Richard Nixon/Frank Gannon Interviews,
April 8, 1983 [Day 3 of 9]

interviewer: Frank Gannon
interviewee: Richard Nixon
producer: Ailes Communications, INC.
date: April 8, 1983
minutes: approximately 189
extent: ca. 258kb
summary: This interview, comprising four video tapes, or just over 3 hours, is the third in a series of taped interviews with former president Nixon. Topics covered in the beginning of this conversation include Watergate, the Vietnam War, democracy, American foreign policy, and Nixon's relationship with the media. Beginning with tape two, the conversation focuses on Nixon's years as vice president. Other topics discussed include Joseph McCarthy and McCarthyism, Pat Nixon, and the meaning of loyalty in politics.
repository: Walter J. Brown Media Archives, University of Georgia Libraries (Main Library)
collection: Richard Nixon Interviews
permissions: Contact Media Archives.

Day three, Tape one of four, LINE FEED #1, 4-8-83, ETI Reel #20
April 8, 1983

Day 3, Tape 1
00:01:27
[Action note: Screen goes black.]

Day 3, Tape 1
00:01:28
[Action note: Picture appears.]

Day 3, Tape 1
00:01:29
[Action note: Screen goes black.]

Day 3, Tape 1
00:01:57
[Action note: Picture appears.]

Day 3, Tape 1
00:01:59
[Offscreen voice]

Go.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:02:02
[Frank Gannon]

Now that the war in Vietnam is over, long over, in order to heal the wounds of war and to begin reestablishing some kind of new American presence and policy in Southeast Asia, should we recognize the Democratic Republic of Vietnam?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:02:20
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, under no circumstances. There's really nothing in it for us in terms of our policy toward Southeast Asia, even though some of those countries down there per forma [he may mean "pro forma"] suggest that that be done. But there's a geopolitical reason that we must not do so, and that is that the Chinese are violently against the Vietnamese government because the Vietnamese government at the present time is totally under the control and s—being supported by Moscow. So, at this point, we should stay right where we are.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:02:55
[Frank Gannon]

Some critics claim that your administration was obsessed with secrecy. Some claim that it—it—it stems from—from your own character, that you have a secretive nature and that this carried over into the operations of your administration. Thinking about the leaks of information—leaks are endemic in Washington. They—they always have existed. They always will exist. Shouldn't you have accepted leaks as a fact of life and not become so concerned with them that you had to resort to things like wiretaps and—which—which turned out to be unsuccessful anyway?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:03:34
[Richard Nixon]

Well, I think there are two parts to that question, as I understand it. First, that we were obsessed with secrecy. As a matter of fact, you're being too kind. I was paranoiac, or almost a basket case with regard to secrecy, and Henry Kissinger as well, because, believe me, if you think I was tough on these leaks, he was even tougher at times because he thought it was jeopardizing his negotiations. The second point we should have in mind is that we were strongly urged to do something about leaks by two of our predecessors. I remember so well the first conversation I had with President Johnson after the election in 1968. We were in the Oval Office, and he had read in the paper that I had planned, after my talk with Kissinger, to reinstate the regular meetings of the N.S.C., which he had put on the back burner and had little private meetings which were totally secret. He said, "You will live to regret this." He said, "You"—"Things are going to leak out of those meetings when you have people sitting around in the back of the room, the note-takers and the rest." He said, "You know, sometimes I couldn't even tell Hubert things." He says, "He'd leak because he wouldn't know he was doing it. He just liked to talk." So he urged me not to do it. He also said a very interesting thing which I didn't really understand till later. He says, "You know, I couldn't have been president without J. Edgar Hoover's assistance in trying to track down some of these things." And then I remember too well, as well, that when we were in office, that I went out to brief Eisenhower with regard to a new initiative that we were trying to implement through the N.S.C. system with regard to the Mideast. He was very interested in it. A couple of days later it was in the press. Eisenhower didn't call me. He called Kissinger, and he said, "Shape up your shop. If you don't stop these leaks, you're not going to be able to have a policy." So that tells you what they think. Now, the other point that you make with regard to—why secrecy, why should we care about whether or not people leak. In other words, aren't—aren't the people entitled to know? And my answer is—the people are, but not the enemy, not our opponents. And by that, I mean that—and I'll put it quite bluntly—without secrecy, we would not have had the opening to China. No way the Chinese would ever have done that in public forums, because they had the Russians that they feared in this respect. They had a number of other internal problems, those that opposed any rapprochement with the United States. It had to be done secretly, and that was an enormously important event which could not have been accomplished without those secret trips that Kissinger took and the secret negotiations we had through the White House channels. Without secrecy, we wouldn't have had the meetings in Paris which reached the agreement with the North Vietnamese and brought the peace agreement which ended the American involvement in Vietnam. It couldn't have been accomplished without secrecy, because people will say things secretly that they won't say publicly when they're talking to a much broader—broader constituency. And without secrecy, as a matter of fact, we wouldn't have had the negotiations with the Russians that led to the first [Strategic Arms Control Agreement]. So, I am simply suggesting to my successors in this office—have an open administration to the extent that you can. It's much more popular, particularly with the members of the media. But remember, the most important thing to do is to make progress in solving particularly great international problems. You cannot make progress at times in public forum. Let the media know—unless letting the media know is going to abort an initiative you're attempting to undertake.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:07:30
[Frank Gannon]

This makes logical sense, but isn't it really deeply basically inconsistent with the—the ethic of democracy? Let's take a worst case. Let's assume that there is a president who either has bad intentions, which I guess would be the very worst case, or a well-intentioned president who has a—a policy that turns out to be disastrous. If he has the ability to carry it out behind the scenes in secret, to carry it to fruition, how—then—we then—we then have to live with the results of that. How can you balance the need for secrecy in order to get things done with the kind of checks and balances that are built into the democratic system and keep it on an even keel?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:08:11
[Richard Nixon]

Well, let me say with regard to secrecy that there are some you do confide in. For example, when I had the secret bombing of Cambodia, I did inform Senator Russell and Senator Stennis, both Democrats, because I knew that they, as key Democrats, could keep a secret. And, incidentally, they proved it. But let me say, too—

Day 3, Tape 1
00:08:33
[Frank Gannon]

Your critics, though, would charge that you chose the two key Democrats who you knew in advance would, because of your relationship with them and because of their background, would approve your—

Day 3, Tape 1
00:08:44
[Richard Nixon]

Oh—

[Frank Gannon]

--your—

[Richard Nixon]

Not necessarily, not—

[Frank Gannon]

--your actions.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:08:45
[Richard Nixon]

--particularly in the case of Senator Russell. He was very much disenchanted with the war, even though he is always known to be a hawk. No, I chose them because I knew they'd keep their counsel, and I couldn't say that, frankly, for some of the Republicans. On the other hand, in terms of the—of how we are to operate, we have to have in mind that it's most important for a president, for an administration, in the field of foreign policy, to be effective. We have to have in mind, too, that it is a fact of international life that, in the world we live in, negotiations that are private are a way of accomplishing things. And this is particularly true, may I say, particularly true when you're dealing with totalitarian states. Secrecy to the Soviet Union, to the Chinese and so forth—it's a way of life for them, and if you don't move in those secret channels, you're always going to be fighting things out propagandawise. Let me say--(laughs)--it was very difficult for me. I'd liked to have gone out and huffed and puffed in front of the media about all the great things I was doing to bring rapprochements with China and get a lot of plaudits and kudos in The New York Times and Washington Post and CBS, NBC, and ABC. But, on the other hand, what I wanted to do was have results. And if I'd had those kudos, we wouldn't have had the results. So, I say it is very important, of course, to inform the country once you have made a breakthrough. It is very important, too, to submit to the Congress to the extent that the Congress has responsibility for the—for approval of the programs. But, on the other hand, the negotiations of—in these particular cases have to be, in many cases, accomplished through secret, or, should I say, private channels.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:10:37
[Frank Gannon]

What about the critics who would say that in your conduct of the war, you purposely avoided the democratic processes which would have involved going to Congress or informing larger numbers of congressmen, because you knew, which turned out to be the case in 1972 and 1973, that if you went to them, they would essentially stop the war. They would stop the funding. If they knew what you were intending to do, they would have stopped it.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:11:03
[Richard Nixon]

No. That was true. I wou—I think we should say, in the Johnson years—I mean, in the Johnson years, we went in, as some people have said, by stealth, and the Congress, it approved very early on sort of a general approval of a—a program in this instance. But it w—Johnson did not inform them along the way. But let me say, on the contrary, in my case, if you look over the record, I addressed the country over and over again, publicly, on television, on these issues, with regard to—with our withdrawal program, with regard to our training of the Vietnamese, with regard, too, to our incursion into Cambodia, and explained what we were doing. I was going over the heads, I may say, of the media, most of whom were opposed to anything except a bug-out, and I was going over the heads of some of those in Congress who would have opposed anything except a bug-out. But, on the other hand, there was no question but that the Congress was well-informed of what we did and could, at any time prior to the time we reached the peace agreement, put thumbs down on it. They didn't do that, because I had the support of the country. It's very important to recognize that the president of the United States is not just speaking for the Congress. They are the people's representatives, because they also have been elected, but he represents—he's the only person in this country—he and the vice prepi—president—who represent all the people, and he has a right and should go over the heads of the Congress, over the heads of the media to the people when he believes that the people's support may override congressional opposition.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:12:49
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think you ever got fair treatment from the media?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:12:54
[Richard Nixon]

Possibly, some say—I mean, as president, I assume you're asking, not the earlier years. I—I would say that some would say that I got fair treatment on the China initiative, and perhaps it was one that many of the media considered to be a great adventure, and I think some of them honestly thought it was a major achievement. As Henry Kissinger used to ruefully say, he says, "Well," he said, "they're supporting it, but they've—they really are sorry we did it. They only wish that one of theirs had done it." No. As far as the media is concerned, let me understand, I hold no personal grudges. I—I know that some people say, do—do I hate the press. I was asked that once in a press conference. I said, "No. I—I—you only hate people you respect." I don't mean I don't respect many in the media, but those in the media, for example, on the war issue, who supported Kennedy's getting us involved in Vietnam, which was proper, in my position—in my opinion, who supported Johnson, when Johnson was campaigning against Goldwater, and Johnson's Vietnam position, and then who deserted ship, in effect, once the public opinion began to turn against the war, and then sabotage me, in my opinion, or tried to, when I was trying to bring the war to an honorable conclusion—as far as those in the media, and they are several of them—there are several of them—I don't have any respect for them. I don't hate them. It’s just a matter, I would say, of mutual contempt. I'm sure they share the same feeling toward me.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:14:32
[Frank Gannon]

You talk about a—people who wanted to "bug out" of Vietnam. What—what—what is a bug-out?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:14:40
[Richard Nixon]

A bug-out is what, for example, the Democratic caucuses in both the House and the Senate voted for in 1972. It, in effect, says, "Bring back our prisoners of war. If we get those from you, we will withdraw all of our support from the South Vietnamese," so that the North Vietnamese would be able to impose their government on the South with, of course, all the consequences that have come from that, as we have well seen. I think Mel Laird put it pretty well once, though, when the prisoner-of-war issue was beginning to get very, very hot. He said, "Look, we can't be in the position of fighting these war—this war in order to get back our prisoners of war." And I must say that he was exactly right. So, a bug-out basically is w—something where we say, "The war in Vietnam is wrong. We shouldn't be in there in the first place. It's been conducted the wrong way. It's costing more than it can possibly gain. So the thing we have to do is to get out and let Vietnam—South Vietnam fend for itself," which would have meant a Communist takeover, which of course is what happened when we cut back on them, which was, incidentally, a modified bug-out. Whenever your friends don't have the support and tanks and arms and so forth that your potential enemies have, they're going to lose.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:16:07
[Frank Gannon]

Why do you think so many of these people, who were smart, sophisticated, involved, aware people, were, in your judgment, so wrong in their assessment of why Vietnam wasn't important to us? How was it possible for the—the—the leaders of Congress, the leaders of—in—in the universities, the thought leaders—indeed, arguably, the American Establishment wanted us to bug out. Why were they—how could they be so wrong?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:16:37
[Richard Nixon]

When you describe these people, they are what we call "the best and brightest," "the best and the brightest" in the media, in the universities, in the foundations, even in the—some parts of the business community, and, of course, in the Congress. It's been difficult for me to understand. I think part of it was because they were turned off by, frankly, the horrors of war, war being in living color on television night after night. This was the first war fought on color television, as you know. They were turned off, too, by what they considered to be the excesses of the Vietnamese government. They had a double standard. They could see the danger on the right—they saw it in Vietnam, they saw it, for example, in Iran, they saw it in Cuba—and yet who would say, for example, that Cuba is better off under Castro than it was previously? Who would say, for example, today that Iran is better off under Khomeini than it was under the Shah? And in the case of Vietnam, who could really say that Vietnam is better under the Communists than it was under Thieu? It seems to me that, when you look at it that way, it is difficult to understand how the best and the brightest, because they were overwhelmed by seeing the horrors of war, because also they felt that the war was very divisive at home, and it was, that they said, "Well, get it off our plate and turn to other things." And let me say the fact that it was divisive at home, I think, was a major factor, because in the university communities and the rest, college faculties and so forth just didn't want to stand up to the activist students and particularly the professors.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:18:27
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think—talking about the American Establishment, do you think it is "the best and the brightest"? Do you think it is the brightest but not the best?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:18:36
[Richard Nixon]

The American establishment certainly can't be faulted on brains. We have more college graduates per capita than any country in the world. We have excellent institutions. The whole world comes to America now, just as Americans used to go, for example, in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, for example, to Germany, for example, in the field of science, to Britain if you wanted to learn something about political science, and the rest. In terms of the best, in terms of character, in—in I would say that I think that the American university community has got to look very carefully at what has happened. What—what is the situation today, for example, when a Jeane Kirkpatrick or a Bill Buckley happens to be denied the right to speak on a university campus and then your faculty just didn't have the backbone to face down the demonstrators and so forth and let them speak, and why an Ellsberg goes there and is recog—is received like a hero? Now, what I am saying here is that, as far as the American establishment is concerned, it certainly is very bright, but in terms of responsibility, of facing up to the real world, of distinguishing—and these are hard distinctions a make—to make—distinguishing between governments that don't meet our standards but understanding that the choice often is not between something perfect and something imperfect, betw—but between something which is not good—between something that is much worse. It's on these scores that I think the American establishment has really forfeited its right to lead. And I trust—and, incidentally, having said that, there are a substantial minority who know this and are attempting to turn it around. I hope they prevail.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:20:32
[Frank Gannon]

If it follows that the best—or that the brightest people make the smartest choices, why is the American Establishment liberal?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:20:42
[Richard Nixon]

Of course, the brightest people don't always make the right choices. This is not just a modern phenomenon. It goes back through history. We often find that as far as leaders are concerned, some of them have been intellectual geniuses, others have not—but far more important than a high I.Q. is good judgment. Far more important than whether you lead your class is whether or not you have the strength and the character in a crisis to stand up against the mob. I would say, above everything else, far more important than doing what is fashionable—and these days so many people are affected by what is in fashion, the trendy business—is to do what is right. As I've often said, a—the responsibility of a leader is not to follow public opinion, what is trendy, but to change it when he believes it should be changed. Not to follow the polls, but to change the polls. And I would say that, in terms of much of the American Establishment, it's—that is the case. I would say, finally, in this respect, we have to understand that most of the American Establishment coming out of the universities and so forth—it's liberal, and generally those coming out of universities have a liberal background.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:22:10
[Frank Gannon]

Why is that?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:22:12
[Richard Nixon]

It is because you—you have—from—historically, from way back, that those who—who sit in the great universities and so forth are not in the real world. It's an unreal world. Let me say, I speak with great respect about looking back at my own professors, at—at college and in law school and many that I have known. But generally speaking, they do not live in the real world, and when they see the real world and what you have to do, to make choices between the perfect and the imperfect, or, I should say, between what is not perfect, from what is—and something that is worse, it is this that really makes it very difficult for them. And also there is this to be said. Generally speaking, when you look at the universities and so forth, as—they're basically idealists, which is to their credit. They basically are critics, and they see everything wrong around them, as they should, and they're very critical of that. But way out there they see also—they—they are usually taken in by those who offer panaceas. That's why Communism appealed, let's face it, or Marxism, or socialism, as it even appeals today. In practice, it's been a disaster, but, on the other hand, in the earlier years, in the thirties, and the forties and fifties, before it self-destructed by how it failed to perform, it had enormous appeal among the intellectual elite. I haven't given up on them. After all, they are intelligent, and I do feel that over a period of time, that I don't expect them to be conservative. I don't ex—certainly would hope they would never be reactionary. I would always hope that they would be for progress, but i—within a democratic framework. But I would think they would be less naïve about what the—how the world works.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:24:16
[Frank Gannon]

If there is one most common denominator of the American Establishment, my guess is that it is dislike of Richard Nixon. What is it about you drives the Establishment up the wall?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:24:31
[Richard Nixon]

I don't know whether I'm the best qualified. You really ought to ask them. People often say, "Your press relations are bad. Get a new press secretary." That isn't the problem. I could have the best press secretary in the world and that isn't going to change the attitude of the press. I think there are two things, one—or maybe three. One, they don't agree with what I stand for. I am a conservative, I hope an intelligent one. Un--(coughs). And I—

Day 3, Tape 1
00:25:00
[Frank Gannon]

Isn't that redundant?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:25:01
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, yeah. Not necessarily. I would say I am not reactionary and tha—therefore not a very good target for them. I'm usually not reckless and therefore not a good target. I think, for example, a second point that has turned them off is almost historical. I can—I'll never forget my old friend Bert Andrews, who was an intellectual, a very—one of the top reporters for The New York Herald-Tribune in Washington—he was the head of their office—after we'd broken the Hiss case and after I had stayed on the ticket through the fund broadcast, he'd had a couple of belts, and I was feeling pretty good after that broadcast, and I said, "Well," I said, "I guess things are going to change. We're going to get a better press." He said, "No, you won't." He said, "Let me tell you something about my brethren in the press." He said, "They don't mind if you're stupid. As a matter of fact, they like it. You make a better target. They like the dummies, frankly, in a way, because it gives them something that they can really cut up pretty good." He said, "And, as a matter of fact, when you're wrong, they can take you on, because that puts them on the side of the right. But," he says, "there's one thing that they cannot tolerate. There's one thing that really turns them off. And that is if you embarrass them by proving they were wrong." He said, "They were ten-to-one against you on the Hiss case. You proved them wrong. That embarrassed them. And then on the fund—on the Eisenhower train, they had voted forty to two that you ought to get off the ticket. With one broadcast you proved them wrong." He says, "Mark my word. It isn't they hate you individually, but you have embarrassed them, and from now on they're going to be after you." Now, that sounds a little petty, and perhaps it's way overstated, but I would say that, as far as the media is concerned, I probably have t—don't handle myself in a way they like. They like fashion, and I'm not a fashionable person. They like the trendy people. I am not a trendy person. They like froth, and I'm more one who believes in substance. So, basically, under the circumstances, however, I think it really gets down to the fact that I am a conservative, and also, curiously enough, a conservative who is not an isolationist, who is not a reactionary, who is for progress, who is an internationalist. As a matter of fact, I think really many of them privately resented the fact that I went to China and that their boy hadn't done it, whoever their boy was. Now, having said that, let's simply say that that's all in the past, and looking to the future, I hope that when—as time goes on, that they will take a more tolerant attitude, or at least a more objective attitude upo—toward conservative Republican presidents, or Democratic presidents, for that matter, if they happen to be conservative.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:28:05
[Frank Gannon]

One of the—for a number of years, one of the arguments in favor of the—or one of the arguments for the necessity of fighting the Vietnam War was the [Domino Theory], that if South Vietnam fell, the rest of the nations in Southeast Asia and Asia and the Pacific Basin would fall like a row of dominoes. Now, several years after the fall of Vietnam, the end of the war, the fall of Vietnam, the dominoes still seem to be in place. Does that mean that the [Domino Theory] was wrong?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:28:34
[Richard Nixon]

No, not at all. You have to understand historically how the theory developed. It developed first and was first expressed by President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson back in 1948 and '49 when the French were still there. And in that period and in 1953 when I traveled throughout that area, and in 1956 when I was there again, and again back in 1964 when I was there again—in all of that period of time we have to understand that Communism, the idea, ha—still had appeal. These were new nations, many of them. They were just trying the great experiment of self-government. They were trying to find the best way to quick progress. They saw the Soviet example, and they did not see the fact that Communism didn't work. Now, since that period, particularly in the mid-sixties, the late sixties and the seventies, that has all changed. So the Communists don't have the appeal that they had, for example, in Indonesia and the Philippines and Malaysia and Thailand that they had back in 1953 and '54 when the [Domino Theory] was first suggested. So what happened here is that by holding the ring in Vietnam against Soviet- and Chinese-supported revolutionary warfare, we bought time for those nations to develop their own systems. We bought time for the Communist systems to self-destruct. Let's take Indonesia as the best example. Indonesia in the year 1962, throughout, Sukarno, who was left-leaning and was getting taken in by sort of the Communist ideas and—put in a non-Communist, a strong non-Communist government. That would not have happened, in my opinion, had the United States failed to hold the line in Vietnam, beca—and Indonesia was the most important country in that area. There's a hundred and fifty million people and it has a thousand miles of strategically located islands.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:30:36
[Frank Gannon]

Was it worth destabilizing our government, having hundreds of thousands of American casualties, fifty-seven thousand American dead, in order to hold the line for Indonesia, to buy time for the Indonesians?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:30:50
[Richard Nixon]

It wasn't just Indonesia. It's a question of the whole area of what I call revolutionary warfare, because we have to understand the dominoes are just not in Southeast Asia.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:31:04
[Frank Gannon]

Is—is one American life worth buying time?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:31:10
[Richard Nixon]

It is if it's going to affect us. Let's well understand that here sits the United States. Now, I think most people say, well, the United States certainly should risk an American life to save Europe. And most people in America would say we should risk an American life to save Israel. And maybe they would say we should risk American lives to save Japan, because of its economic importance to us and so on. Having said that, however, we have to understand that, as we look at Europe, the United States, and Japan, they cannot survive if, basically, the Third World—and that's a very big term—Latin America, Africa, the Persian Gulf, Southeast Asia, and South Asia—if that comes under Communist domination, we will be surrounded, squeezed, because our supplies will be cut off and so forth and so on. So, in the long term, we simply have to stand firm. We don't fight everyplace. In fact, we try not to fight at all. We should help others fight their own battles, the so-called Nixon Doctrine. But, on the other hand, we have to recognize that what happens in Indonesia, what happens in El Salvador, what happens in Iraq and Iran does matter.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:32:33
[Frank Gannon]

Where is the domino—where are the dominoes today, and what should we be doing? How—

Day 3, Tape 1
00:32:38
[Richard Nixon]

I—

[Frank Gannon]

How—

[Richard Nixon]

I—

[Frank Gannon]

How—

Day 3, Tape 1
00:32:39
[Richard Nixon]

I—I pointed that out in—in considerable detail in my book The Real War. The real war is being fought today not between the superpowers and not between N.A.T.O. and the United States, for example, and the superpower, because there is no war. There's the absence of war there at the present. But the real war is being fought i—in the so-called Third World, Third World, which has the minerals, which has the energy supplies, the oil and so forth, which has the raw materials that is essential for an industrial survi—society to survive. It's Latin America. It's Africa, both black Africa and North Africa. I—it's the Persian Gulf. It's the Mideastern area. It's South Asia and Southeast Asia. That is where the Communists, particularly the Russians, the Chinese now being supportive but playing a—a less expansionist role than it did previously. But that is where by—war by proxy, through using Cuban troops, war through supporting revolutionary warfare, and so forth and soon—where it's being conducted. And so what we have seen since the fall of Vietnam—we've seen Angola. We’ve seen it work there through support of war by proxy, when the United States Congress refused to honor President Ford's request that we do something to save that—to prevent that from happening. Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen—these are places far away. They don't seem to matter, but when that begins to develop in other areas, it's going to matter very much.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:34:21
[Frank Gannon]

Is it—

Day 3, Tape 1
00:34:22
[Richard Nixon]

And, of course, Nicaragua.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:34:24
[Frank Gannon]

Is it worth American lives to buy time for El Salvador?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:34:29
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, certainly. It's a—it's a small country. I've been there. Sad in many ways, and yet hopeful, too. There are four million people in El Salvador. They're very good people. I was there in 1955. But certainly there were reasons for a revolution to occur, but a revolution which brings more repression and more corruption than they had previously is not what the people of El Salvador deserve, and that's what we're trying to prevent. But I think President de Gaulle, many years as a matter of fact, was very prophetic when he said, "What we have to understand is that the countries of Central America are only incidents on the road to Mexico." So Nicaragua was gone, despite the editorials in our great newspapers to the effect that the Sandinistas were not at the—under the control of the Russians, or at least didn't depend it—upon it, and are not today, and so forth—they are. There's no question about that. Nic—uh—

Day 3, Tape 1
00:35:38
[Frank Gannon]

Direc—

[Richard Nixon]

El Salvador—

[Frank Gannon]

Directly, or just in terms of inspiration?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:35:41
[Richard Nixon]

I think [unintelligible]--

[Frank Gannon]

Do you think Moscow is calling the tune or just setting the—

Day 3, Tape 1
00:35:45
[Richard Nixon]

I think m—I think—I'll put it this way—without Moscow, the Sandinista government could not survive for even one month. And that, I think, tells the story. The—El Salvador, now, it can go. Now, call it ["domino"], call it what you want, but the effect on Guatemala, where there are also dissident elements or terrorists or guerrilla elements, you know, who are trying to overthrow the government—let me say in this respect, I hold no brief for the Guatemalan government, for the Nicar—for, certainly, the previous Nicaraguan government, for the El Salvador government. They had their faults, and some of them were very glaring faults. But, on the other hand, what I do say is that it's the old story. It's the choice between them and somebody worse, or them—rather than between them and somebody better. It doesn't mean that we simply say there we support these governments, right or wrong. We must, of course, use our influence to move them into an age of reform. That has to be the American position, always, and that's the real way to practice human rights. But it's no way to practice human rights to say because this government or that one denies human rights, some human rights, to get rid of it and then to bring in a government that allows no human rights. That's what's happened in Cuba, and that's what happened in Nicaragua, and that's a bad choice.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:37:16
[Frank Gannon]

If it came to an up-or-down decision, and you were president, would you send American troops to El Salvador to save it?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:37:22
[Richard Nixon]

No, sir. There's where the Nixon Doctrine—which I'd like to s—take just a second on, applies. Under the Nixon Doctrine, which I announced in Guam in 1969, I said the problem is that in Korea and in Vietnam, the United States provided the arms, we provided the economic assistance, and most of the men in order to help them defend their freedom from Communist domination. I said, in the future, the United States should provide for our friends who are threatened by Communist insurrection. We should provide arms, we should provide training, we should provide economic aid. But, on the other hand, we should not provide the men, except for technicians who—for training, because if they are unwilling to and unable to fight themselves and win, we shouldn't do the fighting for them. And that is the rule that should apply in El Salvador.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:38:18
[Frank Gannon]

Isn't—

Day 3, Tape 1
00:38:19
[Richard Nixon]

Now there is one exception to the rule.

[Frank Gannon]

Isn't that what's happening, though? We're providing this, and they're getting creamed. For whatever—

Day 3, Tape 1
00:38:23
[Richard Nixon]

I think—

[Frank Gannon]

--reason, they can't—

[Richard Nixon]

I think they're going to survive.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:38:25
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think so?

[Richard Nixon]

I think they're going to survive if we provide the arms. You understand, we have to provide the arms, we have to provide economic assistance, and we also have to provide technical training. Now, understand, those that are fighting against them are not fighting with pitchforks. They're a pretty tough bunch, and they have some very modern weapons, and they're not just ones that have been captured from the government forces. A lot of them have been—are Soviet imports, and, of course, Cuban, and so forth and so on. There's one exception insofar as the so-called Nixon Doctrine is concerned, and that is if a foreign government intervenes, then we have to have a reevaluation, and that, of course, is what happened in Korea. The reason the United States went into Korea is that North Korea attacked South Korea. It was not just a civil war. And the same happened in Vietnam. If the North Vietnamese had stayed out of South Vietnam, there would have been no necessity to keep any American forces there, because it was North Korea—North Vietnamese tanks that rumbled into Saigon when it capitulated, not VC tanks, believe me.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:39:34
[Frank Gannon]

Should President Reagan, then, get on the hotline and tell Yuri Andropov to cool it in El Salvador?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:39:42
[Richard Nixon]

Well, I believe that when a summit occurs, as it in—inevitably will, that it must not be one just zeroed in on the very important area of arms control, but it should be the whole world, the relations of the United States and the Soviet Union economically, the relations of the United States and the Soviet Union to the Mideast, to other areas where our interests happen to collide. We're not going to agree on everything, but we at least can set up a process to avoid war over disagreements. They call that "linkage" and so forth. And people say, "Well, why don't you get arms control alone? Wouldn't that be enough?" And the answer is—not at all. Important—you have to remember that wars do not come because of the existence of arms. They come because of failure to resolve—to—political differences that lead to the use of arms. Therefore, since the purpose of arms control ostensibly is to prevent war, that purpose is not served unless you go to the heart of the question. You have arms control, but then you leapfrog that to the differences that might bring war, and you try to cool those. And we've got to make it very clear to the Soviet that, as far as we're concerned, we can have arms control, we can have better trade relations, we can even help them in non-strategic areas in trade, if they're willing, of course, to cool it in areas that might affect us detrimentally.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:41:14
[Frank Gannon]

How do you react to the charges that we caused, largely during your administration—that we caused serious health damage to our own troops in Vietnam by the use of the chemical defoliant Agent Orange? Do you—and do you think that the government should make financial settlements for soldiers or—or people whose health was affected by Agent Orange in Vietnam?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:41:39
[Richard Nixon]

I have not studied that, but if—if a—an independent study indicates that the government was responsible, of course—course they should make financial settlements. Obviously.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:41:53
[Frank Gannon]

What is it—what does it feel like—it's probably an impossible question to answer, but it's not an impossible question to ask, and I think it occurs to people. What does it feel like to make a decision that leads to the bombing of people? You were under fire in the South Pacific. You—you experienced the—the—the terror and the—the helplessness of that. When you’re in the air-conditioned Oval Office and you're looking at maps, and you're making a decision about sending out a bombing run, do you think—can you think about the people in the—in—in—in the non-air-conditioned jungles that—that are going to be under those bombs?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:42:29
[Richard Nixon]

Yes, you did. I must say that, in terms of Vietnam, however, I at least was able to order the bombing, recognizing that our bombing was very carefully restricted to military targets. In fact, our pilots, many of them, as I pointed out, may have lost their lives due to the fact that we did not allow any area bombing, including the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong. And the records will show that we did carry that out. I remember, though, that President Eisenhower, who had a much more difficult decision, told me that one of the most heart-rending decisions he made was to approve the bombing of Dresden in World War II. Dresden was not a military target, and in one night, thirty-eight thousand people were burned to death because of a firebombing. But the purpose was to discourage the Germans and to bring down Hitler. And it's an awful close question—was it worth it? So I say every president has that problem, but in our case it was not nearly as difficult as the one that President Eisenhower had or that President Truman had when he ordered or approved the bombing with atom bombs of Nagasaki and Hiroshima.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:43:39
[Frank Gannon]

In a—in a—a television documentary, General Westmoreland has been charged with suppressing intelligence estimates and leading a conspiracy to conceal from the president, the Congress, and the people, the actual number and placement of enemy troops in Vietnam in order to convey the impression that we were winning a war that we were in fact losing. How do you react to those charges against General Westmoreland?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:44:04
[Richard Nixon]

Disgraceful. He's filed a libel suit. I hope he wins it. He should. I think that as far as he's concerned—I know him. He was an outstanding commander. He's a by-the-book commander. He would never allow himself to be used politically, I'm sure. I saw him out there in Vietnam to—on a couple of my trips. Now, it is true that what, of course, taints him is the fact that the Johnson administration, as we've pointed out earlier, did not level with the American people as much as it should have, due to pol—domestic political considerations with regard to what was going on and so forth. But you can't blame that on West—General Westmoreland. He would never have done it. I know the man.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:44:54
[Frank Gannon]

Looking back on the American experience in Vietnam from your perspective as—as commander-in-chief and president of the United States and as someone who was there from the—from a very early point, before we even became involved in a military sense—looking at the billions of dollars, the millions of refugees, the hundreds of thousands of casualties, the fifty-seven thousand American dead in Vietnam, and the fact that in a matter of a couple of months the whole thing went down the tubes anyway and the Communists—the Communists won—

Day 3, Tape 1
00:45:27
[Richard Nixon]

A couple of years, I should say.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:45:30
[Frank Gannon]

--was it worth it?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:45:32
[Richard Nixon]

Well, was it worth it—I've, of course, obviously, often asked myself that question during the times I had to make the decisions with regard to Cambodia, with regard to the bombings, and so forth and so on. And particularly I asked myself that question when I met with the next-of-kin of people who had lost their lives and so forth. My answer is that the United States and Vietnam, as we know, going back over twenty-five years, have been entwined together. Fate brought us together in that area after the French left Vietnam. I know a case can be made, and it is made by many, that we shouldn't have gone along with the policy of trying to help Vietnam prevent a Communist takeover, but when you say, "Was it worth it?" my answer is, when you see what has happened since the Communist takeover, there's no question about who was on the right side. More people, for example, many more people have been killed and starved to death in Cambodia, between two and three million, than have been lost by the French, by the Americas, by the North Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese in twenty-five years of warfare in Vietnam. And there were no [Boat People], may I say, when our governments, the ones we were supporting, Thieu, et cetera, Diem—there were no [Boat People]. The traffic was all one-way. Nobody went north. They all came south if they possibly could. The question is who was it on the right—were we on the right side. Were we on the right side? I have no doubt about it when I see what we were trying to prevent. When I see the terrible holocaust that has been visited upon the people of South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, I say that any government with any moral sense whatever was justified in trying to prevent that from happening. And I think history will record, when we get further away from the trauma of defeat, that at—as President Reagan has said, it was a just war, if any war at all is just.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:48:02
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think that the Vietnam vet has got a fair deal?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:48:08
[Richard Nixon]

No, not at all. A fair deal, certainly, in terms of education and perhaps jobs and so forth, and some would even question that. But that isn't the important thing. More important than anything else for a s—for a veteran after he has served there—to be—come back and to be respected, to be appreciated, and many of these fellows came back, and they almost had to slink around in their communities, particularly if they went into the universities and the colleges and so forth, in order to get the education that they were denied due to the fact—for having—going out there. I do not think, in other words, that the Am—that the Vietnam veterans have been properly recognized. That's changing some now, and I hope it changes a great deal more, and that those lucky people, particularly, who didn't serve in Vietnam, quite legally, continued their college education, demonstrated against the war and thereby prolonged the war without intending to do so—I think they should be the first to get in and say, "Thank you, fellows. You did your job, and the country owes you a debt." That's the way I feel about it.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:49:20
[Frank Gannon]

What would you say if you found yourself trapped in an elevator on a—in a ten-story building with a—someone who went to Canada to avoid the draft? What would you say to them now? What would you talk to them about?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:49:36
[Richard Nixon]

I don't know that I can really reconstruct what could happen. I don't know what he would say, what I would say. He would probably be very bitter toward me, because in this case—and I don't want to make an invidious comparison—I was like Lincoln in the Civil War. People talk about the fact that Lincoln, of course—

Day 3, Tape 1
00:50:01
[Frank Gannon]

I think another comparison would come to his mind—

Day 3, Tape 1
00:50:03
[Richard Nixon]

Yeah—

[Frank Gannon]

--but that's—

Day 3, Tape 1
00:50:04
[Richard Nixon]

No, but the point is—I remember Sandburg tells a very moving story. Lincoln was sitting in the White House one day, and a—a soldier came to the front gate. He had fled to Canada rather than serving in the Union forces. He wanted a pardon, and Lincoln said, "No, I will not pardon him. He must go back and serve with his unit until the war is over." That was my attitude toward those that ran to Canada and so forth. I understand why they did it. Some disapproved of the war. Some didn't want to take the risk of it. I understand those things, but on the other hand, let me just say, I think they've got to recognize—I don't mean that they should bear this guilt and wring their hands about it, but let them at least compensate for it by paying proper respect to those that did go. You ought to remember, a few thousand went to Canada and Sweden or what-have-you, but two-and-a-half million Americans went out there to Vietnam. And I'm mighty proud of them, and—and I think we all should be proud of them.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:51:10
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think those—

[Richard Nixon]

Because they were on the right side.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:51:12
[Frank Gannon]

Do you think those thousands that went to Canada and Sweden are as good Americans as the million that w—that served?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:51:19
[Richard Nixon]

I don't know what has happened to them since. At the time they made that decision, no. I think those that served were the better Americans of the two.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:51:27
[Frank Gannon]

Would you allow them just to reenter the society, perhaps to—to expiate just by honoring the people who did serve—

Day 3, Tape 1
00:51:35
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, sure.

[Frank Gannon]

--or should they have to do something more?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:51:37
[Richard Nixon]

No, that's done now. I mean, the point is, President Carter, of course, has—in effect, very early on, made the decision that they should all come back.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:51:48
[Frank Gannon]

Did you agree with that decision?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:51:50
[Richard Nixon]

I wouldn't have, no. But, on the other hand, that's done now, and I think the best thing now is to put that aside. These—these people, I think, deep down, deep down, many of those that went—they—they must have a feeling of remorse, and particularly a feeling of remorse when they see what has happened in Vietnam, in Cambodia. And that is where our intellectual elite, I think—I think their problems are sort of two-fold. They're going through quite a trauma. One, it was a war that most of them in the first instance supported, and then they turned against it. They sabotaged my efforts to get them out. They said it wasn't possible to have peace with honor. When we did get the peace with honor, I think it embarrassed them, but I think—think beyond that, that—that these people have got to have a feeling of remorse, remorse about what happened because, it happens, they were on the wrong side.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:52:57
[Frank Gannon]

Talking about the—the draft evaders and deserters, and talking about people like Jane Fonda and Ramsey Clark, you're very hard to interview because you're so—you—you appear to be so magnanimous or so calm, and yet it doesn't make sense that you—that you can't be passionate and furious about what these people did and the damage that they caused, from—from your point of view, and it's—it's—in a way, it's been through your career, it's—it's—a—and it's got you the worst of both worlds, because to your opponents, it proves that you're phony and hypocritical, and to your supporters, it robs them of the catharsis of seeing you share the anger that they feel at the things that get them angry, which is why they support you. Don' t you feel more passionately about these things?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:53:55
[Richard Nixon]

Yes, I feel quite passionately about it, but I've always had the feeling that you—that it serves no purpose to answer hate with hate. You see Jane Fonda and Ramsey Clark and their faces contorted and all the rest, and so I'm supposed to ret—respond that these people are so terrible and I hate them and so forth. I may feel that.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:54:16
[Frank Gannon]

Don't you think they are?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:54:17
[Richard Nixon]

I may feel that, but I am not going—

Day 3, Tape 1
00:54:19
[Frank Gannon]

FG: Do you?

[Richard Nixon]

--to express it.

[Frank Gannon]

You say—say—if you—

Day 3, Tape 1
00:54:20
[Richard Nixon]

No.

[Frank Gannon]

Again, you've put the qualifier in. You may feel that.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:54:22
[Richard Nixon]

No, what they—

[Frank Gannon]

Don't you—f—from—

Day 3, Tape 1
00:54:24
[Richard Nixon]

I—

[Frank Gannon]

--from everything you say, you have to feel that.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:54:26
[Richard Nixon]

I have very strong feelings about them and what they—I did at the time, what they—particularly what they said about our P.O.W.s, for example. That really infuriated me. On the other hand, it would have not served any good purpose to get down in the gutter with them on that kind of thing. I stayed above it, and I think I am going to continue to stay above it.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:54:50
[Frank Gannon]

What does that—does that take an internal toll to—to have the—the calm and discipline that you have, outwardly? What does that do inside?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:55:03
[Richard Nixon]

Well, it tears you up some. It's a lot of turmoil. But, on the other hand, I think th—I think a leader has to be somewhat different from those that attack him. I've—I've taken quite a banging from the media, from the best and the brightest, over the years and so forth, and sometimes, like in 1962, when I told some of the press what I thought of them, I—except for incidents like that, I have not responded in kind. I've never cancelled, for example, a—a—a subscription to a newspaper because of bad cartoons and editorials. If that were the case, I wouldn't have any newspapers to read. But, on the other hand, I—I think that—let me put it this way. Wh—wh—when you get down in the ring there, when you answer hatred with hatred, you destroy yourself. I think they are destroying themselves with it.

Day 3, Tape 1
00:56:06
[Frank Gannon]

One final question on Vietnam. You resigned the presidency because of Watergate. Without Vietnam, many of the attitudes and elements of Watergate wouldn't have existed. From that point of view, do you feel that you were in any way the last—the last American casualty of Vietnam?

Day 3, Tape 1
00:56:38
[Richard Nixon]

You know, some people have written that. It's an intriguing thesis. I guess I would have to respond this way. As you've already implied, if it had not been for Vietnam, there would have been no Pentagon Papers. There would have been no Ellsberg case. There would have been no Plumbers. There would have been probably no wiretapping, because most of that was really directly related or indirectly related to the need to keep a—a very tight ship during it—during wartime. There would have been no demonstrations, certainly, no demonstrations about Vietnam. So that's one side of it. In that sense, I suppose I could be called a casualty. And then, in another way, too, I guess it would have to be said that, had it not been for Vietnam, the outrage about Watergate would not have been as virulent as it was. After all those—the best and the brightest had been embarrassed by the fact that we ended the war, when they said it couldn't be done, and ended in an honorable way, that we went to China, that we had then arms negotiation with the Soviet Union—some of the things which they had not achieved, and then we won an overwhelming election victory against their candidate, or the candidate of most of them, Senator McGovern, and, as—as they looked at those events, I—I think they began to be concerned, as they should have been, about whether they were to continue to have the role that they had—traditionally have, of being those who controlled and directed a—public opinion and affected the decisions of government in the future. And I would say, in that case, that consequently, when Watergate came, that it was manna from heaven. Now, let me make it clear, Watergate was wrong. It was stupidly handled, and as far as—and we should have been attacked on it. But I would say that when you car—you compare it with what happened previously—and this does not justify it—the virulence of the attackers was to a certain extent due to the fact that we had been through the Vietnam syndrome and probably because we had succeeded when they said we couldn't succeed. Perhaps that's a—a theory that some won't buy. But, incidentally, as far as the last casualty is concerned, I'd like to bring all this esoteric talk—and of course this is that—that psychohistory that I—as you know, I have very little use for. Who—I remember the last casualty, and I would say that it was one of the most moving experiences I had in the White House. I am—am known—I'm considered to be, as you've already implied, a non-emotional person. I know, for example, that it's often said that pol—politicians, political leaders, are monsters of self-control. Well, that isn't quite true. I—Winston Churchill, for example, when he was dictating his great speech about—"We will fight on the beaches. We will fight in the cities. We will fight in our homes. We will never surrender"—the tears were streaming down his cheek, and I remember Eisenhower used to tell me that when Churchill would argue his case before Eisenhower in the high councils, the tears would flow down his cheeks. Well, I am not that way. But I am an emotional man. I—I just believe in controlling it, and I'm pretty good at it. I recall only three incidents when I was unable to control my e—emotions when I was president. One was when Eisenhower died. I don't know yet why it happened, and yet I do, in a way. Mel Laird was in the office. We were discussing the next withdrawal program for Vietnam, or—which had not yet occurred but we were g—wh—wh—which was going to occur in a few months after that, and Bob Haldeman interrupted us. He came in, which he never does normally when I'm talking to anyone else, and I knew it was something important. He said, "Mr. President, the general has just died." And all of a sudden, I—I burst out into tears, and I suppose I should have said something for the ages or that sort of thing, but all I could say was, "He was such a strong man." And the second occasion was one that is a—also been well-publicized, of course—was at the time I resigned, the day I made the resignation speech. I met with my supporters, Democrats and Republicans who had stuck with me on Vietnam and when I went to Russia and to China and so forth, and stuck with me during the Watergate period. And I had to tell them about resigning, and it was a very emotional s—moment. The whole Cabinet Room was packed, and people were hanging on every word, and so I thanked them for what they had done and for the years that we had worked together, because many of them went back over thirty years with me, back to 1947 when I came to the Congress. And finally, as I was reaching the conclusion, I was saying something to the effect that, "I only regret that I have let you down." And I looked across the table, and there was the—Les Arends, who was the minority whip for the Republicans, an old friend, a dear friend from Illinois, and I remember he had his face in his hands and the tears were coming down his cheeks. He was sobbing, and I couldn't control myself. I had to leave the room. Fifteen minutes later, I had to go on national telev—

Day 3, Tape 1
00:01:02
[Action note: Screen goes blank.]

The following text appears in the original transcript but does not appear on a tape. It has not been edited.

[Richard Nixon]

[Previous tape ended in the middle of the word "television."] --ision and make the speech. I still don't know how I did it. The other incident is not known. It involved the last casualty, the really last casualty in Vietnam. The officer—I believe he was an officer—might have been an enlisted man—I don't recall—he had been killed the day before the cease-fire went into effect in Vietnam. And so I was receiving his widow and his two children in the Oval Office. It was difficult. They were such fine-looking people, very dignified, and I tried to tell them in simple words, as simply as I could, how much we appreciated what he had done and how much we regretted the loss that they had suffered. And I said that in the long run, "I think you should know that the nation will recognize that it owes him and all those who died and served with him a very great debt that we can never repay." Well, they got up to leave, and as we got to the door, the daughter—I guess she was about eighteen years old, a pretty thing, sort of vivacious, and reminded me of both Tricia and Julie—and she said, "May I kiss you?" Well, I must say, I broke up. I thought of all the thousands of children of the men who had died, and—

Day three, Tape two of four, LINE FEED #2, 4-8-83, ETI Reel #21
April 8, 1983

Day 3, Tape 2
00:00:59
[Action note: Screen goes black.]

Day 3, Tape 2
00:01:07
[Action note: Picture appears.]

Day 3, Tape 2
00:01:08
[Richard Nixon]

--I must say that, after that conversation, I couldn't have disagreed more with what John Lindsay said when he said our best young men went to Canada. He was dead wrong. I know where our best young men went. They went to Vietnam. They served with honor, and the country is eventually going to honor them, I trust, in the way that they deserve.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:01:46
[Offscreen voice]

Okay, hold positions, everybody. I need to make a quick [unintelligible] stop here, and then we'll continue, so don't leave your positions. [Unintelligible.]

Day 3, Tape 2
00:02:07
[Richard Nixon]

Well, now you've got what? Under the—

Day 3, Tape 2
00:02:12
[Frank Gannon]

We're, uh—

Day 3, Tape 2
00:02:14
[Richard Nixon]

Took a little more time than you expected, huh?

Day 3, Tape 2
00:02:15
[Frank Gannon]

Well, I decided just to take the first hour [unintelligible].

Day 3, Tape 2
00:02:16
[Offscreen voice]

We went further, but I'll tell you, that was [unintelligible].

Day 3, Tape 2
00:02:21
[Frank Gannon]

I don't—I—

Day 3, Tape 2
00:02:22
[Offscreen voice]

I wasn't [unintelligible].

Day 3, Tape 2
00:02:23
[Frank Gannon]

I—I need a few minutes to—

Day 3, Tape 2
00:02:25
[Offscreen voice]

Your lip is fine. It's not perspiring, if that's—

Day 3, Tape 2
00:02:27
[Richard Nixon]

No, no—

[Offscreen voice]

Oh, oh, okay.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:02:28
[Richard Nixon]

Oh—I see.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:02:29
[Offscreen voice]

Every once in a while, you're—you're wiping—

Day 3, Tape 2
00:02:30
[Richard Nixon]

I think I'll go out and get a cup of coffee, if I can.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:02:32
[Offscreen voice]

Okay, can we unwire the president here?

Day 3, Tape 2
00:02:33
[Offscreen voice]

Yes, all right here [unintelligible].

[Offscreen voice]

One second.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:02:36
[Offscreen voice]

We’re going now to the—

Day 3, Tape 2
00:02:37
[Frank Gannon]

I'm going to [unintelligible]--

[Offscreen voice]

--tape playback.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:02:38
[Frank Gannon]

--do the same.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:02:39
[Offscreen voice]

Uh, Frank?

Day 3, Tape 2
00:02:50
[Action note: Nixon gets up and walks off set.]

Day 3, Tape 2
00:03:34
[Action note: Screen goes black.]

Day 3, Tape 2
00:03:36
[Action note: Color bars appear.]

Day 3, Tape 2
00:04:43
[Action note: Screen goes black.]

Day 3, Tape 2
00:05:02
[Richard Nixon]

Eleven thirty-five, twelve thirty-five—

Day 3, Tape 2
00:05:08
[Offscreen voice]

Stand by. One.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:05:11
[Action note: Picture appears on screen. Film clip dialogue:

First speaker: "How do you feel, Senator?"

Second speaker: "How do you feel, Senator?"

Voiceover: "…and declares Richard M. Nixon the Republican nominee for vice president by acclamation."

Cheers; music.]

Day 3, Tape 2
00:05:16
[Frank Gannon]

In this conversation with former President Nixon, we'll cover his vice-presidential years from 1953 to 1961. Why were you chosen as Eisenhower's vice president? What did you bring to the ticket?

Day 3, Tape 2
00:05:32
[Richard Nixon]

Well, he told me years later that what he thought I brought to the ticket was, first, a bridge to younger people, and he was making a great effort to win younger people; second, a possible way to build a bridge between him and the regular Republicans, because he knew that I had considerable support among those regular Republicans; and third, and I think this may have been the decisive factor because at that time domestic Communism was a major issue, he felt that I had credentials in this area. As he put it to me, "You got Hiss, and you got him fairly." And he felt that I therefore would be a good answer to the extremists like Joe McCarthy who didn't care that much about fairness, in his opinion. I think these factors were those that made him make that decision. And, finally, I think, another factor was that he had been told, particularly by Tom Dewey, that I was a pretty good speaker.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:06:33
[Frank Gannon]

How did you and Mrs. Nixon feel about the prospect of becoming national figures, leaving the Senate and becoming a vice president if the ticket won?

Day 3, Tape 2
00:06:44
[Richard Nixon]

Well, her attitude was quite negative actually—not negative in the sense of not being willing to go out and do the campaigning, which she had done so well for the House and Senate, but negative in terms of the fact that we had just been through the Senate campaign, we were looking forward to six years in Washington with our young daughters, a little more peace, not out there fighting battles and so forth. And she knew very well that the '52 campaign would be tough and that from then on we'd be living in a fishbowl. And she didn’t care that much for all that public notoriety.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:07:25
[Frank Gannon]

How did you feel? Were you excited by the prospect?

Day 3, Tape 2
00:07:29
[Richard Nixon]

Mixed emotions. I would have to say yes, because, after all, I was only thirty-nine years old and to even be considered for vice president, particularly running with General Eisenhower, for whom I had enormous respect, was to me something that you only dreamed about. But, on the other hand, I—I was aware of the fact that I was building a career in the Senate, that I had plenty of time, and I wasn't so sure that I wanted to make this move at this relatively early age into a position that—and I had studied a lot of history—that Harry Truman had said was about as useful as a fifth tit on a cow, and Theodore Roosevelt said it's like taking the veil. On the other hand, to answer it, with all these things measured, did I want to do it? The answer is yes.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:08:34
[Frank Gannon]

You got the word that you had been chosen, and—or when you got--when you got the word that you had been chosen, you went to Eisenhower's hotel room to meet him. What was that—what was that meeting like?

Day 3, Tape 2
00:08:49
[Richard Nixon]

Well, for me, quite an emotional meeting, because I had met him before, at the Bohemian Grove in California after I had been nominated for the Senate in 1950, and then in Paris, when I had called on him and had an hour with him when he was serving at S.H.A.P.E. as Supreme Commander.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:09:09
[Frank Gannon]

Didn't you write that at that meeting you were impressed because he was wearing an Eisenhower jacket?

Day 3, Tape 2
00:09:13
[Richard Nixon]

He was not only wearing an Eisenhower jacket, but he was so erect and vigorous and young. What impressed me, too, was another factor that Winston Churchill says is one of the most important attributes that a political figure can have. He said, "When you meet another person," he said, "if you really want to impress him, try to make him feel after you have met him that he has done well rather than that you have done well." And I was really quite impressed by the way that Eisenhower, when I met him, rather than talking about himself—he did answer my questions with regard to S.H.A.P.E. and the rest—that he was very interested in what I had done, asked me about the Hiss case, said he had read Ralph de Toledano and Victor Lasky's book Seeds of Treason, congratulated me on being very fair. I thought right then, he's a pretty coonie fellow.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:10:08
[Frank Gannon]

So you go into the—into the suite at the Blackstone Hotel—

Day 3, Tape 2
00:10:12
[Richard Nixon]

Yes.

[Frank Gannon]

--he shakes your hand, and asks you to join his ticket?

Day 3, Tape 2
00:10:15
[Richard Nixon]

Yes. He—I must say that I had a little bit of an uneasy moment, because when I walked in, I didn't know, really, what to call him. He'd just been nominated for president, and when I had met him previously at the convention, he had attended the California delegation, and of course I called him "General." So I shook his hand and I said, "Hi, Chief," and I could tell he didn't like it. Now the reason I used the term "chief" was not in a derogatory sense, but that is what Herbert Hoover had always been called, and I thought it was a compliment. But President Eisenhower, incidentally, didn't like that kind of a familiar term. I should point out that in the entire period of his presidency, I never called him "Ike." I always called him "Mr. President." And also, after he left the office, I didn't call him "Mr. President." He wanted to be called "General." But I was one of the few of his intimates, as I did become an intimate later on, who never called him "Ike."

Day 3, Tape 2
00:11:13
[Frank Gannon]

Did he consider "general" a higher calling than "president"?

Day 3, Tape 2
00:11:15
[Richard Nixon]

I think he did. I think he did. But, in any event, we sat down, and he—he was quite formal, a—a—and he said—asked me if I would be willing to join his cru—this crusade. Well, I said, of course I would be honored to do so. And then I remember a rather poignant incident that occurred. As we were talking, all of a sudden he snapped his fingers, and he says, "Oh—forgotten something. I've got to resign from the Army." And he called in his secretary--dictated a letter resigning from the Army, and I thought, "Here is fifty years, changing from one career to another," and I also thought in the back of my mind, "I hope he isn't going to be too disillusioned when he gets into the ring in politics," because I knew with Harry Truman on the other side, with Adlai Stevenson, with his rather cutting rhetoric, that it would not be an easy campaign even for Eisenhower.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:12:16
[Frank Gannon]

From that meeting, you went to the convention hall, where you met Mrs. Nixon. We have some film of your arrival at the convention hall and then your nomination as vice president in 1952.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:12:33
[Action note: Clip begins; noisy.]

Day 3, Tape 2
00:12:40
[Frank Gannon]

That's your one suit, eh?

Day 3, Tape 2
00:12:42
[Richard Nixon]

Hmm.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:13:01
[Richard Nixon]

I remember, incidentally, when that demonstration was going on, and it went on and on and on, that I kept telling Joe Martin, I says, "Can't you calm them down?" He turned to me with that sort of Irish twang of his, and he says, he says, "An old saying," he says. "Get in the hay while the sun is shining." And you see there Pat, Mrs. Nixon, kissing me. What had happened was that I was at the Stockyards Inn when I got the word, and she was having lunch with a friend of hers. She got the word—when she got it, incidentally, dropped the sandwich on the floor, she was so surprised—and here we are together.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:13:41
[Frank Gannon]

It must have—

[Richard Nixon]

I can—she hasn’t changed, but I don't think I was ever that young.

[Action note: They both laugh.]

Day 3, Tape 2
00:13:47
[Frank Gannon]

Will you ever be that young again?

Day 3, Tape 2
00:13:50
[Richard Nixon]

Possibly.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:13:52
[Frank Gannon]

That must have been a heady moment for you, for both of you, to--to be standing in front of a national convention and—for the first time. Of course, you'd been in the House and you'd been in the Senate, so you'd campaigned, but to hear all those people cheering for you to become a national—to become the vice president.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:14:07
[Richard Nixon]

Well, the first time, of course, is the one that is always the mountaintop experience. Not that everything else is downhill, but there is nothing that equals it. For example, people ask which--which election gave me the biggest thrill. It wasn't being elected president. It was being elected to the Congress. That was really a big thrill.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:14:27
[Frank Gannon]

So you remember.

[Richard Nixon]

And the same thing is true here. I addressed this convention, and--and then I addressed the 1956 convention, the 1960 convention, 1964, when I introduced Goldwater, 1968, '72. All were memorable. The excitement of the crowd and so forth—it really gives you a lift. It turns on the adrenaline if it wasn't already there. But nothing like the first time. Nothing like the first time.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:14:46
[Frank Gannon]

We have a photograph of the two nominees at the—that night receiving the acclaim of the convention. (Pause as they look.) Do you remember that moment?

Day 3, Tape 2
00:15:11
[Richard Nixon]

Oh, I remember it very well. That's a very famous picture, too. It was used all over the country on posters and that sort of thing.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:15:18
[Frank Gannon]

You look very happy.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:15:19
[Richard Nixon]

Well, I was happy, and I—I must say, though, that I sensed when I held the general's arm up that he resisted it just a little. Oh, he didn't indicate displeasure, but that—he didn't quite like it. And later on I learned that, in watching him over the years, that Eisenhower didn't like people to manhandle him, to grab him, and so forth. He had a great sense of dignity and also of privacy. He wasn't the average politician in that respect. I remember, too, that he was very different in another way. He had a famous smile, and he appreciated a good joke, but it really turned him off if a joke was off-color—really turned him off. He felt that that was an insult to the presidency, to the office that he held, and he never would laugh at one. And, also, he didn't like any humor when it was a serious situation or a serious subject. I recall vividly very early on a briefing of the legislative leaders with regard to our civilian defense program, and all the numbers were put out about the number of missiles that might fall on the United States and all that sort of thing, and why we had to have a civilian defense program, and Senator Gene Milliken, who had a wry sense of humor, from Colorado, after the briefing was continued, he—concluded, he said, "Well, you know, after hearing this briefing, Mr. President," he said, "I think what we all ought to do is to paint our asses white and run with the antelope." And Eisenhower—everybody else laughed, but not Eisenhower. He sort of smiled a bit, and he said, "Well, Gene," he said, "let me say we may not have time to paint our asses white if the bombs begin to fall and we aren't prepared for it."

Day 3, Tape 2
00:17:22
[Frank Gannon]

After the convention, you—you went to Colorado for a fishing vacation with Eisenhower to plan the campaign, and this—this film of that—that event. Was that one of your favorite vacation memories?

Day 3, Tape 2
00:17:37
[Richard Nixon]

No, I don't think it was one of mine, except for the dinner that Eisenhower cooked. He was a gourmet cook, and he wouldn't allow anybody else up there with him. There were about ten of us that were up there at this camp in the mountains, and he cooked, I remember, a—a—a beef sirloin and potatoes. He let somebody else peel the potatoes. That was the only thing he didn't do. But otherwise, he did it all. It was marvelous. But also he insisted that I learn to fish. I had never hunted or fished in my life, and so, having to learn to fish, and trout fishing, fly casting—that was really starting in the major leagues when I should have, probably, started with something much easier. And I remember he got me out there and showed me how to cast. I tried it about six or eight times, but when I brought the thing back and it caught him in his jacket once, he gave up on me and I gave up. I've never tried it since.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:18:31
[Frank Gannon]

The—you kicked off your campaign with a whistle-stop train tour up the coast of California, in California, and the first day out a--you got zapped by a bolt from the blue. A headline in the New York Post newspaper said, "Secret Nixon Fund: Secret Rich Men's Trust Fund Keeps Nixon in Style Far Beyond His Salary." This was the—the first shot in what became known as the "Fund Crisis." What was this secret rich man's fund?

Day 3, Tape 2
00:19:06
[Richard Nixon]

Well, first, the headline was very misleading in three characteristics: the fund was not secret, it was not a rich man's fund, and the purpose of the fund was not to keep me in a style far beyove—far above what I could afford. As a matter of fact, it was a routine fund, which were very common in the Congress then, and even more so today, which took care of political expenses that could not be properly charged to the government. For example, and this is hard to think, if you were to tell a senator today from California that the government only paid for one round trip a year between Washington and California, he'd say, "I really can't serve in the office." Today, I think it's ten or twelve that they allow. But, in any event, this fund of eighteen thousand dollars had been set up after I won the Senate campaign so that I could conduct a year-round campaign and get back to California. It paid for some of my travel expenses. It—it paid for some of my mailings. It paid for some extra office help to handle the huge volume of mail that I received as a new senator from California. Absolutely nothing went for personal purposes. It was not secret. It was—Mr. Dana Smith and—my finance chairman in the '50 campaign—sent over--several thousand letters to supporters all over the state. And it was not a rich man's fund, either. As far as that's concerned, there were some rich men that contributed to it, but the limit on the contributions was five hundred dollars. The average contribution was two hundred and forty-three dollars. Nevertheless, all that being said, once the headline appeared, it really created a firestorm.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:20:52
[Frank Gannon]

It later turned out that there was a—a Stevenson Fund, that Governor Stevenson had a fund of his own. What were the differences between the Nixon Fund and the Stevenson Fund?

Day 3, Tape 2
00:21:03
[Richard Nixon]

Well, it's interesting to—how we learned about the Stevenson Fund. After I had gone on—on my campaign train up into Portland and it was decided that I return to Los Angeles to make a nationwide broadcast, the so-called "Checkers speech," as it later came to be known—on the way down, as I was working on my notes, Murray Chotiner, my campaign manager, slipped into the seat beside me, says, "I don't want to interrupt you," he says, "but, you know, I kind of smell a rat here. Here Stephen Mitchell"—who was the Democratic National Chairman—"has asked you, has demanded that you get off the ticket. Several newspapers have. Several of the leading Democratic officials have. But Stevenson is not saying a word. I smell a rat." And sure enough, the next day, it was a--the rat exposed himself. What had happened—I don't mean Stevenson was the rat, but, in any event, the next day it became known that contractors doing business with the state had contributed to a Stevenson Fund. Stevenson office immediately put it—out a story to the effect—well, this fund was different, because it was solely for the purpose of supplementing the salaries of people on his staff who couldn't otherwise serve in state government if they didn't have this sa—salary supplementation, and it indicated that the fund was eighteen thousand dollars only. Well, the press, in one of the rare t—times when they did not have a double standard, asked Stevenson for a press conference so that he could explain his fund, just as I was going to explain mine on television. They petitioned him, as a matter of fact, and he just flat turned it down. It was only years later, long after Stevenson was dead, that his authorized biographer, John Bartlow Martin, disclosed that the fund was much bigger and very different from the one that had been admitted in the campaign. It was for eighty-four thousand dollars. The major contributors put up five thousand dollars. They did so with the expectation, no promise, but expectation, that they might get business from the state. It was not used solely for political purposes. It was used, for example, to pay for Stevenson's annual Christmas parties. It was used for the purpose of hiring an orchestra for a dance that his sons were having. And under the circumstances, therefore, the fact that it was being used for personal purposes as well as political purposes totally distinguishes it from my fund. Now, in retrospect, therefore, it seems that—that I have the best of the argument, but Stevenson had the media with him. And so it took a—a—it took a broadcast which went over the heads of the media, in fact, over the heads of the politicians, to win the day.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:24:05
[Frank Gannon]

What was Eisenhower's reaction when he got word of the—of the Post story, because, of course, one of the things you were running on was—or running against, was the—

Day 3, Tape 2
00:24:16
[Richard Nixon]

The mess—

[Frank Gannon]

--scandal-ridden corruption of the—

Day 3, Tape 2
00:24:17
[Richard Nixon]

--the mess in Washington.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:24:18
[Frank Gannon]

--mess in Washington, the Democratic administration. How did he react?

Day 3, Tape 2
00:24:21
[Richard Nixon]

Well, I wasn't there, but all that I knew—that I didn't hear anything from him. Sherman Adams called. Jim Hagerty called. I didn't take their calls. I wasn't going to be fobbed off on some aide. Even though I was just thirty-nine years of age, I knew better than that, but I heard, for example, that Herbert Hoover had made a supportive statement. I had a nice wire from Warren Burger, who later became chief justice. I had a wire from Jerry Ford, who later became president, and a very warm statement made by Bob Taft, when he said he didn't see what was wrong. And he says, "This is something that seems to be a regular pattern, and the only question is whether or not he was affected by his votes, and it appears that he was going to vote the way most of his supporters wanted him to vote anyway. He'd been elected by them. These were his supporters." But nothing from Eisenhower.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:25:12
[Frank Gannon]

Were you surprised or hurt by Eisenhower's silence?

Day 3, Tape 2
00:25:15
[Richard Nixon]

Uh—not hurt to an extent, but then, as I thought it through—not necessarily surprised or hurt, because I realized he was not a politician. A—and I realized, too, from what I later heard that he was under terrific heat. There were some people on his staff who did not approve of my being on the ticket in the first instance. They preferred a more liberal candidate than I was, and also Eisenhower was very sensitive about the media. He'd always had a very good press when he was in Europe, and he was very sensitive about it. And so, consequently, when he learned that the press had taken t—a poll and, by a margin of forty to two, said that Nixon should get off the ticket, as Stephen Mitchell had demanded, and as the New York Herald Tribune, a Republican paper, as well as the Washington Post, a Democratic paper, had demanded, he then told the press in an off-the-record session that there was going to be no attempt here to whitewash Nixon, that he had to come out clean as a hound's tooth. He also made the point that he had confidence that—of my integrity. So that's all I heard. This was not from him directly. It's what I was reading in the play—in the papers. In other words, he was saying, in effect, though—I could read between the lines—not that I was innocent till I was proved guilty, but that I had to prove my innocence. In other words, there was the presumption of guilt. I had to prove that I was clean as a hound's tooth.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:26:45
[Frank Gannon]

When did you finally hear from him or d—or did you finally hear from him? And wh—

Day 3, Tape 2
00:26:51
[Richard Nixon]

Well—

[Frank Gannon]

--what did you decide to do?

Day 3, Tape 2
00:26:52
[Richard Nixon]

Well, the way it worked was this. Murray Chotiner had suggested to me that I should use the money that was allocated for a vice-presidential TV program to answer the charges. Tom Dewey called me, told me—he said, "Eisenhower's advisors are a hanging jury as far as you're concerned." And he said, "I think what you ought to do is to go on TV and ask the people to indicate whether they support you or not," which was—which was exactly the way Murray had come down. So, up to this time, I still hadn't heard from Eisenhower, and finally in Portland, I got a call from him. It was a very friendly call. He says—d—said, " I understand it's rather difficult." And I said, "Yeah, it hasn't been easy." He then went on to say that he wanted me to make the decision as to whether or not I should stay on the ticket and so forth. He said, "After all, you've got a lot of support in this country." He said, "I don't want it to appear that I have knocked you off and condemned an innocent man." I then went on to say, well, I'd be willing to leave if it would serve his interests or the interests of the ticket, but he said no, that was not the way it should be done, that I should make the decision. Well, the conversation went on for a while, and finally, he s—came up with the same suggestion that Tom Dewey had made, except he elaborated on it. He said, "Not only answer the fund, but," he said, "tell the country everything you have ever received, how much money you have earned, what it's been used for, what your worth is," and so forth. He said, "I advise that that be done," which was shrewd advice. And I said, "Well, General, I'll be glad to do that because I've got nothing to hide." I said, "But once I've made the broadcast," he said, "then can we make a decision?" He said, "No," he says, "I think we should take three or four days to see how it goes." I said, "Well, General," I said, "the problem here is the indecision." I said, "We've really got to get it decided because otherwise it's going to be ballooned bigger than it i—even is at the present time." And then I sort of blew my top a bit, and I says, "You know, there comes a time you either have to shit or get off the pot." Well, from me, a thirty-nine-year-old senator to say this to the supreme commander of Europe forces, a great war hero whom I admired enormously, a presidential nominee who was going to be president, was pretty shocking. He took it rather well, though, and his last words were, "Keep your chin up." So that was that.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:29:31
[Frank Gannon]

So you decided to—to make a national television speech.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:29:35
[Richard Nixon]

Yes.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:29:36
[Frank Gannon]

You had to go back to Los Angeles to do it, and you've described the moments just—just as you were getting ready to go to the studio, you received a phone call from a Mr. Chapman.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:29:48
[Richard Nixon]

Yes. Mr. Chapman was Governor Dewey's code name. You know, even in those days I guess people were afraid that they were being tapped or what-have-you, and I wouldn't put it past some of our friends on the other side. But, be that as it may, he called and said, "This is Mr. Chapman." I knew it was Dewey, and I was scheduled to go out on the television, to the studio, in thirty minutes, and I was working on my notes. The speech, incidentally, was to be in three sections. I should make—lay the groundwork for that. First, I was going to explain the fund, as I've explained it earlier. Second, I was going to release all material with regard to everything I had earned and what I owned and what I didn't own and so forth, which of course virtually qualified me for—for food stamps, if we'd have had food stamps in those days, because I didn't have much. And, third, I was going to go on the attack and take on Stevenson for his fund and also point out why it was very important to have Eisenhower rather than Stevenson as president. I had it all worked out and had made the notes and so forth. So this call came in from Dewey, and Dewey said, "Dick," he said, "I--I don't agree with this, but," he said, "I think you should know that Ei—Eisenhower's advisors have all met, and they unanimously agree that you should resign from the ticket." I said, "Well," I said, "it's a little late to hear that." He said, "I think probably that's what you should do." And he said, "I think further that what you should do is resign from the Senate, and then what you should do is to announce you're going to resign from the Senate and then run for reelection so as you can be vindicated in reelection." It was getting a little unreal at that point, because Dewey was a pro, he was a friend, and so forth. So I just didn't say a word. There must have been about a two-minute, or at least one-minute silence, and then Dewey said, "Well, what are you going to do?" I said, " Governor, I don't know what I'm going to do. Just tell your friends to listen to the broadcast." End of conversation. Well, that was a rather traumatic experience, and I went to the studio, and I must say I—just before going in at—or getting a little preparation for it, we were sitting in the control room, and Mrs. Nixon, Pat, was sitting with me, and I said, "Gee, I just don't think I can do this." She put her hand over and says, "Yes, you can." She's a very strong person. So we walked out to the set together, and I made the famous fund speech, or infamous, as my critics would say.

Day 3, Tape 2
00:32:24
[Frank Gannon]

Two of the most famous images from that have to do with Mrs. Nixon's coat and the cocker spaniel puppy—we have—that—that gave the speech its name. We have two c