue mission?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:44:07
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, yes. Oh, I think President Carter deserves high marks for taking that risk. I took a similar risk, somewhat, during the Vietnam War. We had the [San Te] operation, where we had intelligence reports with regard to a prison camp for our P.O.W.s, and we sent in a--a magnificently trained group to rescue them. It came off--after all the training and so forth that they had had and the support we gave them, it came off perfectly. Unfortunately, they had moved the P.O.W.s from the camp, and it was found empty.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:44:43
[Frank Gannon]

Did you direct that they follow that worst-case dictum and send in--

Day 6, Tape 2
00:44:45
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, yes.

[Frank Gannon]

--twice as many--as--

Day 6, Tape 2
00:44:46
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, we were ready. Oh, yes, we were ready. In fact, we lost a helicopter or two, but there were plenty there, and we--as a matter of fact, we lost no men on it, because we were prepared. No, that didn't fail because of lack of preparation or because of lack of equipment. That failed only because our intelligence was faulty in terms of not finding out that the P.O.W.s had been moved from that camp to a place in Hanoi.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:45:12
[Frank Gannon]

In practical political terms, could you have resisted the tremendous domestic feeling and pressure against the shah at the time? If you had been in office and had invited him into this country, wouldn't that have created a--almost an unmanageable national uproar?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:45:29
[Richard Nixon]

It might have, but I would still have done it, because in the long term a president on occasion has to stand against what appears to be the best opinion of the brightest and the best in the media, who, of course, would try to create that uproar, and I'm not--I would not say that you would find that, when the American people really realized what the stakes were, that they would have opposed what the president did in that respect. I think, in retrospect, that the American people perhaps would respect a president for his--doing what he felt was right and what was in the interest of the country. I must say I was quite moved by the fact that after I went to the shah's funeral--I went at my own expense, of course--and took this long trip and came back--that I received a great volume of mail from the United States, from all over the world as well, saying, "Thank you very much for standing by a friend." Now, I'm not sure that's the majority opinion, but, in any event, there's still a lot of support in the world and in the United States for doing the right thing, even though it has some political costs.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:46:44
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think that the government should have picked up the tab for your going to the shah's funeral to represent the country as you did? Even unofficially?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:46:51
[Richard Nixon]

Absolutely not. I never asked the government to do that. For example--

Day 6, Tape 2
00:46:54
[Frank Gannon]

But--do you think they should have offered?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:46:56
[Richard Nixon]

No. No, they wouldn't and I wouldn't expect them to, because basically if they were to pick up the tab for that, why didn't they send me on an official mission? No. As a matter of fact, in all of my travels abroad, I don't ask for government support. Secret Service has to go along by law, but I--for example, my several trips to China since I've been out of office, my trips to the--the Mideast, and also my trips over to Europe have all been at my own expense. I--I want to be--if you go as the representative of the government, then of course you have to do what the government wants. And I want to be independent to do whatever I want and to say whatever I want when I come back.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:47:43
[Frank Gannon]

Would you accept a government mission if it were--if you were asked to take one?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:47:47
[Richard Nixon]

No, if I thought it would be appropriate, like f--well, for example, let me say I was a member of the delegation that went to Sadat's funeral, and we rode in a government plane down there. From Sadat's funeral, however, I did not stay--I didn't--not come back with Ford and Carter on the plane. I went on around to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco after I had attended the funeral. I did that at my own expense.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:48:17
[Frank Gannon]

There's a great story about that, that they didn't know that you were going to peel off and--and go off on your own, and that the w--when they found out you were gone was when the door was about to close, and they looked around and found you weren't there. Did you plan to shake them up a little bit by just disappearing?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:48:31
[Richard Nixon]

No. I--I didn't plan to shake them up, but I--I couldn't inform them that I was going to make this kind of a trip, since it was being done on my own. And I c--I couldn't inform them without getting involved in a lot of diplomatic double talk and so forth and so on. But I did inform--let me make it very clear, I did inform the--Secretary Haig, because the State Department did furnish me briefing materials for the trip. But I didn't--but I did not want--I did not want the trip--l--let me explain. The major reason I couldn't inform them is it wouldn't have been proper, before going to a funeral and before the funeral was completed, to announce that after the funeral I'm going to go visit other countries in the area, particularly when the other countries in the area--none of them at that particly [sic] time had good relations with Sadat, and none of them had attended the funeral. So I had to wait until after the funeral and then just to take off.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:49:42
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think that if President Sadat had been dealing with anyone other then Prime Minister Begin that he could have achieved a broader, more comprehensive peace settlement?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:49:53
[Richard Nixon]

Doubtful. President Sadat didn't think so. We've referred to his various abilities, his intelligence, and his determination, and his vision, et cetera. He was also a pragmatist. I remember the last time I saw him, a--at his suite in--here in New York on his last visit to the United States. Begin at that time was pretty low in American public opinion, because he--I think that was right after he'd bombed the Iraqi reactor, or something like that, and people were referring to him as being crazy. In fact, there was a column that morning in one of the papers saying he was crazy. And I said, "What do you think, Mr. President? Is this Begin crazy?" He says, "Oh, he's crazy, but he's crazy like a fox." And I said, "Wouldn't you prefer to have somebody else to deal with, somebody who would be, perhaps, easier to deal with and not as intransigent and difficult as he apparently was at Camp David?" He thought a moment. He says, "Oh, no. I prefer to deal with him. He's tough and he's strong, but I know that once we make the deal, he will be able to deliver on it." And he says, "I'm not sure that some of the others would." So I would say that, as far as Begin is concerned, it'll be hard to make a deal with him, particularly when he says that Galilee and Samaria belong to Israel and so forth. But, on the other hand, once he makes it, he is certainly one that can get support from it, because those who oppose a deal in Israel are not the liberals but the conservatives, and Begin, of course, represents them.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:51:36
[Frank Gannon]

Some observers say that because of Begin's aggressive and tough and--and, as some people see it, unpleasant personal characteristics, he does Israel's cause harm with United States public opinion. Do you think that's true?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:51:52
[Richard Nixon]

I think he does in many respects. For example, I do not think that, if it had been Golda Meir or Rabin--that the whole Lebanese operation would have received the bad press that it did in the United States that it did with Begin, because Begin was so hard-nosed and tough all the way through. On the other hand, there's a lot of grudging respect for him, too, in this country. I mean, d--this country doesn't like to lose. This country likes to--to see another nation stand up for its rights. A--and so, under the circumstances, I think Begin has some support. But I think in--in overall terms, his personality was not particularly a pleasant one for most Americans, particularly when Israel was engaged in what many considered to be--was inconsistent with Israel's basic ideals.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:52:44
[Frank Gannon]

Some observers feel that President Sadat was naïve in his policies. The--the distinguished Arab journalist [Mohammed Hikov] says that he was naïve in that, when he traded R--Russian support for American support, he confined himself to having to negotiate to Israel. And even Henry Kissinger, apropos Sadat's throwing the Soviets out in 1972, said, "He should have let us known it--known us--he should have let us known [sic] it in advance. We would have paid him well for it." Was--how sophisticated was Sadat in planning his policies, thinking them through?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:53:21
[Richard Nixon]

I never think of Sadat as being a particularly sophisticated person. He's intelligent, but I think he is a man who sometimes is moved by impulse. I think what happened when he flew to Jerusalem--he just decided that there was a bottleneck there, that--that a big play was required. It was risk for him, but he believed in taking risks, risks for peace. It's very important for all of us to remember that it takes a--a--a cer--it takes courage to fight war, but it also takes courage, a different kind of courage, to wage peace. Sadat understood that. He was willing to take risks for peace, and it paid off. As--I think as far as the Russians were concerned, what happened there is that one of the reasons that he had them leave, as he told me when I saw him in 1974, he says, "We just gave up on them, we gave up on them," because they weren't providing the economic and military support that he thought that they had promised. And let me emphasize, too, that Sadat was influenced to a certain extent, I am sure, and maybe to a great extent, by Faisal, because Faisal was very anti-Soviet, and Faisal constantly remonstrated with Sadat with regard to having too much Russian influence in Egypt and tried to wean him away, and that played a role as well. So maybe it [sic] just possible that Sadat should have played it in a tougher way and have said that the United States had to pay a price in order for him to throw the Russians out. But that was characteristic of Sadat. He did what he thought it was right [sic]. And, incidentally, it was the right decision. And let me say another thing that set up Sadat's doing what he did with regard to renewing relations with the United States. That occurred because Sadat was convinced, after the '73 war, where, you've got to understand, the United States supported Israel with an airlift at a time that Israel was about ready to be overrun by the Egyptians and the Syrians that--nevertheless, he--every--shortly after that--pe--the cease-fire ended that war--resumed diplomatic relations with the United States. And I think he did that because he realized that the United States could do something for him in terms of peace that the Russians were unable to do in terms of waging war. And he also did that because he was convinced that, while there was no question about my being pro-Israel, he felt that being I--that being pro-Israel, as far as I was concerned, did not mean that I would be anti-Arab or anti-Egypt. As a matter of fact, he had a very candid talk with me on that '74 trip a--about the American political scene. He'd followed our elections pretty closely, a--and he realized that, except for Eisenhower, I was the only American president since World War II who had been elected without substantial Jewish support. He thought that I would support Israel, but he thought I would not be unfair to Egypt or anti-Arab as a result of that support. And he was right. That's why among--those are among that factors that got him to move as he did.

Day 6, Tape 2
00:56:53
[Frank Gannon]

On that last trip, the 1974 trip, did he mention Watergate to you at all?

Day 6, Tape 2
00:57:02
[Richard Nixon]

He did not mention it, but his--his wife, interestingly enough, spoke to Mrs. Nixon about Watergate. Now, understand, this is before Camp David, before the so-called "détente" between Egypt and Israel. But she said that they in Egypt just couldn't understand Watergate at all, and that they thought it was a conspiracy, and that she and many Egyptians thought it was a Jewish cons--conspiracy. I don't think that was the case, incidentally, but that does show that there was still a strong anti-Jewish sentiment back in 1974, which of course still is the--

Day 6, Tape 2
00:57:41
[Action note: Screen goes black.]

Day 6, Tape 2
00:58:27
[Action note: Color bars appear.]

The following text appears in the original transcript but does not appear on a tape. It has not been edited.

[Richard Nixon]

--[interrupted in the middle of the word "there"]--re to an extent but changed by the new relationship created by Camp David.

[Frank Gannon]

How did Mrs. Nixon handle the diplomatic confidence of that nature?

[Richard Nixon]

Well, she handles it very properly. She listens and she nods and, of course, does not make comments of her own, because she wasn't asked to.

[Frank Gannon]

There's a very vivid film of you and Sadat standing by the pyramids on the '74 trip. Do you remember that scene? Was it as dramatic to live it as it is to watch it?

[Richard Nixon]

I had been to the pyramids before, but being there with Sadat, of course, was a different kind of experience, different in kind, particularly, even though the place was the same. And as you stand there, you think of Egypt's past, which is a great past. We think of China being an old country and--

Day Six, Tape three of four, LINE FEED #1, 5-27-83, ETI Reel #43
May 27, 1983

Day 6, Tape 3
00:01:05
[Action note: Screen goes black.]

Day 6, Tape 3
00:01:08
[Action note: Picture appears on screen.]

[Richard Nixon]

--the Chinese having an old civilization, and I--Egypt goes back much older. It's one of the oldest civilizations in the world--two or three thousand years older in terms of history than even China. And as you look at the pyramids, you think of modern-day Egypt, a terribly, terribly poor country, overpopulated, but people with a great potential, a great potential. The--the Egyptians are the educators, or at least that's been my observation--the educators of the whole Mediterranean--southern Mediterranean-Mideastern area. And Sadat was trying desperately to move Egypt up economically. He died, unfortunately, before much progress had been made in that direction. But as we stood there in the pyramids, you naturally think of the past, and you think that a man like Sadat and those who follow him, like Mubarak--that they also must think of their past every time they look out their windows and see the pyramids and think of the greatness of Egypt in the past. That must renew their dedication and their determination to build a bigger and better Egypt in the future.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:02:24
[Frank Gannon]

We’ve reached the end of our hour.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:02:28
[Offscreen voice]

Just stay for one second, gentlemen. Talk to each other. Lights.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:02:36
[Frank Gannon]

Do you remember that it was hot as hell and your leg hurt?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:02:40
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, yes. We'll get that in another place.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:02:44
[Frank Gannon]

Yeah.

[Richard Nixon]

If you want the--

Day 6, Tape 3
00:02:45
[Frank Gannon]

Yes. No.

[Richard Nixon]

--whole thing--

Day 6, Tape 3
00:02:46
[Frank Gannon]

No.

[Richard Nixon]

I had the phlebitis in terms--

Day 6, Tape 3
00:02:47
[Frank Gannon]

No.

[Richard Nixon]

--of another compact.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:02:58
[Frank Gannon]

I think for the--yes. I think for the fade-out on this, the f--picture of--the--the film of standing with the pyramids in the background and that--I think the way you did it is just right for ending the Sadat story. And we got the shah in. He was a little out of order, but we got him.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:03:06
[Richard Nixon]

That's right. That's enough.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:03:07
[Frank Gannon]

Got him in good.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:03:09
[Action note: Screen goes black.]

Day 6, Tape 3
00:03:10
[Richard Nixon]

Well, the main thing is the line is "It's dangerous--"

Day 6, Tape 3
00:03:12
[Offscreen voice]

Thirty-five minutes.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:03:13
[Richard Nixon]

"It's dangerous to be a friend of the United States, and it pays to be an enemy." That summarizes it all.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:03:17
[Offscreen voice]

[Unintelligible, in background.]

Day 6, Tape 3
00:03:18
[Richard Nixon]

Be sure that stays in. You see, that's a k--

Day 6, Tape 3
00:03:20
[Action note: Color bars appear on screen.]

[Richard Nixon]

--that's a kind of a quote that people can understand.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:03:22
[Action note: Tone begins.]

[Richard Nixon]

Did you read this?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:03:28
[Frank Gannon]

Yes, we've got Middle Eastern food in honor of our--we--we have the sheep's eyes for you, Mr. President.

[Action note: Some talking among all is audible under the tone.]

Day 6, Tape 3
00:04:25
[Frank Gannon]

--we ate for lunch there may be a--

Day 6, Tape 3
00:04:26
[Offscreen voice]

You better keep your eyes on me, Frank.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:04:27
[Richard Nixon]

Burp?

[Offscreen voice]

I'm going to be counting down, and I'll cue you. [Unintelligible.]

Day 6, Tape 3
00:04:29
[Richard Nixon]

Is that--some burps, you mean?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:04:30
[Frank Gannon]

No, there may be a steady flow of people out to the--

Day 6, Tape 3
00:04:33
[Richard Nixon]

Can.

[Frank Gannon]

--the head.

[Action note: Both laugh.]

Day 6, Tape 3
00:04:44
[Offscreen voice]

Stand by.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:04:48
[Action note: Screen goes black.]

Day 6, Tape 3
00:04:49
[Action note: Picture appears on screen.]

[Offscreen voice]

Okay, ten seconds out.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:05:00
[Frank Gannon]

Over the years, you met King Faisal several times, both in Saudi Arabia and in the United States. What kind of a leader was he?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:05:10
[Richard Nixon]

I would have to rate him very, very high. Without question, he was the ablest leader of the Arab world that I've ever met, and I would rate him, in terms of all the leaders I've met, and I've met perhaps over three hundred heads of government and heads of state over the past thirty-seven years. I'd put him in the top ten. He's that good.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:05:29
[Frank Gannon]

Did he have a--a sophisticated understanding of the--the forces throughout the world or just in his region?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:05:36
[Richard Nixon]

That is--that was the reason that I would rate him so well. He was one who knew his country and knew it well. But he was one also who knew the world. He knew Europe, he knew America, he knew Asia. He could talk as well about other countries in other areas--s of the world as he did the Mideast. And he also had a deep appreciation of the East-West conflict. He had one hangup, however, on which I--we did not agree. He always referred to the Zionist-Communist conspiracy, e--even though the Soviet Union, it seemed to me, was trying to do Israel in, as he would have liked to have done it in, too, on occasion. But a--apart from that, he was a very clear thinker, and I--he played a great role, of course, when he helped to wean Sadat away from the Russians, one for which we should always be grateful to him.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:06:31
[Frank Gannon]

Did his belief in this Zionist-Communist conspiracy unbalance his judgment, do you think?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:06:37
[Richard Nixon]

Not to the point that, for example, he couldn't receive me. After the war of 1973, I had strongly supported Israel. We had saved Israel from defeat, certainly, or helped to save it, through the airlift and through keeping the Russians out. But he appreciated the fact, as he told me, that while he knew and understood that I was pro-Israel, that I was an American president that was not, because I was pro-Israel, anti-Arab. And all that he asked for was that the United States have an understanding of the Arab world, an appreciation. And that's why we developed a very good relationship. I would say, further, with regard to Faisal, he was two different men, as I remember him. I met him first when he was, I think, minister of finance in Prince--in King Saud's government, and he was in New York at the Waldorf-Asori--Astoria. I was in New York at the same time, and I found that he would like to get together for a meeting. And he was dressed in Western clothes and spoke impeccable English and so forth, and spoke about his concern about Mideast relations and so forth. Then when I saw him in 1974--he was king then, and he looked altogether different and sounded altogether different. He wore the hair--heavy Arab gowns that the men wear, the crown. He spoke only Arabic, never English. He was totally a man of the Saudi Arabian country empire at that time. He was a man, basically, who was two kinds and two different people in another sense. He was a progressive, progressive in terms that he wanted to move Saudi Arabia into the twentieth century, but, on the other hand, he was conservative, conservative in the best sense. He wanted to retain the best of the past. That's why he wanted to retain, basically, Saudi Arabian culture and religion. And it was a very intelligent thing to do, because, rather than making the mistake that some leaders in that area have made, of--of rooting out the past so that people don't have any roots in the past--keeping the best that is in the past and building on that, he avoided the--the re--rebellion that might have occurred by--i--if they thought they were being moved too fast into the modern.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:09:11
[Frank Gannon]

King Faisal had rather a--an unhappy, almost forbidding countenance. What was he like as a man?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:09:20
[Richard Nixon]

Well, a--again, it depends what period of time we're talking about. He's very different. When he was in his Western clothes in the Waldorf, he was basically a man of the West. And then, there in his own kingdom, he was as Arab as any Arab as I've ever seen. He was a man that seldom smiled. I remember one of his friends told me that whenever King Faisal smiled, it was like--as if someone had bitten into a lemon and found it to be sweet. He was also, incidentally--and this always impresses anybody who meets with somebody else--he was a very good listener. One of his favorite quotations was that God gave men two ears and one mouth, and the reason was that men were supposed to listen twice as much as they talked. But he not only used the proverb, he practiced it himself. And there's nothing that impresses the other fellow more than when you listen to what he has to say rather than insist that you've got to do the talking.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:10:26
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think that he intended the oil embargo during the 1973 war to have the revolutionary and revolutionizing effect on the West, and particularly on America and the American economy, that it did?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:10:40
[Richard Nixon]

I think that he must have had very mixed emotions about it. He felt he had no choice but to do that, in view of the fact that the--the United States had gone all-out in support of Israel against the Egyptians and against the Syrians, and, after all, Saudi Arabia a--Arabia at that time, and at the present time, supports those countries, as against Israel. I think, however, that we have to give him credit for attempting to mitigate the effect of that embargo at a later time. In fact, Saudi Arabia and its oil minister, [Yomani,] were very, very helpful in getting the embargo removed eventually, but certainly moderated at a later time.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:11:25
[Frank Gannon]

How would you describe the effect of--both long-term and short-term, on the United States of the Arab oil embargo in 1973?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:11:35
[Richard Nixon]

Well, it was very detrimental in terms of the perception of--that Americans have of--of Saudi Arabia, the other oil-producing countries. After all, we don't like to sit in gas lines and have the price of gasoline go up and all--and go through all the things that we did during that embargo. And, of course, I was president at that time, and I've noted recently that they've got several billion ration tickets that they've ha--now got to destroy, because I wouldn't let rationing go ahead, thank God, when some were recommending it in the administration. But, nevertheless, that perception of the Saudi Arabians as being basically anti-American, which was really not it so much as they--they're anti-Israeli--and I think Saudi Arabia, we have to recognize, too, had another problem. Saudi Arabia is not a very populous country. It's a very big country, and it's a very rich country, but almost half its population is Palestinian, and so, under the circumstances, I think Faisal felt that the embargo had to go forward or the Palestinians would've been in an uproar.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:12:42
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think that the results of the oil embargo contributed to your downfall a year later?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:12:50
[Richard Nixon]

Well, a number of things contributed to it. It didn't help. In fact, the fact that the recession began to develop--the oil embargo, of course, created more inflation, and that, combined with the worldwide food shortage in 1973, 1974, helped to create the inflation which later led to the recession. So, it contributed to it, probably.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:13:12
[Frank Gannon]

You met King Faisal when you were in the Mideast on your tour in 1974. Did you talk to him about the possibility that you might not survive in office in terms of what would happen with American policy in the Middle East, or did he raise it?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:13:29
[Richard Nixon]

No, he didn't raise that. That just left--he just left that unsaid. I was consequently very surprised when we met the press after our formal talks, and he stepped right up to that issue in a way that left little to the imagination. He first praised me quite fulsomely, and perhaps more than he should have, in terms of what my policies had done toward producing peace in the world, "peace and progress," as he called it. And he said, "I urge all Americans and all people in other countries to support President Nixon in the greatest initiative toward peace in world history--one of the greatest, certainly." And then he went on to say, "And those in America and those in other parts of the world who oppose him are, in effect, opposing the cause of peace." And he concluded it by saying--and he said, "Mr. President, so hand-in-hand and shoulder-to-shoulder, we will go forward together in working for a world in which there will b--pea--there--there will be peace and progress and justice." Well, it had quite an impact on the press corps, because by that time I think many of them, understandably, not only were against me, but they w--were hoping that everybody else would be as well and were waiting for the day--for the downfall. But it didn't help him. The point is that, as far as Faisal was concerned, he could have buttered up to the press by saying nothing or even, still, giving a little jab in terms of my problem being my own and being rather harmful to relations. But his standing up the way he did was just the kind of a man he was.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:15:25
[Frank Gannon]

The--the [House of Saud] seems to enjoy special prestige and success. What do you think it is that sets it apart from the other ruling houses or the other rulers in the Middle East?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:15:39
[Richard Nixon]

Well, one thing that sets it apart is that they're very rich. They're the richest country in the Mideast. But it's more than that. Basically, Saudi Arabia is the religious center of the Mideast, and also, in looking at Faisal, and in looking also at his predecessors, Khalid and Saud--whatever we want to say about them, they were deeply and profoundly religious men. The same, of course, is true of Fahd, who is now king, and a man also whom I knew very well and very favorably--met him in Washington first when he was not even crown prince, just a minister, and then met him later when he was crown prince, and have been in correspondence with him since he has ascended the throne. That's part of the reason. The other reason is that the Saudis have played, because of their wealth, a--a very significant role with other countries. After all, they subsidize, or did subsidize, the Egyptians. That's one of the reasons Faisal had great influence with Sadat. But they subsidize the other Arab g--governments to a very substantial amount and therefore can influence them. Now, I must say there are those, and understandably, in this country and other parts of the world who think that the Saudis are much too cautious, that they'll never step up to anything. But I would only suggest th--that the reason they are that way i--is that--that whoever is king in Saudi Arabia is sitting on, basically, a--a potential explosive situation, due to the fact that there's such a heavy proportion of the population which is Palestinian and potentially ra--radical. But above all, I think the reason that the present House of Saud has prestige far beyond the population of the country is not so much its money but because, while it supports progress for the future, it has not made the mistake of rooting out the past, and therefore its progress is going to b--be built on the solid culture that the Saudis think is very important to them and to the other countries in the Arab world.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:18:02
[Frank Gannon]

How would you describe the American stake in Saudi Arabia?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:18:09
[Richard Nixon]

Well, the stake, of course, is enormous, due to the fact that Saudi Arabia has not only present oil but also great reserves in oil which are among the greatest in the world. Now, that is important to us, but it is indispensable to Japan and indispensable to most of Europe, except for the British, of course, who now have North Sea oil. At the time, for example, o--of--of the embargo--one of the reasons in 1973--one of the reasons that our European friends didn't want to go along on that, and, of course, didn't, is they were mortally afraid of the effect that an embargo would have on them. Now, the United States, if an embargo were to come--if, for example, Saudi Arabia and the other oil-producing states in the Persian Gulf were cut off from us, if that supply were cut off, we could get along. It'd be tough, but we could. Japan could not, and much of Western Europe could not. So, therefore, Saudi Arabia holds the oil pipeline which is essential for the manufacturing capabilities of much of Europe and of Japan and, to an extent, of the United States.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:19:35
[Frank Gannon]

Are there circumstances in which America's--America would go and fight to protect that pipeline if it were threatened?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:19:44
[Richard Nixon]

Well, I think one of the reasons that after the Afghan invasion by the Soviet Union, President Carter announced the doctrine for that part of the world, that the United States would be prepared to intervene, and asked for ap--approval by the Congress, and approval was given, for a force which would be available in the area to handle such contingencies. I would say that certainly the United States is developing that kind of capability. Now, when the question is asked as to whether or not we would go to war in order to save our oil pipeline, I think that poses a very difficult one. I'm not prepared to say what others would do. I certainly would suggest that our European friends, the Japanese, and the United States would have such an enormous stake there, that we could not stand by and allow that whole area to come under control of a power that would be antigonist--antagonistic to us.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:20:59
[Frank Gannon]

When you were president, would you have sent in troops if--if that were the case--if it were threatened, say, by the Soviets?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:21:05
[Richard Nixon]

They would certainly think so. Th--they're nor--it isn't a question of whether--whether people thought that I would, but as far as the Soviet were concerned, they weren't about to make a move of that sort, particularly after what I had done in Vietnam. I had proved my credibility by taking the risks we did politically in the invasion of Cambodia, as it is--as it was called, the May eighth bombing and mining of Haiphong, the bombing in December of 1972. All of these things create credibility, and I do not think that the Soviet Union would have tried to test me in that way. But there was another reason, too. We have to recall that with all of the problems of so-called "détente," that--that the very fact that summit meetings were going on an annual basis deterred the Soviet Union from engaging in aggressive conduct in that part of the world or any other part of the world that might be detrimental to the interest between the two countries.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:22:11
[Frank Gannon]

Do you remember how you heard about the assassination of King Faisal?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:22:17
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, yes, I read it in a news report. It didn't--which was--which had come in in the morning. That was all. I--

Day 6, Tape 3
00:22:25
[Frank Gannon]

You've written in your book that he was perhaps the--the only modern leader assassinated by or because of television. What did you mean by that?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:22:36
[Richard Nixon]

Well, the irony in Faisal's case was, as I have often pointed out, he was a progressive--progressive in the sense that he had a great program for literacy, he abolished slavery, he provided education for women, and of course a great program--because they had the funds for it--to build hospitals and roads and schools and all that sort of thing. He moved this basically nomadic desert empire into the position of being a modern state. On the other hand, deep down, he was a conservative, and deep down--and he has told me this in our conversations--he didn't like television. He thought it was a corrupting influence. But also, as a pragmatist, he realized that many of the younger people in Saudi Arabia did like it, but also he realized that if Saudi Arabia were going to be a modern state, it had to go forward with some of these modern appliances. And what happened was--the irony of it all--was that he, one who opposed television, was assassinated by an extremist who was opposed to having any television in Saudi Arabia. So he is the first, and I hope the last, leader who has lost his life because of television, having in mind the fact that it shouldn't have happened to him. Let me say, incidentally, that brings up another very important point to make which many people miss. When people think of Faisal, and when they think of Sadat, and they think of the shah and those who opposed them, most liberals jump to the conclusion that they--that the shah was forced out of power and that Faisal was assassinated and Sadat was assassinated because they may have been too conservative. It's just the other way around. In all cases, in the case of the shah, it was not the liberals who drove him from power, it were [sic] those who wanted to turn the clock back. In the case of Faisal, it was a conservative reactionary who assassinated him, and the c--same was--case of Sadat. I remember Faisal--even he did not see the danger--that the real danger was not on the left, but on the right. I recall he expressed great concern to me when I was there about his own air force. He said that many of his young air force pilots had been trained in the United States, and he had sensed that many of them had come back inoculated, as he thought, with the virus of Western liberalism, and he f--feared that therefore they might engage in, frankly, revolutionary activities. It didn't work out that way. He lost his life not because the left opposed him, but because the right did, even though he was more on the right than he was on the left. And I think throughout that part of the world, we should make another observation. We can speak of the danger of Communism in that part of the world, and it is not to be, certainly, underestimated, because the Communists will always come to power, and they'll always profit from chaos, and there's a lot of chaos out there, and they'll do what they can to m--pick up the small change even, in the way that they usually do. But, on the other hand, if there were no Communism, if Russia didn't even exist and was not trying to move into that part of the world, there would still be a major problem. The problem is on the right. In Morocco, in Tunisia, in Jordan, in Egypt, in Saudi Arabia, you will find that, as far as the opposition forces to those governments, all of which are so-called, quote, "moderate" governments--the opposition forces are forces that are on the right, like the revolution in Iran. As a matter of fact, I would say the most destabilizing potential force in the Mideast today is not Soviet-supported activities, but the kind of attitudes and activities and so forth that are represented by Khomeini in Iran a--and by Qaddafi in Syria. I mean, b--b--by Qaddafi in Libya.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:26:52
[Frank Gannon]

How do you think history will assess King Faisal's role and contribution?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:26:59
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, far better than his contemporaries. It has to assess him well, because he was a big man. I mean, a--and there were--and, incidentally, I am not alone in this appraisal. Many other leaders have told me--they don't publicly, as I do--but they had enormous respect for Faisal. I--I'll put it this way. He's one of the few men in the world it was worth traveling eight thousand miles to see. He's just worth talking to, because he was so intelligent and had the wisdom that he did, but I think they will--they will app--un--they will appreciate him in this respect--that he recognized in that part of the world, which is so backward, which needs progress, he recognized the need for progress and supported it--for--for liberating women, for moving ahead on the literacy problem, for moving ahead in all the areas of industrialization and so forth. But he also recognized that in building the new future, you must also retain the best of the past.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:28:09
[Frank Gannon]

On your June 1974 trip to the Middle East, you went for the first time to Syria, a country that you hadn't visited before. What were your first impressions of your first visit to Syria?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:28:21
[Richard Nixon]

Well, a lot different than the background that I had received with regard to what Syria might be like. I don't mean the briefing papers said this, but much of what I had read in the press and some people who had been there observed it--they always refer to "the crazy Syrians," and that this fellow Assad was a bit of a nut, totally irrational, you couldn't do anything with him, and so forth, and that--another thing that was said was that there was no country in the world which was more anti-American than Syria. And so, consequently, when the trip was laid on and we went to Syria after being in Saudi Arabia, I was a little concerned about the kind of reception we would get. And I remember sitting in the cabin of the plane, making some notes for the arrival, and all of a sudden the plane really gave a lurch, and I thought we'd hit an air pocket, and the pilot came back and he said, "There's some S--Soviet jets outs--out there." And I looked, and, sure enough, they were buzzing the plane. Well, we were relieved when we found out that, while they were Soviet jess--jets, they were operated by Syrian pilots, and that they were simply an escort to escort us into the airport. So, we arrived there in Damascus, and I must say it was one of the most fascinating places I've ever visited. I had not known until this trip that Damascus is the oldest continually populated city in the world. I'd known it from this description in the Bible. I had not known that it went back that far. And I must say, apart--as contrasted to the anti-Americanism that was expected, or I expected, they were very pro-American. The people would clap when we came out of meetings. They lined the streets, although there wasn't a great deal of publicity about our being there, and so forth. I think, however, it posed quite a problem to Assad, because I remember he told me after he had witnessed--after we had ridden in from the airport and saw all these people on the side there, he--he said, "I hope you noted the warm welcome you received." And I said I did. He said, "Well, it does pose a problem, see." And then he told me what had happened when he had talked to his eighteen--eight-year-old son just after we came in, and his eight-year-old son had seen me shaking hands with Assad at the airport. He said, "Father," he said, "how possibly could you do that?" He said, "Isn't Nix--that Nixon, the Zionist, you were shaking hands with? That evil man who sided with Israel against us in the Jordan war in 1970, the man who saved Israel with the airlift in 1973? How could you possibly shake hands with him?" And Assad went on to say, he said, "You've got to understand, even though he's only eight, that as far as our children in this country--they have been taught to hate capitalism. They have been taught to hate America, and particularly they've been taught to hate Nixon, because Nixon is the one that sided with Israel and also helped Israel in 1973 and avoided a defeat that we otherwise would have inflicted upon them. And then he said, "I replied to my son with one of our favorite proverbs. 'Better for the blind man to see with one eye than not to see at all.'" Now the question is, why would Sada--why would Assad, after all of this propaganda, anti-American propaganda--why would he want to tilt his policy a bit more our way? And I think that the reason is that, deep down, Assad and the Syrians are not pro-Russian. They like the Americans a lot better. They'd like to have a foot in our camp as well. They depend upon the Russians, but that is the reason that he, I think, was glad to see us there, and he welcomed the opportunity to agree, as we did agree, to a resumption of relations and particularly to economic cooperation, which unfortunately has aborted considerably since we left.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:32:30
[Frank Gannon]

One of the other leaders in that region that you have known for many years, from his time as a very young man, is King Hussein. What are your impressions, or what do you remember from your various meetings with King Hussein?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:32:44
[Richard Nixon]

Before getting to that, it's another interesting thing to note that in both Egypt and Syria we had a very interesting reaction in terms of the difference between the Russians and the Americans. And I got this report from Manolo Sanchez, who worked for us and who accompanied me on the trip. And Sanchez would go into the kitchens and check the food and that sort of thing and talk to some of the people, and the waiters and so forth, and cooks. And he said that in Syria--said when he went in there, they said, "Thank God the Americans here [sic]. Now we hope the Russians go." And he--he said they didn't like the Russians, because the Russians were--lived apart, and they were sour and mean. And when we got there to Egypt, he ran into exactly the same thing, and Assad told us that the Americans made more friends in six months, because we had renewed relations, of course, in 1973, after the '73 war, than the Russians had made in six years. And I think what it had to do with was the way Americans conduct themselves abroad. Whether rightly or wrongly, we are a very friendly people. W--we're a very outgoing people, and the Russians were dour, under their Communist rules and so forth. They weren't allowed to fraternize. And so we have something going for us in that respect. But with regard to Hussein, he has been described as a survivor, and he certainly is. I've known him for twenty-five years. He came to the Eisenhower White House, and then I have known him off and on through the years, both there and in--in his own country. And he is a man, first, of great intelligence. He's very shrewd in--politically, but he is a man who is sitting on a powder keg, because, again, about half of his people are Palestinian or Palestinian background. And, in fact, as far as the Jordanians are concerned, if he is to survive as king, he's got to get along with both. And that is why he has to be more cautious than some in the West would like him to be. They want him to step up there and run over to Jerusalem right away. Well, if he does that right away without getting some sort of better understanding with regard to relations in the future and as far as the West Bank is concerned, he's going to risk physical or political suicide or both. Another thing about him that many are not aware of in the West is that he's an enormously courageous man. I'm referring to it not politically primarily, but particularly physically. For example, in 1970, when there was--were very serious problems within Jordan--groups rebelling, particularly Palestinian types--he led the lead tank himself and operated it. H--he is absolutely fearless. And when his critics say that he isn't fearless enough in making some sort of agreement with Israel and stepping forth, I would say better to have him there as a moderate leader, which he is, as one who is not anti-Israel--and that's true of him as well--than to have him out of there and have a radical Palestinian in charge in Jordan. Let's don't push him to take action until he gets something from Israel that will be understood by his own people.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:36:19
[Frank Gannon]

How would you describe King Hassan?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:36:24
[Richard Nixon]

Hassan of--of Morocco is--is quite an outstanding leader in his own right as well. Let's first understand that Morocco is a very important country. It isn't recognized as being important as it is, not simply because it is basically a Moslem or Arab country, which it is. Because of its location, Morocco is one of the most strategically important countries in the world. It borders on the Straits of Gibraltar. It is the bridge between Africa and Europe. It is also a bridge between the Arab world and the rest of--of Africa and the Arab world and the Mideast. And so, under the circumstances, it's a very important country. Now, coming to him himself, I met him for the first time in 1957. I was a--a young vice president then, traveling in that area, and he was a very young crown prince. And his father, who was then the sultan--later became Muhammad V, the king of Morocco--had his crown prince a--accompany me as we drove through the streets of Casablanca and Rabat and these other cities. There were thousands and thousands of people out. I followed my usual practice in my vi--that I had in my vice-presidential days of stopping the car from time to time and moving into the crowds and shaking hands and going into the bazaars and the coffee shops. Now many times when I did that when I was in other countries, the people just didn't understand it--I mean, the people I was traveling with. But not him. He loved doing it himself. He mingled with the people, and he still does, now that he is king. Another thing happened on that trip that was very interesting. It rained for the first time in a year, and they'd had a terrible drought. And that night the king of Morocco, King Hassan--I mean, Muhammad V, the father of the present king, proposed a toast to me. And he said, "To the man with the green feet. That means wherever he walks, the grass grows." And I understand that's th--about the best toast you can get. The other point of interest insofar as the background is concerned is that when his father, Muhammad V, came to the United States in 1957 for his state visit, that was the only occasion in eight years that I ever was the host at a White House dinner. And that was because that was the day that President Eisenhower had his stroke. So that night I was the host of the dinner, along with Mrs. Eisenhower. Now that King Hassan has grown up--he's no longer a young prince, he is now a mature king--I would evaluate him this way--highly intelligent, but I think one of the most impressive things about him is that he has a better understanding of Europe and European politics than any Arab leader that I have met, with the possible exception of Faisal. Faisal would be about equal. He's very sophisticated. He travels a lot in Europe, and he handles the situation within his own country, I think, quite well. He has the [polisarios] who are rebelling against him, but instead of going out and fighting them in their turf out in the deserts, he's taken the best part of the disputed Spanish Sahara. He's built a wall around it and stays behind the wall. It's one of the few walls in history that has worked.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:39:57
[Frank Gannon]

How would you describe President Bourguiba?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:40:02
[Richard Nixon]

Bourguiba is one of the real survivors in the area. He's been in power as long as anybody can remember. Very charismatic, very outspoken, very warm and friendly. He's--he--when I visited him last, in 1982, he threw his arms around me he was so glad to see me, because I had seen him also in 1957. And he is very courageous in terms of Arab-Israel relations. He is one of the first of the Arab leaders who began to make moves toward a more moderate stance toward Israel. And he's done that, even though--even in--even though in his country, in Tunis, they have a problem as far as the radical right is concerned. Bourguiba in Tunis has the radical right. They are his danger. His danger is not on the left. Hassan's danger is on the right, not the left. This is interesting to say about Hassan. Hassan has been thought of as a very rich--is--which he is--monarch, living very well, which he does, and you would think that therefore his danger would be on the liberals, on the left. But his danger is not there because he is progressive in terms of trying to move the country into the modern era. His danger is on the right--those who want to move Morocco back as, for example, Khomeini has moved Iran back. And it's to our interest, above everything else, to be--do everything we can to see that leaders like Hassan, and like Bourguiba, and like the king of Jordan, and, of course, the Saudis--that they have as much support as we possibly can, so that moving our way will demonstrate to the peoples of those countries that that's a better way than moving back, as Khomeini has moved the Iranians.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:41:57
[Frank Gannon]

If these Arab leaders are so great and so important and influential, why is it that they are either unknown to most Americans or that they are thought of as sort of grown men wearing bed sheets?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:42:11
[Richard Nixon]

A part of it is at their own fault. They have been very inept in terms of their public relations. They--they don't--they have not demonstrated the understanding of the United States, and particularly our media, that they should. They come over here and hi--hire high-priced PR firms who--who don't understand it either and just take their money and pocket it, and--and, I f--feel, in many cases don't do much good for them, although there are some exceptions, of course. Another reason f--we have to be very candid about it--is that this country is basically very supportive of Israel, and it is generally assumed that Arab leaders are opposed to Israel. Now, that's not true of the king of Morocco, despite some of the impressions that fray--it's not true of Bourguiba. It's not true of the king of Jordan. It is true, certainly, of the Saudis. They are very strongly anti-Israel. But, on the other hand, the fact that--that so many Americans have been indoctrinated--the idea that to be pro-Arab means that you're anti-Israel I think causes some of the problem. And that's simply got to change, because these are a--men that--that--that deserve certainly a--a better hearing insofar as the United States are concerned. I'd say further that one impression that I made in my toast in Saudi Arabia, and I followed this same theme in the toasts in the other countries that I visited on that trip in 1974 and again when I went back last year--I constantly made the point that I was pro-Israel. I mean I didn't duck that because they all know that. But I made the point that being pro-Israel doesn't mean that you're anti-Arab. And then I made this point, and this, I think, touched them. I said, "It is not natural for Americans and Arabs to be enemies. It is natural for us to be friends." They appreciate that, and I believe that. And I think that if we can just get that across and then if we can some way take some of the poison out of the Israeli-Arab antagonism by finding some even halfway solution for the West Bank, providing some kind of self-government, defusing that issue so that it can't be exploited by the radicals on the right or by the Soviet Union--that that is going to change the whole Arab world in terms of its perception in the United States.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:44:48
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think that if the Arabs had better or most sophisticated public relations that American support for Israel might be changed or attenuated?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:44:58
[Richard Nixon]

I'm not very high--I never have been--on public relations moves. Public relations firms--I--I know they're necessary. I think sometimes they're a necessary evil, and some of my very good friends operate them. But generally speaking, as far as that particular matter is concerned, it's essential for these countries themselves and their leaders to understand America. The most effective proponent of any of these countries in the United States is the man himself as they perceive him. He is the one who can best present a proper image in America. I--I'm just sorry, for example, that Faisal has passed from the scene. If he had been able to come to the United States, as he would have if he had lived, and certainly if I had survived he'd have been there very fast--but if he'd have been able to come to the United States, with his sophistication, with his wisdom, and so forth, he, with one visit, could have substantially altered the perception of the Amer--of the Western world, particularly of the United States. And let's get another example of that--Sadat. Now, one of the reasons that Sadat, who was the only leader of that part of the world, except for Israelis, many of whom have been in the top ten--the only reason he has been in the top ten of those most admired in the world among Americans who answered the poll--the reason was, first, that he had gone to Jerusalem and therefore he was not considered to be anti-Israel. But second because of his personality. People are able to see him. He's a charismatic figure. And, consequently, I--I think it's--it's very important for some of these leaders to be exposed to the American public but to be exposed under circumstances where they can present their own case. Hussein does a good job in that respect, incidentally--handles himself well with--part--part of the reason being, of course, that he speaks English. But time will--it takes some time to work this out. But we've got to defuse the Palestinian-Israeli thing before there's going to be widespread acceptance of these Arab leaders for what they really are--that they aren't just a bunch of nuts wearing bed sheets and so forth and so on. They are different from us, a--and we should not try to change their cultures or their religions. They like theirs and we like ours, but, on the other hand, we've got to recognize they go their way, we go ours, and, as I've often said, it's not natural for Americans and Arabs to be enemies. Let us be friends.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:47:44
[Frank Gannon]

What's your opinion of Yasir Arafat?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:47:50
[Richard Nixon]

I do not know him, except from what I've seen on television, and what I read in the newspapers, but I think I could best describe him as being a cat on a hot tin roof. He's jumping all over the place, and the reason is that he sits on what is called the P.L.O. There are various segments of that. Now, many people have painted him as being a moderate among the Palestinians. Deep down, perhaps he wants to be, and deep down he knows that's the best way to get some kind of acceptance by Israel of some kind of self-government on the West Bank. But, on the other hand, he cannot cut the umbilical cord with what he's called his hard core, the Al Fatah group, a--and the moment that he, for example, made any kind of conciliatory statements with regard to Hussein being allowed to join the talks on the Reagan plan for the West Bank, the Al Fatah group raised hell with him, and he had to back off, because their only answer is to wage war. Now, he's obviously an intelligent man. He knows that waging war has not worked for them as was--any time, and it certainly didn't work the last time when the Israelis wiped them out in Lebanon. But while he is ac--I would say, a cat, then, on a hot tin roof, he also is a cat with nine lives, because how he's able to survive out there in that hotbed of intrigue and differences and so forth--it's hard to say.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:49:29
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think the Israelis lost moral stature by the invasion of Lebanon and the Beirut massacre?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:49:37
[Richard Nixon]

Before going into that, I think it's important to--to really tackle a subject that's often raised. I mean, you say, "Why don't we talk to Arafat? Why don't we talk to the P.L.O.?" And the answer is we can't. We can't because, like it or not, we have cast our lot with and for Israel, and their not recognizing Israel means they're not recognizing us. And so, therefore, unless--till they do that, it would be a mortal affront to I--I--Isr--Israel for us to deal with the P.L.O. However, there is another ground. We should try to influence them, and I say "we" in the broadest sense of the word. We should not object to our European friends and our friends in the Ara--ma--on the Arab world [sic], particularly the Saudis, talking to Arafat. In fact, we should encourage it, having in mind the fact that maybe over a period of time he and the Palestinians can be moved away from the totally intransigent line that they have at the present time. Now to your other question.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:50:43
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think that the Israelis lost moral stature, or how much moral stature did they lose by the invasion of Lebanon and the massacre in Beirut?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:50:54
[Richard Nixon]

Immediately after the massacre, it seemed like it had been almost a death blow, but since then, as it's gotten to more perspective, and since then, when the Israelis faced up to the problem and had a very extensive inquiry which resulted in the defense minister, Sharon, having to resign his post--and being appointed to another one, of course--I think that that has tended to mitigate the strong feeling in the West, and particularly in the United States, that they had lost moral stature, that they were as bad as their enemies, in effect, by--by condoning, or seeming to condone, or allowing to happen, the terrible massacre that occurred, a--even though it could be excused--maybe not excused but certainly understood, having in mind the fact that millions of Jews were massacred in Germany, oh, and in Poland, and in Europe, and so forth and so on. One massacre doesn't make--which is wrong doesn't make another one right, and they know that. I think what has happened here is that among many of Israel's younger people, as well as some of the thoughtful older ones, there is a feeling, a--deep-set feelings, that this policy of continuing war in the long run is going to be disastrous to what I--Israel wants to be, what it means to itself and what it means to the world--that if Israel is going to continue to have to fight its neighbors, then war inevitably leads to repression. War basically i--is a brutal, brutal business. It results in killings, and--and when you let that beast out, sometimes massacres occur, just as they did with us, with My Lai, although we of course reprimanded and prosecuted those who were engaged in it. Let me put it--let me describe it this way. The massacre there was not something that the Israelis approved, but they might have avoided it. But it isn't like the situation with the--with the North Vietnamese in Vietnam. There the killing of civilians, assassination, murder, rape, everything--that was a matter of policy. This was not a matter of policy. This was opposed to Israeli policy, and that's a big difference. So I'd say that, as far as this is concerned, this has set a lot of Israelis to thinking about the future of their country, as it should, and, in my view, we're going to have more things like that in the future, because it is one of the fallouts from war--are events of this sort. And so, therefore, we have to take some risks for peace rather than just continuing to be involved in war.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:53:47
[Frank Gannon]

Did you ever have second thoughts or doubts or concerns about the effectiveness of Henry Kissinger, a Jewish secretary of state, formulating Mideast policy for your administration?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:53:59
[Richard Nixon]

Well, there are many who thought it was a great mistake at the time he was appointed. But I had great confidence in Henry Kissinger, because I knew that he was fair-minded. I knew, too, that while there was no question about his being devoted to the survival of Is--of Israel--that--that he thought in geopolitical terms and that he felt it was very important to support my policy, which has been mine throughout my li--my public life--my policy, which is we stand for Israel, we will support Israel, but that does not mean that we will not also seek better relations with the Arab s--states. And Henry carried that out extremely well. For example, on his shuttle trips, we--we developed closer relations with Egypt, even to a certain extent with Syria, a--and with some of the other countries. Now, I must say there are some out there who don't trust him because he is Jewish. I think, however, they're mistaken in that respect.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:55:13
[Frank Gannon]

A--aren't there also some who don't trust him because they feel he said different things to different people in the different countries?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:55:19
[Richard Nixon]

That is correct. I have heard that, and maybe that's just one of the costs of being a diplomat.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:55:27
[Frank Gannon]

Why is that the U.S. State Department is considered to be pro-Arab and throughout your administration thwarted in some cases, directly or indirectly, some of your pro-Israeli Middle Eastern initiatives? Wouldn't one expect the foreign policy establishment, as represented in the State Department, to be pro-Israeli?

Day 6, Tape 3
00:55:51
[Richard Nixon]

Well, first of all, the State Department is not just one entity. It's--the--the State Department is made up of individual Foreign Service officers, and there're some over there that are very pro-Israeli. The majority of them, as are the great majority of those in the Pentagon, however, are pro-Arab as well, and I emphasize that point. The--the State Department people, and I think the Pentagon people, too, are not pro-Arab and therefore anti-Israeli, but they feel it is very important that the U--that for geopolitical reasons that the United States not alienate a hundred million Arabs, particularly when they sit on as much of the strategic oil of the world as they do. And even apart from that, if there were no oil there at all, that's a lot of people, and they cover a lot of important territory--the gateway to Africa, the gateway to the Indian Ocean, et cetera. And so, I think, too, in--in--in defense of some of the State Department people, who may be called the Arabists--we have to have in mind they believe, as I believe, that it is vitally important from Israel's standpoint that the United States have good relations with Israel's neighbors rather than bad relations, because we will restrain their neighbors. The Soviet Union, if we leave a vacuum, would not. It would egg them on. So that's the way I would look at it.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:57:19
[Frank Gannon]

Can--do you think that there can ever be a truly bipartisan American Mideastern policy, given the--

Day 6, Tape 3
00:57:27
[Offscreen voice]

Excuse me, Frank. We want to do a pickup on that question. You hit your microphone, and it made a sound. [Unintelligible.]

Day 6, Tape 3
00:57:33
[Frank Gannon]

'Kay.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:57:34
[Offscreen voice]

Switch two on the line, and--I'm sorry, switch one on the line. Okay, go ahead.

Day 6, Tape 3
00:57:53
[Richard Nixon]

Well, generally speaking, Democratic candidates will get a very heavy majority of the Jewish vote. Republican candidates simply don't. Eisenhower's highest percentage of the Jewish vote was about thirty-eight percent in 1956. My highest percenta--

Day 6, Tape 3
00:58:08
[Action note: Screen goes black.]

The following text appears in the original transcript but does not appear on a tape. It has not been edited.

[Richard Nixon]

[interrupted in the middle of the word "percentage"]--ge of the Jewish vote was thirty-two percent in 1972, at a time I got about sixty-eight percent of the non-Jewish vote in the country. President Reagan got about thirty-six--thirty-five, thirty-six percent in his landslide in 1980. He won’t get that much the next time around, due to the fact that people probably feel that a Democratic candidate will be more pro-Israeli than Reagan, although Reagan is, as I have pointed out to many of our friends in the Jewish community--is the most, in my view--the most pro-Israeli president in the White House, deep down in this heart, since Harry Truman. Not that Eisenhower wasn't--

[Frank Gannon]

How about since you?

[Richard Nixon]

In my case, I was, but, on the other hand, in my case--

Day Six, Tape four of four, LINE FEED #1, 5-27-83, ETI Reel #44
May 27, 1983v

Day 6, Tape 4
00:01:25
[Action note: Screen goes black.]

Day 6, Tape 4
00:01:26
[Action note: Picture appears on screen.]

[Richard Nixon]

--i--it is well known that I took--that one of the reasons I was able to take a situation in 1969, in which we had no relations with Egypt and some of the other countries because of what happened in the '67 war and reestablished a dialogue with the Arabs and so forth--I was never considered to be simply one who was going to give a blank check to Israel, and--and some Jewish voters resented that. It was a case of all or nothing. Understand, most of the intelligent ones don't think that way. They know who was Israel's friend when it counted, and Golda Meir was one of my best press agents in that respect. But, on the other hand, there is a tendency among Jewish voters to be far more pro-Israel than Israel's leaders, because it's--with them it's all black or white. Now, when you come down to it at the present time, you take Reagan--compared with the Democratic candidates, he's not going to be able to out promise any of them with the Jewish voters, and so, consequently, they will be that way. Now, another reason that Jewish voters in this country tend to be more for a Democrat than a Republican is that Jewish voters generally are more liberal, they--and the Democratic Party is more liberal than the Republican Party. So, under the circumstances, therefore, you--you--you have that thing sorting out. Going back to it, we have to recognize that where this really began was in the New Deal period and in the World War II period. Before World War II, the Jewish vote was more Republican than it was Democrat--I'm r--I mean--before Franklin Roosevelt, I should say. Herbert Hoover got a majority of the vo--of the Jewish vote. But since World War II, having in mind that some Republicans were in America First and isolationist and the rest, since then it has just been assumed among many Jewish voters that the only respectable person to vote for is a Democratic candidate because the Republicans are not considered as pro-Israel. I may have helped a bit on that, and, as I said, Reagan certainly feels that way.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:03:44
[Frank Gannon]

You've talked about the home-grown strains of anti-Semitism in Russia and in Eastern Europe. Do you think that there is a home-grown American strain of anti-Semitism?

Day 6, Tape 4
00:03:55
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, yes. There's some. Yes. And some of it is due to competition economically. Let's face it--it isn't because they are Jews, but because they work harder. That--many of--many of the Jews do better in law school. They do better in medical school. Th--they do better in business. They do b--better in finance than do their Gentile counterparts. And, believe me, there's nothing like being beaten in--in business or in a professions [sic] to make you more anti-somebody, or at least jealous of them. Now that, of course, is unfortunate, but you have to have in mind that this is a--just a fact of life.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:04:41
[Frank Gannon]

Why do you think some Jews feel that you are anti-Semitic?

Day 6, Tape 4
00:04:47
[Richard Nixon]

Well, part of the reason is that I'd--am--that I have made it very clear, one, that I have never had the--I'm not in a position of doing things because of the power of the Jewish vote. And I think it's very important to do that. I have made it clear that I am going to do whatever is best for the country, and I think part of it may go back, I would have to say, to my service on the Un-American Activities Committee, when it was a fact that, apart from Alger Hiss, many of those who were investigated by the committee, in government and out, had Jewish backgrounds, because of their liberal persuasion and so forth and because of what happened in World War II. So, under the circumstances, those of us who were on the committee, mayno [sic]--many of us unfairly--even though I have supported Israel on every vote and every speech ever since then--are designated as being anti-Semitic. Another thing, too--I have made it very clear that I didn't appreciate the f--the fact that during--during the Vietnam War, at a time when I was asking the country for support of Vietnam, some of those who violently opposed what we did in Vietnam--demonstrated against us--were just as violently urging us to support Israel. And I made the point over and over again that if we failed in Vietnam, in supporting one country and so forth, it would slop over and it'd make it very difficult to enlist the support in case Israel came under attack. And I think that did not particularly go down with some of the Jewish voters. But that's part of the life.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:06:38
[Frank Gannon]

Henry Kissinger has described some of the factors he felt that he had to take into account in dealing with you because of your attitudes toward Jews. He wrote, "Nixon shared many of the prejudices of the uprooted California lower middle class from which he had come. He believed the Jews formed a powerful, cohesive group in American society, that they were predominantly liberal, that they put the interests of Israel above everything else, that on the whole they were more sympathetic to the Soviet Union than other ethnic groups, that their control of the media made them dangerous adversaries, above all, that Israel had to be forced into a peace settlement and could not be permitted to jeopardize our Arab relations." Taking those elements, do you think that the Jews form a powerful cohesive group in American society?

Day 6, Tape 4
00:07:22
[Richard Nixon]

Powerful, but not cohesive, because I have--I had a lot of support among many very intelligent and, I think, perceptive Jews, who--who saw that I was, frankly, the best friend that Israel had because of the very fact that I had the strength to do things that others would talk about.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:07:40
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think the Jews are predominantly liberal?

Day 6, Tape 4
00:07:42
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, yes, for reasons that are--that are very understandable, growing out of the World War II experience and having in mind the fact that that, to a certain extent, is their credit. I mean, they--for example, the Jews generally have been very pro-civil rights. I understand that, because they consider themself [sic] to be a minority group. However, ironically, though, the Jews are very much against the quota system, because there they realize that if you have a quota for blacks, you may have one for Jews, and if you have one for Jews, there'll only be one United States senator and not seven.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:08:21
[Frank Gannon]

Do you feel that Jews put the interests of Israel above everything else?

Day 6, Tape 4
00:08:25
[Richard Nixon]

No. I've already covered that, the--I think, very well.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:08:29
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think, on the whole, that they are more sympathetic to the Soviet Union than other ethnic groups?

Day 6, Tape 4
00:08:35
[Richard Nixon]

Way back. There--there was a period, during the war period, when the Soviet Union was carrying the brunt of the fighting against Hitler, when a great number of American Jews were far more sympathetic to the Soviet Union than maybe some other Americans were. However, I would say that at the present time that is not the case.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:08:57
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think that their control--that Jewish control of the media makes them dangerous adversaries?

Day 6, Tape 4
00:09:03
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, it makes--Jewish control of the media--first, it is not total. It is significant, particularly of television at the managerial level and at the top level, but as far as the--as adversaries are concerned, the answer is that if they are against you, then of course that's going to be very--a very difficult load to--load to carry. I think Secretary Connally found that out in his campaign for the presidential nomination. He seemed to have very good support in the media until he made a speech in--which was interpreted by many as being quite pro-Arab, his so-called "Mideast speech." And from that time on, he felt, at least, and I ha--would tend to agree, that his media support turned very strongly the other way. Now, I don't think it's because they thought he was anti-Semitic. I don't believe that at all, but he just wasn't taking the line that they could.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:10:03
[Frank Gannon]

Do you feel that you suffered because of--in the media because of Jewish anti-Nixon feeling?

Day 6, Tape 4
00:10:10
[Richard Nixon]

No, not because--no, that isn't true. The--that isn't the case. It isn't Jewish anti-Nixon feeling. It's media anti-Nixon theel--feeling. I mean, basically the media, apart from whether it's Jewish or not--the media generally is liberal, just as--just as the university community is genul--generally liberal, and so forth, and basically I'm not a liberal. I'm a conservative.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:10:33
[Frank Gannon]

Do you feel that Israel has to be forced into peace settlements so as not to jeopardize our Arab relations?

Day 6, Tape 4
00:10:38
[Richard Nixon]

No, that's incorrect, of course. I think that Israel i--i--i--the--the very fact that in 1973 at--in San Clemente, when Brezhnev for three hours tried to get me to agree to join him in imposing a settlement on Israel which would've forced them to give up all the occupied lands without any guarantees in return, and I resisted that, is a pretty good answer to that.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:11:10
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think that Israel has the bomb, the atom--atomic bomb?

Day 6, Tape 4
00:11:14
[Richard Nixon]

I don't know, but most experts believe they do. And I would say it's really irrelevant as to whether I think so or the experts think so. There is no--

Day 6, Tape 4
00:11:24
[Frank Gannon]

[Unintelligible.] Does it worry you if they do?

Day 6, Tape 4
00:11:25
[Richard Nixon]

I--there's no question about this score. They have the capability, if they don't have it, of getting it very, very fast because they're a very highly developed industrial society.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:11:35
[Frank Gannon]

If the Mideast goes nuclear, can Armageddon be forestalled for very long?

Day 6, Tape 4
00:11:42
[Richard Nixon]

One of the reasons that developing some sort of--of progress in the whole Mideastern relationship, defusing the Palestinian issue and so forth--one of the reasons, too, in the broader sense of developing some kind of arms control agreements between the major powers, the Soviet Union and the United States and so forth, is that the greatest danger, perhaps, in the future of nuclear war is not going to come from the United States or the Soviet Union, both of whom, because of the am--great amount of nuclear power they have, fear its use and would be deterred to use it. The greatest danger is going to ha--come from a nation that is smaller, that is desperate, and that just wouldn't care, and this lets the genie out of the bottle. It's proliferation of nuclear weapons that concerns me at the present time and should concern the Russians, should concern the Americans. And so, as I look at it, looking at the Israelis--certainly I would think they would be more responsible than many others, but let us suppose the Libyans get it. Now, they are a little crazy, I think--certainly the leadership is, and that is why we've got to get this thing under control before it's proliferated out there, because the danger of a nuclear explosion then and--which would spread worldwide is simply unacceptable.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:13:08
[Frank Gannon]

Isn't it too late, though, to stop proliferation? There's so much material out there. Is it really practical? It's like the argument of calling in handguns--that there--there's just so many out there.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:13:18
[Richard Nixon]

Very difficult. But it--unless--unless the--I would say this. Unless the two major countries find some way to control themselves, then the--there will be no inhibiting effect on other countries. No, I don't think you can say that because these weapons are so terrible they're not going to be had by others. But, on the other hand, if the United States and the Soviet Union can find some agreement between themselves, it will have some restraining effect.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:13:53
[Frank Gannon]

In October of 1973, American nuc--American forces were put on worldwide nuclear alert. How close did we come to nuclear war in October of 1973?

Day 6, Tape 4
00:14:06
[Richard Nixon]

I don't think we came very close, actually. I think what happened is that the alert was in response to the Soviet Union putting its airborne divisions on alert, putting eighty-five ships into the Mediterranean, ships equipped with helicopters and landing barges and the rest, and Brezhnev indicating to me through a message that unless we would join him in sending American forces in, along with Russian forces, to help keep the peace in that area that he would move in unilaterally. We had to respond with a--an alert in order to keep them out.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:14:49
[Frank Gannon]

At the time when you--

Day 6, Tape 4
00:14:53
[Richard Nixon]

Well, and when you s--I--it--we [unintelligible] and I--I--when when--when--sometimes when people ask, "Well, when you called the alert"--which, incidentally, was not just the nuclear forces--even just as important, all of our conventional forces in the Mediterranean, the fleet, which was quite powerful--they were also put on alert. And when the follow-up question there is often, "Well, suppose that the--suppose the Russians had moved in with divisions, airborne divisions, and otherwise, into the Mideast, would you have used the nuclear option?" And my answer to that is that it isn't important what I might have done. The important thing is Brezhnev thought I might. And he thought I might because of the record, the track record, I had already established. And when people say, "Would you have done this or that and the other hand--other thing in a case like that?" my answer goes back to my poker-playing days. When you got a hole card, you never show it unless they call you.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:16:02
[Frank Gannon]

In October of 1973, when you received word that war had broken out in the Middle East, you were up to your ears in domestic problems. Congress was debating the War Powers Act. The special prosecutor, Archibald Cox, that you'd appointed was causing a lot of trouble with his requests for White House files and tapes. You were waiting for the court of appeals ruling on whether you were going to have to surrender White House tapes. Vice President Agnew was about to have to resign, and you were going to have to choose a new vice president. How did you manage, with all those things going on, to keep abreast of the international crisis?

Day 6, Tape 4
00:16:39
[Richard Nixon]

Well, it was not easy. As a matter of fact, in that period, from October sixth to November seventh--October sixth was when the war started, and October seventh was when we renewed relations with Egypt and when Kissinger started on his shuttle again--in that period there were--three great crises converged, and it was the most tumultuous period of the American presidency for any thirty-day period that I can certainly recall. I, of course, had all these political problems as a result of the Watergate business and so forth, so that I was really fighting with one hand rather than two. And so it was like a juggler trying to juggle three balls with just one hand. Just thinking back to the calendar of what happened then, one thing right after another--on October the sixth, we learned that the Syrians and the Egyptians had launched a surprise attack on Israel. I say "surprise"--it was no surprise to me that our intelligence didn't discover it, because they're really not that good. But I was very surprised that the Israelis didn't, because they have the best intelligence in the world, and they were totally surprised. That was on the sixth. Three days later, on the ninth, President--Vice President Agnew resigned after a long investigation. And then three days after that, we got word that the Egyptians and the Syrians were having great success on the battlefield and that it was going to be necessary--at least we--it was requested by Golda Meir that we resupply the Israelis for the tank losses and others that they had ha--had had, and airplane losses. Then the next day, on the tenth of October, we had these three issues coming up again. On the tenth of October, I nominated President, or Vice President Ford--he was then, of course, vice pres--i--in the Congress--I nominated him for vice president to succeed Agnew. The Watergate thing came to attention that day, because that was the day that the circuit court of appeals ruled against us in the tapes case by five to two, and on that day, too, I had to bring the Defense Department in line and have them go forward on a massive airlift to Israel, which was the biggest airlift, incidentally, since the Berlin airlift and turned out to be much bigger in terms of tonnage that was delivered. That would seem enough, however, but it wasn't the end. We went on through the month. On the eighteenth of that month, I finally worked out what I thought would be a successful compromise insofar as the tapes were concerned, one that would be in substantial compliance with the decision of the court, when I got Senator Stennis to agree to review all the tapes that they had--had been requested and then to furnish to the Senate Watergate Committee and to the special prosecutor, Archibald Cox, summaries of anything that was relevant to their investigations. The--the following day--I was very encouraged on the nineteenth when Senator Ervin of the Ervin Committee and Senator Baker, who was the Republican member of that committee, and leader, came in and they agreed to it. They were enthusiastic about the program. And I thought we were out of the woods on that issue. But, unfortunately, that was not the case. The following day, the twentieth, was all three balls in the air, it seems, at one time. Early in the morning we received notice from Brezhnev that he wanted Kissinger to come to Moscow, because prior to that time, on the eighteenth, he had requested for the first time that we join him in sending American combat forces in with Russian cambat--combat forces--into the Mideast in order to keep the peace, and we weren't going to be suckered on that one. But Kissinger was to go over to Moscow to see if he could work out a cease-fire. So I sent Kissinger off on the morning of that day. Later in the morning, Archibald Cox had a press conference, and he refused to accept the Stennis compromise and demanded that he have access to more tapes on a fishing expedition. I thought that this was in violation, frankly, of his charter, so I directed the attorney general, Elliot Richardson, to fire him. Elliot Richardson refused to do so, although we had been--I'd assumed from the conversations he had had earlier, because he--he had been told about the compromise earlier, that he would do so in f--in--if Cox was unreasonable. Later that day, Elliot Richardson came in to see me to submit his resignation. Now, I had known him for many years. He had been in the Cabinet, and he had been in various high positions and so forth throughout, which is fine, and he did a very fine job in them, but in this particular case I urged him not to stay on but simply to d--delay his resignation. I pointed out that Kissinger was in the air going to Moscow. I pointed out that if he were to resign--that it would have a--a very detrimental effect insofar as the Russians were concerned. It would give them the idea that we were in disarray. And he refused, however, and he decided that he was going to have to resign. I've often wondered why he didn't stay on at least that long, and I th--I think, in fairness to him, it was the fact that he's a--he was a pretty good politician, and he wasn’t about to go down with what he considered, as a politician, to be a sinking ship. But--

Day 6, Tape 4
00:22:33
[Frank Gannon]

Do you feel, though, that he rejected an appeal based on the national interest--

Day 6, Tape 4
00:22:38
[Richard Nixon]

Yes, he did.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:22:39
[Frank Gannon]

--at a time of war and--

Day 6, Tape 4
00:22:40
[Action note: Nixon makes a sound.]

[Frank Gannon]

--peace?

Day 6, Tape 4
00:22:41
[Richard Nixon]

Well, he--he rejected it, but each of us was probably con--approaching it from a different standpoint. But, on the other hand, my concerns were borne out by what happened after he left, because, needless to say, it caused a firestorm in the press. About five newspapers that previously had supported us asked for my resignation. There were twenty impeachment resolutions went in.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:23:05
[Frank Gannon]

This was the Saturday Night Massacre?

Day 6, Tape 4
00:23:07
[Richard Nixon]

This is the so-called "Saturday Night Mask--Massacre," and Brezhnev has bound [sic] to have heard about that in the Soviet Union.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:23:15
[Frank Gannon]

Why--

[Richard Nixon]

So--

[Frank Gannon]

Why didn't you change your timetable and instead of ma--asking him to stay on until after the war was settled, why didn't you wait to fire Cox until after the war was settled?

Day 6, Tape 4
00:23:26
[Richard Nixon]

We couldn't, because we thought the Stennis compromise had been agreed to. Everything was in place. It had to move then. We couldn't wait. So, under the circumstances, we could have done a lot of things differently, but we didn't at the time. So, a--after the twentieth, then, we then came to the twenty-fourth, and the worst happened, as, unfortunately, I had a sense it might, in the event that there appeared to be too much disarray. I think Brezhnev was really testing us. He's--he--he knew I was in deep trouble, and he sent a message--this was after Kissinger had been there and we thought a fe--cease-fire was in place--saying that in the event that I would not agree to sending in a joint force of Americans and Russians in the Mideast--that he was going to intervene unilaterally. Well, the message itself wouldn't have bothered me that much, but then I got the intelligence reports that there were eighty-five Soviet ships in the Mediterranean, that on those ships, among other things, were helicopters and landing barges, and that three Soviet airborne divisions, fifty thousand men, were--had been placed on alert. We could not allow the Soviet Union to intervene unilaterally there because if they had we would have been forced to intervene. I knew that Senator Mansfield had told us earlier in the month, right after the war, he said, "We don't want another Vietnam there." But another member of Congress, who was in the majority, on the Democratic side, made it very clear, to the con--on--a--in--in contrast. He said, "We want to be sure that Israel i--continues to have support." And I said, "I will not let Israel go down the tube," and I knew that under the circumstances we could not stand by and let the Soviet Union move in. And that would risk a world war. So under the circumstances, therefore, I approved an alert--alert of our forces, nuclear and conventional. A couple of days after that, Brezhnev backed down, and finally the cease-fire went into place. But this is all by now the twenty-sixth of October, only twenty days after the Yom Kippur War began. November first--the tide had changed by that time. The ceasefire was in place. Golda Meir, shortly after that, flew into Washington--thanked me very generously for the support we had given. And November the seventh, after a time elapsing of six years, Egypt and the United States normalized their relations, and Henry Kissinger started on his very successful shuttle trip. Summarizing it all, I think it's very important to note here two things. One, this is not a demonstration of détente failing but succeeding. Unless I'd had the personal relationship with Brezhnev, unless he knew from what I had said to him at Camp David that we would not stand by, unless I had developed that kind of relation--and unless he was looking forward to another summit the next year, I--I do not think that we would have been successful in keeping them out. That helped. The second point is that we handled the whole situation in a way that saved Israel, but at the same time did not totally alienate the Egyptians, because the Israelis, by the time the cease-fire occurred, had al--totally surrounded the Egyptian Third Army, which was on the other side of the Suez Canal. So they held back, and Egyptians were appreciative of that. And so, as a result, this was one of those wars which ended with peace without victory, and peace without victory is virtually the only kind of peace you can have that will survive in that kind of a situation. You can have too great a victory. If it is too great, what happens is you plant the seeds for another war.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:27:19
[Frank Gannon]

Under this enormous pressure, with all these things going on and these--all these balls in the air, how did you manage to keep your emotional and--and mental bearings or equilibrium?

Day 6, Tape 4
00:27:30
[Richard Nixon]

Well, it's not easy, but you did.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:27:34
[Frank Gannon]

How do you react to some of the commentators who say that you were so distracted and so distraught during this period because of Watergate that you only became involved at--at erratic points in this Mideast crisis and that most of the policy was Henry Kissinger's or General Haig's?

Day 6, Tape 4
00:27:57
[Richard Nixon]

Well, I think the same people would say that--that Henry Kissinger was the one who started the China initiative, and that my participation, for example, was very limited in terms of that and other things and so forth. That--the same ones would say that, as far as the December bombing, which brought the war to [sic] Vietnam to an end and brought back our P.O.W.s--that that was simply a reaction of an erratic man and so forth. And in this instance, all I could say is the record speaks for itself. I know the critical point where I made the decision, and it's here where I think I was decisive in overruling the recommendations I received from the Pentagon and that Kissinger brought in to me--this was after Golda Meir had begged us to send in some supplies. We had to do it by air, because the Soviet Union was sending in massive supplies by air. And Kissinger came in and said that--that the Pentagon was recommending three [C-5-As.] I said, "How many do we have?" He said, "About twenty." I said, "Why don't we sent twenty?" He said, "Well, because they think that--that politically that's going to be more than the traffic will bear." I said, "We're going to get just as much heat for sending twenty--three as for sending twenty." I said, "Send everything that flies." I don't think that many people thought that was a very rational decision, but it--you never make a small play when the stakes are big. You make a big one. We played for all the stakes, and we won. Now, that was--that was my major participation, I would say.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:29:39
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think that if the Libyans got the bomb--that that would draw America and the Soviet Union together?

Day 6, Tape 4
00:29:47
[Richard Nixon]

I would put it another way. There will at some point be a major Soviet-American summit. Very high on that agenda, clearly apart from Soviet-American arms control agreements, should be what can the Soviet Union and the United States do to cool the situation in other areas of the world, peripheral areas, because Libya is like the Balkans in World War I. And under the circumstances, to allow these people to have it and then to have them draw the Soviet Union and the United States into war is something that is not in our interest or theirs. This has nothing to do about whether the Soviet wants peace or war. They want the world, but, on the other hand, we have to re--recognize they do not want a nuclear war any more than we do. So, under the circumstances, we should join together at least to prevent that kind of action which would draw us in.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:30:46
[Frank Gannon]

That finishes our afternoon hour.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:30:50
[Offscreen voice]

If you'll hold in that position, gentlemen, just keep [unintelligible] for a second.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:30:55
[Richard Nixon]

Well, we got through most of it there.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:30:57
[Frank Gannon]

Got through a lot, yes. The only th--matter of fact, the only major thing we didn't get to was the Salzburg and the--

Day 6, Tape 4
00:31:07
[Richard Nixon]

Phlebitis?

Day 6, Tape 4
00:31:08
[Frank Gannon]

Alexandria, but that's easy to fill in. We did get through the Sadat through Assad, and the--and the MiGs.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:31:14
[Richard Nixon]

Mm-hmm. Well, we didn't get the phlebitis thing in. That's not big.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:31:19
[Frank Gannon]

We already got for--some for the European trip--for the Soviet trip.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:31:24
[Richard Nixon]

Mm-hmm.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:31:28
[Offscreen voice]

Change lights.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:31:31
[Richard Nixon]

All right.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:31:32
[Offscreen voice]

Thank you.

Day 6, Tape 4
00:31:33
[Offscreen voice]

[Unintelligible.]

Day 6, Tape 4
00:31:34
[Action note: Screen goes black.]

Day 6, Tape 4
00:31:48
[Action note: Color bars appear.]

Day 6, Tape 4
00:33:23
[Action note: Screen goes black.]

 

Go to: Transcript, Day 7

< Back to Nixon/Gannon Interviews