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interviewer:
Frank Gannon
interviewee: Richard Nixon
producer: Ailes Communications, INC.
date: May 12, 1983
minutes: approximately 202
extent: ca. 273kb
summary: This interview, comprising four video tapes, or about
3 hours, 22 minutes, is the fourth in a series of taped interviews with former
president Nixon. The focus of the conversation is the Soviet Union and the West.
Nixon discusses the Bay of Pigs, Nikita Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev, and the
S.A.L.T. Treaty.
repository: Walter J. Brown Media Archives, University of Georgia Libraries
(Main Library)
collection: Richard Nixon Interviews
permissions: Contact Media Archives.
Day four, Tape one of four,
LINE FEED #1, 5-12-83, ETI Reel #27
May 12, 1983
Day 4, Tape 1
00:01:05
[Richard Nixon]
[Unintelligible.]
Day 4, Tape 1
00:01:06
[Action note: Screen goes black.]
Day 4, Tape 1
00:01:07
[Richard Nixon]
--speech in 1976, people said that he had--had done it several times and had watched it and then did it. That, of course, is the assholes that--who were producing it wanted to take credit.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:01:19
[Frank Gannon]
Wanted to get the credit for it.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:01:20
[Richard Nixon]
And they should--
[Frank Gannon]
[Unintelligible.] They had written and rehearsed it.
[Richard Nixon]
--never have put it out.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:01:22
[Frank Gannon]
Yeah.
[Richard Nixon]
Yeah. They rehearsed him.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:01:24
[Frank Gannon]
Yeah.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:01:25
[Richard Nixon]
Right?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:01:26
[Frank Gannon]
Yeah. That was [Panayi] and--
Day 4, Tape 1
00:01:27
[Richard Nixon]
Wasn't that awful?
[Frank Gannon]
Yeah.
[Action note: Screen goes black.]
Day 4, Tape 1
00:01:30
[Richard Nixon]
I don't mind their doing it. I mean, I--e--everybody's got to do it his own way.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:01:52
[Action note: Picture appears.]
Day 4, Tape 1
00:01:58
[Frank Gannon]
Today we're talking with President Nixon about the subject of the Soviet Union and the West. Mr. President, can we trust the Russians?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:02:10
[Richard Nixon]
Well, I recall talking to Manlio Brosio, the former secretary general of N.A.T.O., a great Italian diplomat who served six years in Moscow before he came to the United States. And he told me in the late sixties, before I became president, very, very vigorously, when many Europeans were clamoring for détente--he said, "I know the Russians. They are liars. They are great actors. They are cheaters. And they lie and they act because they consider it's their duty to do so." He says, "You cannot trust them." Now, having said that, however, he did not go on to say that you should not deal with them. And my answer to this whole proposal or question as to whether or not the Russians can be trusted is, very simply, only if we make agreements which are in their interest to keep, self-enforcing agreements, and only if everything we do with them positively is linked to something else which will cost them if they break the agreement. But you can't trust them on the basis that, well, we're sincere and they’re sincere. That is totally irrelevant where the Russians are concerned.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:03:18
[Frank Gannon]
Why do they lie and cheat? Why--why are they insincere?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:03:23
[Richard Nixon]
The reason is that their goal is very different from ours. To simplify it, our goal is peace as an end in itself, and their goal is victory, and whether it's peace or war, it's a means to the end, the end of victory--the Soviet or Russian or Communist domination of the world. And under Marxist-Leninist teachings, you use any means to achieve that great goal. And if it requires that you lie and you cheat, you lie and you cheat. Now, under the circumstances, we simply do not follow that particular type of quote, "morality," unquote, and under the circumstances, however, in dealing with them, it doesn't mean that we have to lie and cheat, but we must be aware of the fact that they will when they can get away with it. But, on the other hand, you can deal with them, and they will keep a deal if you make it on the basis that will serve their interests and ours.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:04:19
[Frank Gannon]
Are they sincere as people? As Andropov sits in the Kremlin, does he think of--does he look at a question and say, "Now, I've got to lie and cheat in order to achieve our Leninist--our good Leninist ends here," or do they sincerely believe that what they’re doing is right? Do they have a different definition of morality?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:04:37
[Richard Nixon]
I do not think that morality is really relevant as far as they're concerned. They are thinking in terms of the total Communist world, a Communist society for everybody, equality and everything else that Communism in its ideal state is supposed to produce. And they believe, therefore, that anything they do to achieve that is therefore justifiable. I recall, for example, a conversation with regard to the whole idea of whether or not they were sincere that I had with Ambassador Bohlen, our former ambassador to Russia and a great Russian expert, and he was concerned--this was in the early sixties, after he had become ambassador to Paris--by statements out of Washington in the early sixties that some Washington people in the government were convinced that Khrushchev was sincere in his desire for peace. And he said, "That is so stupid, and it is so wrong." He said, "He is a Communist. He can no more be sincere than this table"--there was a coffee table between us--"can be sincere. He is a materialist, and he will therefore be what--for whatever is necessary to achieve his ends. Sincerity has nothing to do with it."
Day 4, Tape 1
00:05:54
[Frank Gannon]
What do you think about the fairly widespread theory that one of the reasons for the Cold War is because we acted--in the p--post-Second World War period when we had the power of the atomic bomb uniquely ourselves--that we acted suspiciously and vindictively towards the Russians, and--or towards the Soviets, and that--that turned them into what they became--that, in effect, we created the Cold War by our paranoia and our anti-Communist f--Red Scare fears?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:06:24
[Richard Nixon]
Well, that is a theory that just doesn't stand up when you examine what happened. We have to remember that the [Baruch Plan], for example, offered the Soviet Union the opportunity to join with the United States in the developing of nuclear energy. They turned it down. We have to understand that the Marshall Plan, for example, was offered to the Communist countries as well as to the European countries, and the Soviet not only wouldn't take it themselves, but they wouldn't let some of their Eastern European satellites take it because they were not interested in that kind of agreement or cooperation with the West. President Eisenhower's famous "open skies" proposal, which he made, as you may recall, at the time of Geneva in 1955--that proposal, in which the--the two would join together in opening up their countries in terms of inspection so that we could not cheat each other and so forth--they turned that down. What we have to bear in mind is that when what was called the "containment policy" was developed, first under President Truman and continued under President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, it made a great deal of sense. Then the United States has unquestioned superiority. and it was that superiority which avoided World War II, or World War III, I should say, it--because at the time, after World War II, when the policy of containment and the policy of massive retaliation was adopted, we have to remember that Europe was very weak. There was always the possibility that forces of revolution which were inspired and controlled and subsidized by the Russians would take over. It was necessary, in effect, to give them time--the European countries, the French and the British and the Germans, to develop--and the Italians as well--their own defense. We bought that time through the policy of containment. It made sense. I would just also comment on this whole idea that, as far as the Russians are concerned, that we caused them to become as aggressive and as adventurist as they are. They didn't need any help from us. That's the way they are. They say it. They said it even in the period of so-called "détente," when I was talking with Brezhnev. There's no mistaking about that at all. I think we have to have in mind that, as far as they're concerned, they have certain goals, and they're out to cheat them. No--they have certain goals, and they're out to achieve them. I can recall very well people asking me on occasion, "What is the situation with regard to the Russians? Is there a chance that we can get them to accept our views, our ideals, and so forth?" And then they go on to say, "Perhaps if we could only convince them that we are sincerely for peace, then they would not be as warlike as they are." Let me tell you--I know the Russians. We don't have to convince them that we're for peace. They know that. We have to convince them they cannot win a war. And once we do that, the basis is set for negotiation that will be responsible on both sides.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:09:45
[Frank Gannon]
Did they take advantage of--
[Offscreen voice]
Excuse me one second, gentlemen. I have to cut in. I'm sorry. Keep rolling.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:09:54
[Offscreen voice]
[Unintelligible.]
Day 4, Tape 1
00:10:06
[Offscreen voice]
Okay, Steve--
Day 4, Tape 1
00:10:25
[Action note: Screen goes black.]
Day 4, Tape 1
00:10:26
[Action note: Picture reappears on screen.]
[Offscreen voice]
Frank, you want to lead in on that--
Day 4, Tape 1
00:10:27
[Frank Gannon]
Yeah.
[Offscreen voice]
--aggressiveness of the Russians. [Unintelligible.]
Day 4, Tape 1
00:10:31
[Offscreen voice]
--Frank, and then go to the president.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:10:33
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Day 4, Tape 1
00:10:34
[Action note: Screen goes black.]
Day 4, Tape 1
00:10:39
[Action note: Picture appears.]
Day 4, Tape 1
00:10:48
[Action note: Screen goes black.]
Day 4, Tape 1
00:10:49
[Action note: Picture reappears.]
Day 4, Tape 1
00:10:52
[Offscreen voice]
Stand by.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:10:56
[Frank Gannon]
How do you feel about the widespread argument that the Cold War was, at least in part, if not entirely, a product of American post-Second World War paranoia, Red Scare fear and suspicion, and at a time when we uniquely had atomic power, we forced them into a defensive Cold War posture?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:11:18
[Richard Nixon]
Well, I don't agree with that particular theory. It's somewhat similar, incidentally, to the theory that the holocaust in Cambodia was caused because the United States, which was trying to prevent a Communist takeover, brutalized the peaceful Cambodian peasants. Let me say that, as far as the Soviets were concerned, they didn’t have to be forced to or educated to be aggressive. That is what they believe in, and that is what they have been trying to achieve ever since World War II. Under the circumstances, I think what really happened here is that many people have overlooked, who have this particular theory, how the West really has bent over backwards in terms of reassuring the Soviet Union and trying to get their cooperation. The [Baruch Plan], which of course was presented during the---Truman's presidency, with regard to the sharing of atomic energy and so forth, Eisenhower's "open sky" proposals, the Marshall Plan itself, which the Russians and the Eastern European Communist countries turned down--they turned it down because the Russians insisted that they do. What really happened here is that the United States in effect held the ring with its superiority in nuclear power, behind which the European countries--the British, the French, the Germans and the Italians, the major ones as well as others--could restore their economies and their strength and thereby not be, in effect, vulnerable to Soviet subversion. I would just say that, finally, as far as all this theory to the effect that what we really have to do is to convince the Russians that we're for peace and that they will be for peace--is--that's just nonsense. I know the Russians. We don't have to convince them we're for peace. They know that. We have to convince them that they cannot win a war, we've got to convince them that they cannot win without war, and once we have done that, then we can build a peace that will last, but only then.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:13:23
[Frank Gannon]
Do they take advantage of their knowledge that we're for peace?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:13:27
[Richard Nixon]
Oh, whenever they possibly can. They, for example, took advantage of President Carter. Now, President Carter is no silly, sappy dove. He has a good service background in the Navy. He's a good, strong person in my view, but he felt that if he could only convince the Russians by unilaterally cutting back on our arms programs that we were for peace, as he put it in his famous Notre Dame speech, that they would do likewise--in other words, follow the golden rule with them. Well, he cut back on the B-1, and he cut back on the Minuteman III production line, and he--he delayed the [cruise missile] and the MX missile, and so forth. And what did the Russians do? As we cut back, they built up. That was the unilateral approach. It didn't work. Fortunately, at least as far as our defense program was concerned, Afghanistan opened his eyes, and he turned around. But let us clearly understand--we have tried that way, the way of trying to convince the Russians by our restraint that we are for peace, that we are for disarmament. And all they do is take advantage of it.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:14:37
[Frank Gannon]
How could a man who isn't a silly, sappy dove say that he had learned more about the Russians in the week after the--involving the invasion of Afghanistan than he had in all of his life to that point?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:14:49
[Richard Nixon]
That has nothing to do with some--whether somebody is silly or sappy. What it has to do is the way, unfortunately, that many educated Americans look at the world today. Let's face it--the Americans generally a--are a people who have good intentions. Oh, we make our mistakes and the rest, but we would like the rest of the world to share our values, and we believe that our values are so good that they are ones that should be shared and that others may agree to. But in the real world, it doesn't work that way, and sometimes it takes time to find that out.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:15:32
[Frank Gannon]
Yalta is one of the most controversial events of the modern history. What do you think happened at Yalta? How would you describe the Yalta Conference?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:15:44
[Richard Nixon]
Well, those who were there--and here again, I--I would go back to Ambassador Bohlen, who knew something about Soviet-American relations then and later--those were there believe that what went wrong at Yalta was not what was agreed to, but the fact that the Russians did not carry out the agreement--agreement with regard to, for example, elections in Poland and that sort of thing. Once it was agreed to, they didn't even follow it out whatever. Now, whatever the case may be, what we have to understand is that making an agreement which was not self-enforcing was the mistake--trusting the Russians, if I may --may use that term. That if they--we signed an agreement with them, that they would follow it in spirit and letter just as we would--that was the mistake at Yalta. That mistake having been made, it must not make again--we must not make it again.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:16:42
[Frank Gannon]
You don’t think, then, that Franklin Roosevelt was operating either under diminished physical capacity or that he was suffering from pro-Communist or, indeed, Communist, advisors?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:16:54
[Richard Nixon]
Well, there isn't any question about his own anti-Communist ideas, there's--as far as Franklin Roosevelt is concerned. There, however, is some question with regard to advisors, advisors who were not pro-Communist, but advisors, I would put it, who were naïve about the Communists. Maybe there were some who were pro-Communist, but I think the latter, what--what Lenin has referred to as the--the "useful idiots," those who don't know better and should know better. That was the real problem.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:17:29
[Frank Gannon]
Do you discount Alger Hiss's role at a--as a Roosevelt advisor at Yalta, then?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:17:33
[Richard Nixon]
I do not know what his role was, but the fact he was there is not reassuring, because there's no question but that he was a Communist at that time, and certainly that could have had some effect. I would say further that with regard to Roosevelt at Yalta, I talked to Winston Churchill about it, and he tried to be diplomatic about it. But he said there was no question, and he has written this as well, but he said it very emphatically to me--that President Roosevelt was not at his best at Yalta. And what happened was that Roosevelt, in effect, joined with Stalin and supported Stalin's views against Churchill, and Churchill fought a valiant but losing battle in attempting to deal with the Russians on a realistic, tough-minded basis, and that was the tragedy.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:18:23
[Frank Gannon]
President--
[Richard Nixon]
But I--let us--let us make it clear--I am not going to judge those who were advising Roosevelt on the basis of whether they were pro- or anti-Communist. That has nothing to do with it. What--it has something to do with it, but the real problem is something very different, and that is--and much more serious, looking at today's problems--and that is they were naïve about the Russians and what they might do. And that is going to be our greatest danger in the future.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:18:56
[Frank Gannon]
President Carter talked about the golden rule in dealing with the Russians. Didn't you have a Nixon version of the golden rule for dealing with the Russians?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:19:05
[Richard Nixon]
Oh, yes. I had a very interesting conversation in the first state dinner that we had for Golda Meir. She was very concerned a-- about what she thought was the soft-headed views of some Europeans who were "slobbering over it," as she put it--the idea of détente. And she just wanted to be sure that we weren't taken in by the Russians, because she grew up in Russia, and she remembered that the Russian drunken policemen [or "policeman"] used to come by every Saturday night and beat her father up because he happened to be a Jew. And so she had strong emotional feelings against them, but also she didn't trust them generally. And then, in order to reassure her a bit, I said, "Well, let me give you a definition of détente that is a little different." I said, "There is the golden rule of the Bible, 'Do unto others as they do unto you.'" I said, "That isn't the way you deal with the Russians. The international golden rule--and particularly one which must apply whenever you're dealing with an adversary like the Russians--is, 'Do unto others as they do unto you.'" She started to nod, and Henry Kissinger said, "Plus ten percent."
Day 4, Tape 1
00:20:18
[Frank Gannon]
With the invasion of Afghanistan and the suppression of Solidarity in Poland and other activities throughout the world, hasn't détente been discredited in the last several years--certainly since you've left the White House?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:20:31
[Richard Nixon]
Discredited in the sense of how it was managed, but when you look at it historically, not in the sense of how it worked when it was properly managed. And what I am suggesting here is that the period of what is called "détente" really began in 1969. That was when I, in my inaugural, said that we were going to enter a period of negotiation rather than confrontation with the Russians, and we began then negotiations at the ambassadorial level, at the foreign minister level with Dobrynin, the ambassador here, and with Gromyko, the Foreign Minister, with Kissinger on our side, and I participating on occasion, and also by letters, an exchange of letters with Brezhnev. Now, in that period of time, détente produced the Berlin Agreement, which was very much in our interest, and, we believe, in theirs as well, but particularly in ours because we got away from those over-and-over-again incidents of crises on the Berlin Autobahn. It also had a very significant effect in deterring Russian adventurism. They tried to put submarines into Cienfuegos in 1970 in Cuba. We objected, and we said, "If you don't knock that off, then we're not going to continue to negotiate on arms control and trade," and other things that they wanted. They knocked it off. They, uh--w--it was effective, certainly, in restraining them in Jordan in 1970, when the Syrians and the Jordanians were having a go at it, and we were supporting the Jordanians since the Syrians were the invaders, and the Russians were supporting the invaders. They stepped out of that, or kept out of it, I think, because--I'm sure--because of their desire to have a summit meeting, which was to occur almost two years later. The same is true of Indo-Pakistan. When--the--there is no question in my mind but the fact that we had our summit meeting scheduled by that time, that they restrained the Indians, or at least did not egg them on at a time that India would have gobbled up West Pakistan if the s--Russians had stood by and allowed them to do so. But we made it very cl--clear that, unless they were--would cooperate with us in bringing about a ceasefire--that there would be no summit, and that had a--its necessary effect. What I am suggesting is this: détente will only work if it's combined with deterrence, and by "deterrence"--that means you must have the military strength to make it clear that whoever engages in aggression will find that the costs are far greater than anything he's going to gain. And détente will only work provided, too, I--you have everything linked. Arms control must be linked with conduct. That's the way we practiced it, and it worked. Now, when it is practiced in a way that it's two for them and one for us, like, for example, we will cut back on our military expenditures, we'll cut back on our programs, without any reciprocal action on their part, then, of course, it is a disaster. But properly managed, détente with deterrence is the only acceptable option for the West and for the world today.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:24:01
[Frank Gannon]
If they--isn't--isn't that ultimately ill-fated, though? Because if they sit back and are prudent and disciplined and just wait and depend on the cyclical nature of American politics, so that a conservative, strong, hard-headed détente president will be followed inevitably, sooner or later, by a softer, more accommodating president--if they just sit back and wait, they'll eventually get what they want. Indeed, now, it's arguable that they have a strong conservative president who can't even get his strong defense / hard-headed détente program through Congress.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:24:35
[Richard Nixon]
Well, it's easy to make that kind of judgment or appraisal, and to say, "Well, détente won't work." And my question is--what's the option? The option is--to détente--the alternative is simply unacceptable. The Russians are there. It is true, as many have said, that they will lie, they will cheat, they're out to do us in--but they are there. They are a superpower, and it is irresponsible, with our--our being in a position of superpower as well, that we not do everything that we possibly can to avert a confrontation that would escalate into nuclear war that would destroy each other and most of the rest of the world. And until you find some option to détente, détente, hard-headed détente, as I have suggested, then it seems to me that that is the path to pursue. It is not easy, and I'm not going to suggest that there--there are times when they may not gain more than we do, but I believe that what has to develop here is a bipartisan, within the parties and between the parties, approach to this so that we will have continuity, so that we don't have hard-headed de--détente followed by a soft-headed, woolly-headed détente. That is the worst of both worlds.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:25:59
[Frank Gannon]
Do you think that the Soviets are developing biological and chemical weapons now?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:26:04
[Richard Nixon]
Well, the evidence is mixed, but I think we have to assume that they are.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:26:08
[Frank Gannon]
What should we do, then?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:26:09
[Richard Nixon]
And that is something that has to be taken up at the very highest level. When a summit meeting does occur, as I am convinced it should, and will, then that has to be very high on the agenda, and it's got to be made very clear that that will not be tolerated, but you don't go in there and say, "Please won't you quit using biolog--biological and chemical warfare--weapons?" Rather than approaching it that way, you say, "If you're going to use them, we're going to," and we have to have a program ready to go, and then we should initiate it.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:26:41
[Frank Gannon]
Can we--since it's very hard to prove or to verify whether or not they're being manufactured, and since, as you would have us operate from the premise that they do lie and they cheat in order to further their goals, could we depend on any assurances they gave at a summit that they weren't doing it? Don't we have to have a program of our own now as--in--in terms of preventive medicine?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:27:05
[Richard Nixon]
Well, we should develop a program if we don't get some assurances. But I think that, on the other hand, we have enough in place that a program could get going very, very fast. And I think what we have to bear in mind is that this is an area which could and should very properly be a subject for negotiation. Unfortunately, it isn't possible to have verification in many of these areas. But, again, it seems to me that the only alternative to not proceeding in this way is simply a runaway race in biological and chemical and environmental warfare, and that could be, believe it or not, even more devastating than nuclear war.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:27:50
[Frank Gannon]
Do you think the Soviets cheat on S.A.L.T.?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:27:53
[Richard Nixon]
There again, the evidence is mixed, and I know that many people believe that they have in the military, and some claim that they have not. But that misses the point. It isn't a question of whether they cheat. What they have done in S.A.L.T., without any question, is doing everything they could allowed by the agreements. And what the United States unfortunately has done is not doing what we could under the agreements--for example, canceling the B-1 bomber. It was permitted under S.A.L.T. Stopping the Minuteman III production line--that was permitted under S.A.L.T. Not going forward with the MX missile or the cruise missile as fast as we could--both of which were permitted under S.A.L.T. If those actions had not been taken, the United States would not be in a position of inf--inferiority, particularly in land-based missiles, which, first, destroyed Senate--Senate support for approval of S.A.L.T. II, and, second, makes it necessary for us to catch up at the present time. So, as far as the Soviet cheating in this area and that area, we have to be concerned about that, but what we also have to be concerned about is our own failure, when we knew that they were moving forward, to go forward with our own programs.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:29:17
[Frank Gannon]
What's your assessment of Andropov?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:29:21
[Richard Nixon]
Well, he is a very intelligent man. He--very--certainly tough, strong, ruthless. Let us understand right at the beginning that one of tho--one of--s--s--I heard someone--someone talking back there. What we have to understand right at the beginning is that all of this really sappy kind of writing that was done after he came into power is a terrible reflection on our media, on some of our so-called "Soviet experts," and on ourselves. The fact that [makes popping sound] great deal was made out of--out of the knowledge, apparently, that he spoke English, that he was well-mannered, that he was quite civilized, that he liked Western music, that he might even like Scotch whisky and the rest--as if that had anything to do with the kind of leader he was going to be. It had as little to do with the kind of leader that he was going to be as the kind of observations that were made about Khrushchev when he came into power. I remember very well some of the news magazines were pointing out that he spoke poor Russian, that he wore ill-fitting clothes, that he drank too much, and, therefore, that he was going to be a very ineffective and poor leader, not in the league with Stalin. What we have to understand is that the clothes they wear and their personal habits and whether they are elegant or not has nothing to do with whether or not they are going to be formidable leaders. I--it's--it's sort of the same attitude Americans have toward the--the Communists generally--so many Americans. They have the feeling that they're all supposed--the--the--supposed to be like Bolsheviks with--bearded and dirty working-class types. That isn't the type that they are--not here and not abroad. That is why it was so hard for many to--Americans to understand an Alger Hiss or, for that matter, a Philby, or any of the other--those who came from the intellectual classes, with fine manners and the rest. We come back to Andropov--intelligent, tough, ruthless, more formidable because he is younger, and also because, I think, of a better sense of public relations than Brezhnev. On the other hand, a pragmatist, a--a pragmatist who was head of the K.G.B. knows better, perhaps, than any other Russian leader--leader--better than Stalin, better than Khrushchev, better than Brezhnev--the weaknesses that the Soviet Union has. And he, knowing those weaknesses, the economic weaknesses, the ideological weaknesses, the fact that the system isn't working--I think that that means that, as a pragmatist, he will recognize the necessity to have some kind of accommodation with the West--not a surrender, but an accommodation.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:32:16
[Frank Gannon]
There are rumors, although he is younger than most of the other Soviet leaders, that he is not in good health. Do you have any opinions or information about that?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:32:25
[Richard Nixon]
No. There are rumors, and I would assume that that was the case, because he has missed some meetings. On the other hand, let's not allow that to mislead us as to how effective he can be. That may only mean that he's going to be in a hurry to accomplish the goals that he has to accomplish, and if he is in a hurry, then let's give him the opportunity to turn in a different direction than that of simply building on the past, building their strength and--and not doing anything to reduce the dangers of nuclear conflict that's going to destroy his country as well as others.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:33:04
[Frank Gannon]
Now that Soviet summit meetings between presidents of the United States and leaders of the Soviet Union have become almost commonplace, people have become fairly blasé about them, but when you first went there in 1959 to meet Khrushchev, when you were vice president, that was a very dramatic event that riveted the world's attention. Through a very unique stroke of luck, we have some film that I don’t think has ever been seen before--I don't think you've seen it before--that was taken by one of your Secret Service men who was with you on the trip. One of the films he took, which we have, was seated in the front seat of your limousine as you drove into the Kremlin for the first time. So, through his film, we can see today what you saw that first time going into the--the citadel--of the--into the enemy's--into the heart of the enemy's citadel. As we see that, do you recall any of your thoughts?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:34:00
[Richard Nixon]
Are they going to put it on?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:34:01
[Frank Gannon]
Mm-hmm.
[Richard Nixon]
Oh.
[Action note: They watch clip; it appears to be silent.]
Day 4, Tape 1
00:34:32
[Frank Gannon]
You can even see the flags flying on the car.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:34:34
[Richard Nixon]
Mm-hmm.
[Action note: Clip continues.]
Day 4, Tape 1
00:34:41
[Richard Nixon]
Well, this was my first visit to Moscow. And I've made five since then. I remember that I was extremely well-prepared, because this was the first visit to Moscow of anybody of my rank. President Roosevelt went to Russia, but that was in Yalta in the Crimea, not to the Russian capital. I had heard about Khrushchev. I knew that he was a very, very capable, tough, unpredictable leader who would test my mettle and who would be taking advantage of any lack of knowledge that I might have. And so, f--consequently, I was looking forward to seeing him, to see what made him tick.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:35:30
[Frank Gannon]
What were--what were your goals? What did you want to accomplish by the trip?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:35:36
[Richard Nixon]
Well, I was there, actually, to open an American exhibition, which was the first one that was being held in the Soviet Union, and one that had had a very, very great impact. The tickets were being scalped--that is done there as well as it is here--and the Russian people were very, very impressed by the exhibits they saw, so impressed that T.A.S.S. had several articles before we got there indicating that this exhibit was really not indicative of what life was really like in the United States, but only of how the millionaires lived and that sort of thing. So I knew that I had to lay a little of that to rest, so I was prepared to make a speech, and I just assumed that, as far as Khrushchev was concerned--that I--I would listen to his views. I was not president. I could not negotiate with him, but I would listen to his views, and, to the extent possible, reassure him as to our own motives, where he may have had a--misinterpreted them or misunderstood them. Well, as it turned out, it wasn't quite as peaceful as it was predicted it might be. I must say, however, that I had done a great deal of homework, and I was prepared to talk on any number of issues that he might r--raise. And I found, finally, that he rose--he--he raised every issue there was.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:36:57
[Frank Gannon]
Again thanks to your Secret Service man, we have some film of your first meeting with Khrushchev in the Kremlin.
[Action note: They watch clip.]
Day 4, Tape 1
00:37:18
[Frank Gannon]
How well had your briefings prepared you for what he turned out to be like?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:37:25
[Richard Nixon]
Quite well. I think they may have underestimated his quickness, his unpredictability. They did indicate that he was going to be very tough and that he'd take advantage wherever he possibly could, that he could put on quite an act if necessary. But I think that they underestimated his intelligence--underestimated, probably, again, for a reason it's always hard for me to understand--he didn't happen to have a college education, he grew up as a pig tender, he didn’t speak very good Russian, and consequently we think, well, such a man therefore can't be all that capable. That has nothing to do with capability. I th--I remember very well Foster Dulles commenting on that, when news magazine articles came out to the effect that Khrushchev was one who spoke poor Russian and drank too much, and wasn't going to last long--not in Stalin's league, and he says, "Look. Don't believe this. Anybody that gets to the top in that Soviet hierarchy, fighting and murdering and conniving his way to the top, is a very strong person and one who is formidable, and you have to learn to deal with him on that basis." And he was dead right. That's true of Khrushchev. It's true of Kosygin. It's true of Brezhnev, and I know it's true of Andropov. The weak do not get to the top in Communist countries.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:38:54
[Frank Gannon]
Khrushchev seemed amiable enough in these films of your first meeting.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:39:00
[Richard Nixon]
He was very amiable whenever people were around. He was a great actor, as are most of the Russians, and whenever people were around, when the cameras were on, he was gracious. He wanted to prove that he was a good host.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:39:17
[Frank Gannon]
What was the first meeting like?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:39:20
[Richard Nixon]
Well, it changed from night into day, or day into night, I should say. All the sunshine smile and the rest--we sat down opposite each other at a table there in his relatively modest Kremlin office--the same office, incidentally, that I was later to sit down with--many years later--with Brezhnev, on two occasions, in 1972 and 1974. And he began to berate me, to my great surprise, about a resolution that had been passed in the Congress just before I left, a resolution called the Captive Nation Resolutions. It wasn't anything new. It's been passed every year since World War II, and it simply indicated the support of the American Congress and the American people, the moral support, of those peoples living in Eastern Europe and referred to it as "the captive nations."
Day 4, Tape 1
00:40:10
[Frank Gannon]
Wasn't that an undiplomatic thing to do, though, just before this trip?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:40:13
[Richard Nixon]
Had nothing to do with diplomacy. The Congress always passed it, and always at that time of year. It had nothing to do with my trip, but Khrushchev thought that it was deliberate. He said, "Why would you have done this? Why would you have had your Congress do this before this trip? It's created the wrong atmosphere." And I tried to point out, "Look. We didn't do it. The Congress did it," which was absolutely true. We didn't have control over it, and, incidentally, let me point out this was not a resolution that required the signature of the president. This was a resolution that was passed by the Congress. It was a state of the Congress--they pass them all the time down there, and usually nobody pays much attention to them. It's simply for the folks back home. But no matter how much I tried to explain it to him, and--pointing out that we did have many people in our country of Polish background, and Rumanian [ordinarily "Romanian"] background, and Hungarian background, and so forth and so on, who were concerned about those living under Communist governments in Eastern Europe--that--that under the circumstances, while they felt strongly about it, we would not, of course, have a--have a--had a resolution passed for the purpose of embarrassing him or raising a provocative issue before I arrived there on a so-called goodwill trip. But it didn't get across to him, and, finally, after I had explained, however, how the resolutions were passed, and after--he just held up his hands. "I can't believe that, that that's happened in that way," he said. "Well, after hearing all this conversation, I can only say that, as far as the resolution substance is concerned, it simply has no basis in fact whatever." Let me think a minute. I've got it. I'm trying to shorten this down. He said, "After hearing all this conversation about the con--about the resolution, about the captive peoples, and about how it was done, I have only one reaction." And I said, "What it is--what is it?" He said, "This resolution stinks. It stinks like horse shit, and there's nothing that stinks worse than pure horse shit." Well, the translation was made, and--by [Trianosky], the translator--he blushed as he did it, because at first he wasn't going to do it, but our ambassador, Tommy Thompson, was sitting there, and he smiled when he heard it in Russian, and [Trianosky] had to translate it exactly as he said it. And so I remembered that, when he mentioned horse shit, when I had grown up in California, grew up in an agricultural area--that a neighbor one time had a load of pig manure brought in, and it--the stench was overpowering, much worse than horse manure. And so I said, "Well, I'm very interested to hear what you say, but I have to disagree on one point," and his ears perked up a bit. He [sic] said, "There's one thing that smells worse than horse shit, and that's pig shit." He said, "Well, you may be right on that, but you're not right on anything else."
Day 4, Tape 1
00:43:22
[Frank Gannon]
The--your relationship only went--only went downhill from that high point, I guess.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:43:30
[Richard Nixon]
Well, it went down for a while. We went ther--then from the Kremlin after this meeting, which was just hammer and tongs--that was only the prelude of what was to come later. And although the rhetoric wasn't quite as, shall we say, "earthy," later, as it was on this occasion, it was really tougher, because we began to talk about things that were a lot tougher than manure. We went over to the American exhibition, and it was there that the first time that he had ever appeared on American television and worldwide television with a leading American figure took place.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:44:08
[Frank Gannon]
We have some film. This was--this opening of the American exhibition, or your confrontation with him, became one of the most famous events of modern political history, the--the famous Kitchen Debate. We have some film of you and Khrushchev in that Kitchen Debate.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:44:29
[Action note: They watch clip.]
Day 4, Tape 1
00:45:27
[Frank Gannon]
At what point did you figure out that you had a tiger that you had better get by the tail?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:45:32
[Richard Nixon]
Well, I could see that he felt that he was really playing to his audience, and he di--was not thinking, however, that he was playing to an American audience then, because this film that you just saw, or that we just showed, was there as an exhibit. It was in color film, as a matter of fact, and one of the things we talked about prior to this particular interchange that you've just seen was with regard to the fact that in color television that we had made advances which they had n--of course had not yet reached in the Soviet Union. And that was what led him to make the s--statement to the effect that--"Look. We've existed only forty-two years, and you've existed a hundred and eighty years, and this is the level of where you are now," as he looked around at the exhibit--you saw his gestures there--he said, "but in seven years we're going to catch you, and we're going to pass you, and then wave goodbye." You could see what a great actor he was. He's always playing to the audience, but he was playing to his Russian audience. But I knew that there were Americans watching that, too--the American press. I had no idea this was going to be shown later in the United States. And so I thought it was time that--we had to right the balance just a bit, but I still had to be the host. He was at a higher level than I. I was still vice president, and he was, of course, at the general secretary level. So how could I be a good host and yet take him on in an effective way? And that's why when--as we walked on, I tried to think of how I could set the record straight with regard to his charges to the effect that the United States was ahead now, but that they were going to catch up, and they were going to pass us, and that we would follow and do likewise.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:47:29
[Frank Gannon]
How a--
Day 4, Tape 1
00:47:30
[Richard Nixon]
S--
[Frank Gannon]
Sorry. Mm-hmm?
[Richard Nixon]
So, the next time, as we went along, it got a little worse, however. I thought he had probably given his best shot here, but we next went by a model American grocery store. It was nothing compared to the supermarkets we have here, but it was a pretty good store and have--have--had been one of the most successful exhibits in the whole American exhibition. The Soviet people looked at all these marvelous products, the diversity--not everything the same as it is there, the diversity of freedom is what--is its hallmark. And as we went by the grocery store, I just casually mentioned to him that I had grown up in a family where my father had a small grocery store and that my brothers and I had worked in it, as we worked before and after school in order to help work our way through school. And after the translation weez [sic] --it was made, he said, "All shopkeepers are thieves." I said, "Well," I said, "that's apparently true in the Soviet state as well." I said, "I was down at the market here"--I had gone there very early in the morning just to see what it was like. And I said, "I noticed that--as--here were the bureaucrats who run--who worked for the state were--had a pair of scales, a set of scales, on which products were weighed, and then the customers--there was another s--set of scales, and they would weigh the--they--the products on their set of scales as well. So maybe the state can't be trusted either." Well, that at least got one little jab back in.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:49:02
[Frank Gannon]
How acrimonious was the Kitchen Debate, in fact?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:49:06
[Richard Nixon]
Well, the part that we saw earlier was not acrimonious, and that was widely presented in the United States as being the Kitchen Debate. It was really very low-key on my part, because it did not involve, incidentally, the strength of America--military. Military, as you'll note--this was a--this was a discussion of economic progress. And then we got to the kitchen--that was something else again. This was a house--it was a whole house, not just a kitchen, but we happened to be in the kitchen area, and we began to discuss washing machines, and when we discussed washing machines, I happened to make the point, casually again, that in--under our system--that there were many different kinds of washing machines and that people could have a choice. He says, "That's not a good idea. In the Soviet Union we make only one kind. Everybody has the same kind. That's much more efficient." Then I just casually mentioned, "Well, it's really very much better to be talking about washing machines than it is about the--the relative strength of our missiles," because I knew that he had been making some very provocative comments about Soviet progress in missiles and how they had--were ahead of the United States. And then he practically blew up, and he said, "But your generals are trying to threaten us. They're threatening us by their talk about their power," and so forth. And then we went at it hammer and talks--hammer and tongs--with regard to the relative strength of the United States and the Soviet Union. But the key point that I made, and what was the real Kitchen Debate, was that it missed the point as to which was the stronger of the two. I said the important thing for us to bear in mind is that both of us are strong, because I wanted at least to give him a position, which I knew he'd desperately need, where I weres [sic] recognizing, and the United States was recognizing, his equality. I said, "We are both strong. What we have to do is to diplomatically work out methods whereby that strength will not u--be used in a destructive way."
Day 4, Tape 1
00:51:16
[Frank Gannon]
After this, he wanted to take you out to see his country house, his dacha. We have some film of that country house.
[Action note: They watch clip.]
Day 4, Tape 1
00:51:32
[Frank Gannon]
Do you want…to describe…your--
Day 4, Tape 1
00:51:38
[Richard Nixon]
Well--
[Frank Gannon]
--first impressions?
[Richard Nixon]
That film, incidentally, brings back many memories. It does not really capture the beauty of the house, its location, and its size. It's actually bigger than the White House. I--it was a magnificent former residence of either a czarist noble or perhaps one of the czars themselves had lived there. But the new czars--they lived as--as well as the old. As a matter of fact, I--I think there was a--a story, probably apocryphal, to the effect that Brezhnev was showing one of these beautiful dachas to his mother, and she was remarking about how nice it was, and she says, "But what if the Communists come back?" But, in any event, the situation with regard to this particular dacha--was concerned was that we got there after the--we'd had this acrimonious confrontation at the so-called Kitchen Debate, when Khrushchev recognized that he perhaps had been a little too belligerent, and he tried to compensate for it. And so, after we'd had a--a luncheon, in which we threw our glasses into the fireplace and shattered them after sh--after drinking champagne, he--he was simply as hospitable as he possibly could be. He said, "You really have got to go to the dacha." We had been scheduled to meet for lunch there the following day. He said, "You've got to s--go there and spend the night. It's much cooler, much more pleasant than in Moscow." So he insists that we go, and that's why we arrived in the evening, and then he arrived the next day.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:53:33
[Frank Gannon]
But when he arrived, he took you on a boat ride, and, again thanks to the--your Secret Service man's film, we can see some of that boat ride, which looks more like a--in some aspects looks more like a campaign trip than a pleasure trip.
[Action note: They watch clip.]
Day 4, Tape 1
00:54:08
[Frank Gannon]
This must have been all planned. Didn't they tell you that it was--that these things were spontaneous?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:54:17
[Richard Nixon]
Well, as I look at that film, I recall vividly what happened. I knew that it had been planned. I--nob--I could tell pretty well it wasn't spontaneous, and I knew that, as far as millions of average Russians are concerned, they didn't have the opportunity to be out there swimming in that river. And later Tommy Thompson, our ambassador, said, "Well, those are all party types." Those were the elite of the party that were allowed to swim there in that area and so forth. But I must say that Khrushchev made the best of it. You can see him waving his hand. He's doing that for purposes of our photographers, the American photographers, to show that he was a man of the people, and he used to look down at these people, and he would nudge me, and he said, "Look. Do they look like captives?"--referring to the Captive Nations Resolutions. "You see, the captives"--"the slaves," he called them--"they're very, very happy." And I said, "Well, you always make political propaganda." He says, "Oh, no. I don't make political propaganda. I just tell the truth."
Day 4, Tape 1
00:55:22
[Frank Gannon]
Do you think it was planned right down to the baby that was handed you?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:55:25
[Richard Nixon]
Oh, I think--
Day 4, Tape 1
00:55:26
[Frank Gannon]
Are they that--are they that calculating and detailed?
Day 4, Tape 1
00:55:29
[Richard Nixon]
No, I do not think that, as far as the handing of the baby to me--that that was done. I think that was just something spontaneous that happened, a--and that does show that, when we talk about the Russians lying and cheating and so forth and so on, we've got to be a little more precise. What we understand and what we must understand, very simply, is this: the United States and the Soviet Union can never be friends. However, that does not mean that Russians and Americans cannot be friends. Russians are basically a strong--as they proved in World War II--courageous people. They're very emotional. They can be very hospitable, and most of them, I found, when I got out of Moscow on my various trips there, into--into Asian Russia and [Nova Sibersk] in Siberia and Sverdlovsk in the Urals and Alma-Ata way down in--near the Chinese border--and Samarkand near the Persian border, and Kiev in Minks [he may mean "Minsk"] --you would find an outpouring of real warmth from people. What we have to understand is that, as far as the leaders are concerned, they can be Communist one moment and Russian the next, and sometimes it's an act, but sometimes it isn't. So, with all these things in mind, that doesn't--that means that it is very possible for them to be very human when they're acting as Russians. On the other hand, when they're acting as Communists, you must be sure that--you c--may be sure that they can be very ruthless.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:57:10
[Frank Gannon]
I think we're at the end of our first hour.
Day 4, Tape 1
00:57:13
[Offscreen voice]
[Unintelligible.] We have to stop and change the tapes. We'll take five minutes. Gentlemen, you want to--
00:57:16
[Action note: Screen goes black.]
00:57:17
[Action note: Sound cuts off.]
Day four, Tape two of four, LINE FEED #2, 5-12-83, ETI Reel #28
May 12, 1983
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:01
[Frank Gannon]
--most of them.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:02
[Richard Nixon]
Well, who are they?
[Action note: Picture appears on screen.]
[Frank Gannon]
Well, there's a few exceptions, but--
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:03
[Richard Nixon]
No, but who are they? Th--I mean [unintelligible] they're all--
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:07
[Frank Gannon]
Chuck.
[Richard Nixon]
--programmed--
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:08
[Frank Gannon]
Chuck.
[Richard Nixon]
--and packaged the same way.
[Action note: Screen goes black.]
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:09
[Frank Gannon]
Chuck Percy.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:10
[Action note: Picture appears on screen.]
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:12
[Action note: Screen goes black.]
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:13
[Action note: Picture appears on screen.]
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:15
[Action note: Screen goes black.]
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:16
[Action note: Picture appears on screen.]
[Richard Nixon]
Well, you take George Bush. [Whispers:] He's not an--an interesting person.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:17
[Action note: Screen goes black.]
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:20
[Action note: Picture appears on screen.]
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:21
[Frank Gannon]
Yeah.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:22
[Richard Nixon]
Interesting person, isn't that it?
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:25
[Frank Gannon]
That's what people--
[Richard Nixon]
Glenn.
[Frank Gannon]
That's what--
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:26
[Richard Nixon]
Glenn is an interestin--
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:27
[Frank Gannon]
Well, that's their big problem on their side. The only one--
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:28
[Richard Nixon]
[Unintelligible.]
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:29
[Frank Gannon]
--who's got potential, I think, there is--
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:30
[Nixon and Gannon in unison]
Hart.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:31
[Richard Nixon]
Mm-hmm. Cranston? Good God.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:36
[Offscreen voice]
Thirty seconds. [Unintelligible.]
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:37
[Richard Nixon]
It's ridiculous--shouldn't even be in the Senate.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:38
[Frank Gannon]
Fritz Hollings.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:39
[Richard Nixon]
Huh?
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:40
[Frank Gannon]
Fritz Hollings--you can't--can't even understand him.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:42
[Richard Nixon]
Like [Bernie Maybank].
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:50
[Offscreen voice]
Five.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:55
[Action note: Screen goes black.]
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:57
[Frank Gannon]
How acri--
Day 4, Tape 2
00:01:59
[Offscreen voice]
[Unintelligible] want to take that again. Let's get--
Day 4, Tape 2
00:02:01
[Action note: Screen goes black.]
[Offscreen voice]
--over there to Frank's side and set up--
Day 4, Tape 2
00:02:03
[Action note: Picture appears on screen.]
[Offscreen voice]
[Unintelligible.]
Day 4, Tape 2
00:02:08
[Richard Nixon]
I think the hair thing--they should be done properly, but what I was thinking with Downey was it looks so artificial--
Day 4, Tape 2
00:02:13
[Frank Gannon]
Artificial….
Day 4, Tape 2
00:02:14
[Richard Nixon]
All pasted, you know, there's--he's got a bad hairdo man.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:02:18
[Frank Gannon]
Hm.
[Action note: Screen goes black.]
Day 4, Tape 2
00:02:19
[Richard Nixon]
I think. (Laughs.)
Day 4, Tape 2
00:02:22
[Offscreen voice]
Two.
[Action note: Picture appears on screen.]
Day 4, Tape 2
00:02:24
[Frank Gannon]
How acrimonious was the--the Kitchen Debate? Did--did he get mad at you? Did you get mad at him?
Day 4, Tape 2
00:02:31
[Richard Nixon]
No. I don't think it was a question of anger, certainly not on my part. After all, I was the host, and I didn't want to have an international incident on a goodwill trip, which this was supposed to be, basically.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:02:43
[Frank Gannon]
Di--
[Richard Nixon]
Uh--
[Frank Gannon]
You had to suppress that because you were the host, but did it--did it annoy you? Did you feel that he was going outside the--the--the bounds of propriety or protocol, or were you just fascinated by it?
Day 4, Tape 2
00:02:53
[Richard Nixon]
More the latter. I really expected him to be, as I said, very unpredictable and going to take advantage all the way that he possibly could. I recall one of the favorite anecdotes of Chancellor Adenauer. He said that Khrushchev was trying to bully him when Adenauer had been in Moscow, and when Adenauer--what--made what Adenauer thought was a very reasonable proposal. Khrushchev said, "You can go to hell." And Adenauer said, "Well, if I go to hell, you'll be there to meet me when I get there." And what he was really trying to tell me--Adenauer--by that anecdote was, "Don't let him get away with too much." And so what I had to do was find a way to respond, but nar--a way to respond without creating an international incident, and also one that would maintain my hospitality as a host. And I think I finally was able to accomplish that fairly well.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:03:54
[Frank Gannon]
Do--do you think he was genuinely out of control, or was it--was he calculating the effect of what he was doing as he was doing it?
Day 4, Tape 2
00:04:01
[Richard Nixon]
No question about the latter. He--he is a man that does not lose his temper. He uses his temper, and he did throughout. He puts on a show, but he is cold when it matters. He's also one who never really is under the influence of alcohol, or wasn't when he made any decisions. He's a pretty good drinker, but when it really mattered, after we had luncheon later, whenever we were having any substantive discussions out at the dacha--we sat there for four or five hours--five, six hours, as I recall, and he sipped hardly anything at all. When it really counts, he's cold sober, and when it really counts, as I say, he is not one that lets his temper run away with him. He was very calculating, and so he was deliberately, probably trying to provoke me, but also trying to show off, for the great numbers of the American press who were there, his belief that the Soviet Union, if it was behind the United States economically, was going to catch up because its system was superior. He believed that then, and, second, that as far as military strength is concerned, that he had missiles on the way that were going to give him superiority over the United States.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:05:16
[Frank Gannon]
Because the actual Kitchen Debate was spontaneous and unexpected, there is only a--the briefest--seven-, eight-second film clip of the two of you standing at the rail looking into the--into the kitchen. That became a fairly famous photograph or picture because of some of the--some of the other people involved.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:05:37
[Richard Nixon]
Well, that was where the real Kitchen Debate took place, not before the television cameras in the television studio that had been set up earlier that we've already seen. And there, as you will note from the photograph, you will see the man standing on his left I--is a young party worker. His name was Brezhnev. I didn't know till I met Brezhnev in 1972--I didn't know until then that Brezhnev was the man that was in that photograph, because when you go to the Soviet Union, at least at a high a level as I did, you--you don't talk to anybody but the top man, or two men, if--the case might be, if there is another one like a Kosygin along with a Brezhnev that you talked to. When I talked to Khrushchev, except for an occasional word with Mikoyan, one of his deputies, I didn't talk to anybody else. And so Brezhnev was there, and I didn't e--wasn't even aware of who he was. He didn't peep once during this whole conversation, but he watched it very, very closely and was fascinated by it, as I'm sure most everybody else was.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:06:44
[Frank Gannon]
You had done a lot of studying of Khrushchev, and you'd talked to Macmillan and Adenauer and Dulles and--and pored over C.I.A. and State Department profiles of him. Do you think he'd studied you? Do you think he'd done the same?
Day 4, Tape 2
00:07:00
[Richard Nixon]
Oh, I'm rather confident that he had. Not quite the same in one sense, though--he was going, certainly, to do that when he went to see President Eisenhower, and that trip was being laid on right while I was there in Moscow. But I was, after all, one that he knew was not able to negotiate with him. But I think he knew something about my background. He knew that I was a lawyer, for example. He knew that I had grown up in a relatively poor family, although he never liked to admit that I was as poor as he was at--on occasion. And he knew that I had been in the Congress, and he also knew that I had a reputation as being an anti-Communist, because he used to say to me, he said, "You know, y--you don't know anything about Communism," and so forth, "except the fear of it."
Day 4, Tape 2
00:07:51
[Frank Gannon]
"The fear of it," yes. That's--that's--that was e--uh--an exchange in the first debate, wasn't it?
Day 4, Tape 2
00:07:57
[Richard Nixon]
That was in the first debate, but when you come to--
Day 4, Tape 2
00:07:59
[Frank Gannon]
Didn't you--
[Richard Nixon]
--the second debate--
[Frank Gannon]
You told him he mustn't be afraid of ideas.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:08:01
[Richard Nixon]
Well, no. What I said was something a little different from that. I said, "Yes"--I sa--I indicated that there should be an exchange of ideas, and I said, "After all"-- and this is what really set him off--I said, "You don't know everything." And then he snapped right back, "Well, you don't know anything exc--about Communism except the fear of Communism." Coming back, though, to the Kitchen Debate, there, after having talked about the relative progress in color television in the first controversy, and then, after having talked about shopkeepers being thieves in the second, when we looked at the model grocery store, and after having talked about washing machines at the earlier part of the so-called Kitchen Debate, we finally got down to what this whole visit was about, as it finally turned out. And that was the relative military strength of the United States and the Soviet Union, a--and it was there that he insisted th--that, as far as their missile strength was concerned, that they were strong. He accused us, the United States, of attempting to use our strength in order to blackmail him and bull--bulldoze him and so forth and so on, and it was s--simply a hammer-and-tongs interchange with regard to the relative military strength of the Soviet Union and the United States. The point that I made, however--and again, I felt it was very important to emphasize this rather than to get into a debate as to who had the most missiles or the most planes or the most submarines--the point I made was that that missed the point, that what really mattered was that we should recognize that both were strong and that that was the basis, then, for negotiation from the basis of equality. But it was very hard to get across to him, because he f--kept repeating that our military people did not accept that proposition, that all they wanted was superiority.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:10:08
[Frank Gannon]
Did you get the sense--or at what point did you get the sense that this was political dynamite for you, that this confrontation with the leader of the Soviet Union was going to have a tremendous political impact at home, where you were already gearing up for the presidential election in two years?
Day 4, Tape 2
00:10:24
[Richard Nixon]
No, I didn't have that feeling at the time. Frankly, all I was doing was simply counterpunching. I wasn't going for a knockout. And, under the circumstances, therefore, I didn't have any time to think about whether it's going to have some political effect in the United States. I just wanted to be sure that I properly represented the view of the administration, the views of President Eisenhower, and the position of the American people in this first historic meeting with the leader of the Soviet Union. And also that I did not get engaged in, and I repeat again--to meeting him on his ground, of arguing about who had the most, et cetera, and who threatened the other, but trying to put it over on our ground, that that was beside the point, that we both had to recognize that we were strong, a--and respect each other for that strength, and then negotiate on areas like Berlin, which was then the major subject of confrontation between the two.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:11:21
[Frank Gannon]
At the dacha on the river, after the boat ride, you came up and saw long tables sat under the trees for luncheon, almost a Chekhovian scene, peaceful, bucolic--and as the luncheon progressed, he--he began an eerie nuclear confrontation.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:11:45
[Richard Nixon]
Well, before the nuclear confrontation evolved, we should point out that he was the perfect host. He joked with Mikoyan, who was seated beside Mrs. Nixon, and he noted that sh--he was--Mikoyan was talking to her, and he said, "Look, you crafty Armenian, don't you try to monopolize Mrs. Nixon," and then he put a--drew his line across the table between Mrs. Nixon and Mikoyan, and he said, "Look. This is an iron curtain. Don't you step across it. She belongs to me." So I though--thing--was thinking this was going to be a very pleasant meeting, and that, after we finished our lunch--that he and I would probably go to one of the conference rooms in the dacha and have a meeting. But it didn't work out that way. The conversation went on and on. Incidentally, we were well prepared for it, however, or at least I say forti--that we were fortified, because one of the earlier courses was a great delicacy. He described it to me as being frozen Siberian whitefish, and he said that it was Stalin's favorite fish because it gave him steel in his backbone. And he took a couple of helpings of it, and I took a couple of helpings at w--as well. I think it helped--it helped us both to survive four hours of conversation which was toe-to-toe all the way.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:13:06
[Frank Gannon]
Wasn't this--wasn't this fish that--in fact, was raw and had rotted, and that the s--one of the reasons it was supposed to put steel up your backbone was because, if you could stand the smell--that you--you could stand anything?
Day 4, Tape 2
00:13:20
[Richard Nixon]
I didn't notice the smell particularly. All I noticed is that we loaded it down with onions, and it didn't make any difference how it tasted.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:13:27
[Frank Gannon]
How do you handle, when you're, say, in the Mideast, and sheep's eye is presented to you as the--the guest of honor? Do you eat it--
Day 4, Tape 2
00:13:33
[Richard Nixon]
Eat it.
[Frank Gannon]
--with relish?
Day 4, Tape 2
00:13:35
[Richard Nixon]
Eat it. That's right.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:13:36
[Frank Gannon]
Or with onions?
Day 4, Tape 2
00:13:37
[Richard Nixon]
That's right--eat it with relish. I've eaten sheep's eyes. In--in China, as a matter of fact, on one occasion I recall having their famous mao-tai. It was green, and after I had had some of it--this was in one of the provinces--my host, with a delightful look in his eye, said, "Well, that had snake's venom in it." So--
Day 4, Tape 2
00:14:04
[Frank Gannon]
Did it make you meaner?
Day 4, Tape 2
00:14:05
[Richard Nixon]
No.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:14:06
[Frank Gannon]
Have you had Rocky Mountain oysters?
Day 4, Tape 2
00:14:08
[Richard Nixon]
Oh, yes. I've had that in the United States, in the Ozarks. And, incidentally, they're very good. They--they taste like scallops, really. I mean, they--they're very nice.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:14:21
[Frank Gannon]
What--what happened during this dacha conversation?
Day 4, Tape 2
00:14:26
[Richard Nixon]
Well, what happened was that, after we got past some of the amenities at the beginning, he then began to carry on where we had left off in the so-called Kitchen Debate about the relative strength of the United States and the Soviet Union, and I think--well, we went into a number of areas. Insofar as missiles are concerned, he made, to me--what to me was a very, in a way, frightening statement or observation. He said that he favored having--developing missiles and relying on them rather than airplanes. He said the difficulty with airplanes and using pilots to drop bombs is that you have the human factor, and sometimes a pilot might not want to drop an atomic bomb. He says, "With missiles, you don't have that human factor. You just fire them. It's very m--much more impersonal." Then he went on to say that he had no use for navies whatever. He said, "I--in the missile age," he said, "navies are going to become obsolete." He said, "Ships will simply be fodder for sharks." He always spoke in very colorful terms. The same was true of aircraft. He said, "As far as aircraft are concerned, they're going to become irrelevant as well." He says, "They’ll just be sitting ducks for the missiles that we're going to develop." So he talked in pretty frightening t--terms, incidentally, with regard to missile strength and the rest.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:15:57
[Frank Gannon]
What were your impressions of the Soviet people that you met on this trip?
Day 4, Tape 2
00:16:03
[Richard Nixon]
You're talking about the leaders?
Day 4, Tape 2
00:16:04
[Frank Gannon]
No, the--the p--the people--
Day 4, Tape 2
00:16:05
[Richard Nixon]
Yeah.
[Frank Gannon]
--themselves, outside of the--
Day 4, Tape 2
00:16:08
[Richard Nixon]
Well, I think I have often made the point that, when we talk about Communist leaders and the people who live in the countries that they lead, we must always differentiate. As a matter of fact, you've got to take the leader and look at him as two pe--as two people. He is a Communist and, in the case of Russia, he is a Russian, and sometimes he acts like a Russian and sometimes like a Communist. You must have in mind always that, when things really count, he's going to be a lot more Communist than he is Russian.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:16:42
[Frank Gannon]
Were you prepared for the reaction that you got in Poland on your way home?
Day 4, Tape 2
00:16:47
[Richard Nixon]
No, not at all, and in fact we didn’t expect any kind of reaction at all in Poland, because we had understood before we stopped there that the Polish government had not published the parade route--the motorcade route, I should say--from the airport to the guest house that we were going to stay in, and it was a Sunday. We thought that most of the people, on their one day off a week, would be doing something other than coming out and gawking at a vice president coming in after a trip to Moscow. And the first indication that I got that it would be a little different there than it had been in Moscow--let me say, parenthetically, that when we got out of Moscow on that trip, we found that in Leningrad and in [Nova Sibersk] in the heart of Siberia, and also in Sverdlovsk--we found a great outpouring of warmth from the Russian people, as distinguished from the leaders themselves. In any event, the first indication that I got that it was going to be different in Poland was when the honor guard, the Polish honor guard, were loaded on a fatbeg--flatbed truck, and, as we were leaving the airport to drive into the city, I saw the honor guard personnel--some of them were clapping, and some of them were holding up the "V" sign, like that. And I just thought, as I went by them, that they wouldn’t be very reliable troops in the event that there was a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. And then, once we got into the streets, something hit the side of the car, and I thought it might have been a stone or something of that sort, because it had been in Caracas just a year before, but it was a bouquet of roses, and then flowers began to pelt the motorcade all the way in. There was a quarter of a million people there, totally spontaneous. Those who observe it, and I agree--while it was not the biggest crowd we have been welcomed by, it was certainly the most emotional that I have ever seen, and one that moved us beyond belief.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:18:56
[Frank Gannon]
Were the Polish leaders embarrassed by it?
Day 4, Tape 2
00:18:58
[Richard Nixon]
Oh, yes. I think they were very embarrassed, and somewhat surprised, because they didn't want--not because, I think, really, they would have minded having their people welcome an American in that way, but also primarily because they didn't want to irritate the Russians, because what had happened is Khrushchev had just been in Poland about a few weeks before that, and they had tried to put on a big welcome for him, and it was very amusing that, when members of the press asked the people that had thrown flowers into the cars--asked them about it, they said that--"This time we bought our own flowers." The other time, when Khrushchev came in, the state had bought the flowers for them and told them to throw them into the cars, and some of them didn't even throw them in then. It's the old story, too--you can really tell about the difference between crowds. I remember in 1974, when we went into Cairo. There was a huge crowd, over a million people on the way from the airport and to the guest house, and they were cheering and chanting and smiling and laughing, and Sadat said to me, he says, "They are cheering for you. They're cheering for the United States." He says, "You know, we can always get out a crowd, but you can't make them smile." And so it was in Poland. This was a smiling crowd, but not all smiling. I would say hundreds of them had tears running down their cheeks, because they were simply moved with joy that an American was there. There's a strong feeling among the Polish people about Americans generally, probably because so many of their relatives live in the United States.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:20:40
[Frank Gannon]
What do you think you represented to them?
Day 4, Tape 2
00:20:42
[Richard Nixon]
Hope. Hope that they might have an opportunity someday not to have a Soviet-controlled or subsidized government imposed upon themselves, a--and also respect and affection. They--the United States to them is a nation that offers freedom, hope--it's what they would like their own country to be.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:21:07
[Frank Gannon]
When Khrushchev made his visit to the United States the next year, I think he made it clear on several occasions that you were not one of his very favorite people.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:21:16
[Richard Nixon]
Oh, yes. He took every opportunity to embarrass me, as the case might be. Right from the time we met in the White House in the Oval Office with the--President Eisenhower, he said to President Eisenhower that, while he didn't have any question about President Eisenhower's desire for peace, he did have a question about my desire for peace. He didn't say that specifically, but he said, "Some of the people around you--we don't have that same confidence," and he glared at me in the process. The same was true in--when we went up to Camp David. We got up there, and we were meeting with President Eisenhower in Aspen, which is the presidential cottage there, and Khrushchev was very belligerent as long as I was present because he felt that I had not been friendly in speeches that I had made to the American Legion and the V.F.W. two weeks before he arrived there, because I had referred to my own visit to the Soviet Union and so forth. What he missed, the point he missed, was that in those speeches I had urged those organizations, both of which were going to pass resolutions condemning his visit--I had urged them to give him a friendly welcome. But he just overlooked that and considered to me--to be beyond the pale in that respect, and, consequently, President Eisenhower very properly suggested that I not participate in the meetings thereafter, but it was just the--more of the same then. He was just as tough with Eisenhower as he was with me. The famous Eisenhower smile and so f--didn't work, which was no surprise to Eisenhower. He was a pretty realistic fellow. Incidentally, we had one amusing anecdote in that respect. We were having luncheon, and I was trying to, you know, lighten things up a bit after a very heavy conversation had occurred previously, and I asked Khrushchev, I said, "Where do you go on your vacations?" He says, "I like to go to the Crimea," and President Eisenhower said, "Well, I always liked to go down to Georgia, like to play golf," and so forth. He says, "The only problem, though, is that when I go on vacation I am always interrupted by the telephone." Translation was made, and Khrushchev took umbrage about that. He says, "Well, we have telephones in the Soviet Union, too. We don't have as many as you do, but we're going to have more. We'll pass you in that way, too." So, you see, every opportunity--he had this inferiority complex, and he was determined to show that the Soviet Union, while behind now, was going to prevail in the end and pass the United States, as he put it.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:23:56
[Frank Gannon]
What was Eisenhower's impression of this rather spontaneous and belligerent man?
Day 4, Tape 2
00:24:04
[Richard Nixon]
Well, his im--impression was that of a realist, I would say. He had to listen to those--and there were some of his advisors who felt that maybe, just maybe--that he could reassure Khrushchev and dispel some of the doubts that Khrushchev had about the U--United States thr--being a threat to him. But Eisenhower saw through it very soon. After the Camp David meeting, and they were unable to get any kind of a statement out--well, the statement they got out later was referred to as "The Spirit of Camp David," which was a nothing thing. They couldn't agree on anything. Eisenhower, frankly, gave up on him.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:24:45
[Frank Gannon]
Rather than dispelling his doubts about whether we might have been a threat to him, wouldn't it have been better to reinforce those concerns?
Day 4, Tape 2
00:24:54
[Richard Nixon]
Oh, let me make it very clear. I think, after Eisenhower had gone the extra mile in making it clear that we s--were seeking peaceful resolution in Berlin and other issues, that Eisenhower, by that cold manner of his, which he makes very apparent at times, left no doubt in Khrushchev's mind that Eisenhower was not one that could be pushed around. But I would say the main thing that impressed Khrushchev was sending him around the United States, because he was enormously impressed, I am sure, by the thousands and thousands of cars that he saw in parking lots, by the b--the houses that he saw, et cetera. By the--he came back convinced that the United States was not a paper tiger. And, incidentally, he passed that on to the Chinese, and that may have been one of the reasons for the Sino-Soviet split, although there were others as well.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:25:52
[Frank Gannon]
How did--in these meetings, how did Eisenhower's cool manner reflect itself?
Day 4, Tape 2
00:26:00
[Richard Nixon]
Well, more by what he didn't say than what he did say. Eisenhower was not one to engage in a lot of rhetoric with people, but he would just become--when he didn't agree, he'd just put on the silent act. He was very--
Day 4, Tape 2
00:26:16
[Frank Gannon]
Did it have an effect on Khrushchev? Did he seem to withdraw, or--
Day 4, Tape 2
00:26:19
[Richard Nixon]
Khrushchev didn't know what to do with it. He--uh--I was not present at all the meetings, of course. I was only present at the initial ones, but from the--what I had heard later, Eisenhower just felt that he was intransigent, and so he gave up on that--at least--diplomacy course at the present time.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:26:42
[Frank Gannon]
Is it true that you have the distinction of being the man who introduced Khrushchev to Allen Dulles, the director of the C.I.A., and J. Edgar Hoover, the director of the F.B.I.?
Day 4, Tape 2
00:26:51
[Richard Nixon]
Yes. As a matter of fact, that was at a dinner, and they were both invited to it, at the White House--a state dinner. And I remember when I introduced him to Hoover, he immediately perked up, and he says, "I think we know some of the same people." I think the reason he said that was that Hoover, of course, is well known--had always told the Congress that he had people planted within the Soviet K.G.B.--a double agent.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:27:21
[Frank Gannon]
Did he, do you think?
Day 4, Tape 2
00:27:22
[Richard Nixon]
Oh, y--no question about it. Well, as a matter of fact, Hoover used to tell me that, both before the presidential years and even before that, that they had a man, a s--a--a double agent, who used to bring a hundred thousand dollars a year to the Communist Party in the United States. That was his job to bring it. He was the bag man. Now, on the other hand, that man might have been a double agent the other way, too. So who knows what. But I think it was a very astute comment on Khrushchev's part. "We know some of the same people, so don't trust anybody."
Day 4, Tape 2
00:28:05
[Frank Gannon]
Was there--was there u--unified support behind the trip? Was John Foster Dulles, for example, in favor of Khrushchev's coming here?
Day 4, Tape 2
00:28:12
[Richard Nixon]
Well, Dulles by that time was no longer living, of course. The decision with regard to his coming here was made later. Dulles did support my going there, because he had been present at a meeting I had had at the [F Street Club], the--a fine private club in Washington, where Mikoyan was present, and he felt that I had handled myself rather well in a, quote, "debate," or discussion, with Mikoyan, a very clever, intelligent, tough-minded second man to Khrushchev. And m--and Dulles gave me excellent advice with regard to handle--how to handle the meetings when I got to Khrushchev. He was the one who said over and over again, he said, "I could not agree more with those," because all sorts of columns were written when it was announced I was going to go to Russia--that if I could only reassure them--reassure the Russians that we were for peace and dispel some of their fears that they were being encircled and the rest, that that would be--that would serve the cause of peace. And Dulles--it was he who said, "Don't ever believe that." He said, "They"--he said, "We don't have to convince them we're for peace. They know that."
Day 4, Tape 2
00:29:32
[Frank Gannon]
Khrushchev later said that he had done everything he could to defeat you in the race for president in 1960. What do you think he meant by that?
Day 4, Tape 2
00:29:42
[Richard Nixon]
I think one of the things he meant, apparently, was that he did not release some American crewmen, a flight crew that had come down in the Soviet Union when they got off course, and under the circumstances that might have had some effect. I mean, had he released them before the election, that could have helped. I think another point that wa--he was perhaps making was that, after the U-2 incident--that he did not go forward with the plans to have Eisenhower visit the Soviet Union. I think, incidentally, that that was a great loss. I think Eisenhower would have had a great ef--impact in the Soviet Union, and I think the reason that Khrushchev had it knocked over--my bis--visit had been quite effective--I think he feared having Eisenhower come to the Soviet Union for the impact that Eisenhower would have on the Russian people. And so I think the--also Khrushchev felt that his conduct when he was in this country, conduct indicating that he couldn't get along with me, might frighten American people to voting against me, because of the fear that I couldn't get along with Khrushchev. I remember Mrs. Herter, the wife of s--who--who succeeded Dulles, Secretary Chris Herter, a former congressman--that she said to me on one occasion--this is before the election--that she, in talking to many of her friends, had heard over and over again the concern expressed that, because Khrushchev and I didn't get along, that we might not be able to make progress toward peace. And, of course, that missed the point altogether. Getting along with Khrushchev does not mean being belligerent, whether it's with him or any other Russian leader, but it does mean being strong. War is going to come, or defeat without war, which is the greater likelihood, not because we are strong but because we are weak and because we give the impression to the Soviet leaders that they can make gains without some cost to them. It's only when they become determined that the cost of war is going to be far greater than anything they could gain that we will have any meaningful negotiations to reduce its danger.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:32:06
[Frank Gannon]
If you had to lay odds on the likelihood of a major great-power war, say, in the next twenty years, what would you--what odds would you choose?
Day 4, Tape 2
00:32:15
[Richard Nixon]
I don't think there's going to be a war. I wouldn't want to bet on such a thing, because it's--I don't want to lose that bet, or win it, for that matter. I don't think there's going to be a major war for a number of reasons. First, because taking the Soviet leaders at their most aggressive worst, whatever that may be--they are not fools. They are not madmen. A--an Andropov is not a Hitler, just as Brezhnev was not and Khrushchev was not. So, I think, under the circumstances, we're going to find that they have some incentive to avoid war. They want to conquer the world. They want Communism to dominate the world, but not a world of destroyed cities a--and of dead bodies. So they want to win without war. That is what they're trying to do, and that is the great danger that we confront. Now, having said that I do not believe there will be a war, there are two conditions. One, that the United States continue to develop the military strength across the board that will deter Soviet military action. And second, and this is even more critical, in the peripheral areas--I'm referring to the Mideast, to Latin America and to Southeast Asia, as distinguished from Europe, where I think-- there will not be a major Soviet offensive there--in those peripheral areas, to find ways in which the United States and the Soviet Union can negotiate about their differences there, having in mind the fact that we're never going to agree. All we can ever agree upon with the Soviet is how can we be adversaries without allur--lowing our adversarial relationship to escalate into war. And that is possible.
Day 4, Tape 2
00:34:10
[Frank Gannon]
You say that Khrushchev and Brezhnev and Andropov are not crazed like Hitler was. Are they less evil than he was?
Day 4, Tape 2
00: